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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Working group (Lunch Seminar)

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIE (Graduate Students International Economics) Lunch Seminar

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

Migration

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

Parisian Seminar of Game Theory

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du mois de septembre 2017

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Working group (Lunch Seminar)

Du 29/09/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

ESTRADA Ricardo ()

*


TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 28/09/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00

salle R1-11, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris

RIVERA Thomas (HEC)

Robust Mechanisms for the Regulation of Bank Risk





This paper aims at designing mechanisms for the regulation of bank risk (probability of default) that can guarantee robustness to large misspecifications of the regulators information regarding the bank's assets. Assuming banks can (on average) discern the true level of risk of the other regulated banks, I construct a robust mechanism that allows the regulator to bound the worst case probability of bank failure by any arbitrary amount. In doing so, I show that any informationally robust mechanism must necessarily require banks to issue subordinated debt to other regulated banks and must provide a way to guarantee a minimal probability of joint bank failure between at least two of the banks. We show how the regulator can achieve the latter objective by providing a single bank with an explicit guarantee against losses in the event that another bank fails and how, when coupled with a minimum subordinated debt requirement and interest rate ceiling, such a guarantee can ensure an arbitrarily low probability of any regulated bank's failure. Finally, I discuss how the results are affected when banks have biased estimations of other banks' risks and the best bound on bank risk that the regulator can achieve given such biases.

Travail et économie publique externe

Du 28/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45

HANDBURY Jessie (Wharton - University of Pennsylvania)

Is the focus on food deserts fruitless? Retail access and food purchases across the socioeconomic spectrum





Using comprehensive data describing the healthfulness of household food purchases and the retail landscapes consumers face, we ask whether spatial differences in access are to blame for socioeconomic disparities in nutritional consumption. We find that differences in access, though significant, are small relative to differences in the nutritional content of sales. Household consumption responds minimally to improvements in local retail environments in the short run, and socioeconomic disparities persist among households with equivalent access. Our results indicate that even in the long run, access-improving policies alone can eliminate at most one fifth of existing disparities in nutritional consumption.

Behavior seminar

Du 28/09/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00

PSE 48, boulevard Jourdan 75014 PARIS Salle R2-21

SINGH Juni (PSE)

Understanding choices under coarse feedback: a lab experiment


EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Du 28/09/2017 de 11:00 à 12:30

MSE-PARIS 1, Room 116

AVRAM Silvia (ISER, U. Essex)

The role of taxes and benefits in smoothing income shocks



écrit avec Mike Brewer




We examine the extent to which the tax benefit system in the UK smooths income shocks across the life cycle between 1991 and 2008. Using the BHPS, we first estimate six different income concepts ranging from individual gross earnings to net household (equivalised) disposable income. For each income concept, we then decompose its variance into three components-heterogeneous growth, permanent shocks and transitory shocks. We then quantify the extent to which variance in income due to heterogeneity, permanent and transitory shocks is affected by four types of policy instruments, namely taxes, contributory benefits, means-tested benefits and other (mainly disability) benefits. Preliminary results show that the UK tax benefit does play an important role in reducing income variance, especially the portions attributable to heterogeneity and to a (lesser extent) permanent shocks. Contributory benefits have the strongest effects, more than halving the variance attributable to heterogeneity and permanent shocks; other benefits and means-tested benefits also reduce considerably the variance due heterogeneity but appear to have a minimal effect on the variance of shocks, either permanent or transitory. Taxes play no role in the reduction of income variance.

Economic History Seminar

Du 27/09/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)

Middleman, Minorities and Ethnic Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Russian Empire



écrit avec Irena Grosfeld and Seyhun Orcan Sakalli

Paris Trade Seminar

Du 26/09/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15

ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405

TREFLER DAN (Toronto)

*Trade and Innovation: The Role of Scale and Competition Effects



écrit avec Kevin Lim & Miaojie Yu

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 26/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

ZHU Shenghao ( National University of Singapore)


GSIE (Graduate Students International Economics) Lunch Seminar

Du 25/09/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00

Salle S/3, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris

KAZAKOVA Ekaterina (Mannheim)

*


Régulation et Environnement

Du 25/09/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

LISKI Matti (Aalto University)

Carbon leakage: a mechanism design approach



écrit avec co-author: Lassi Ahlvik (NHH, Bergen)



Texte intégral

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 21/09/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00

salle R1-13, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan - 750145 Paris

BOBTCHEFF Catherine (TSE-CNRS)

Insurance Pools for Undiversifiable Risks



écrit avec David Alary (TSE) and Carole Haritchabalet (Université de Pau)




Abstract : This paper discusses the decision of the European Commission not to renew the antitrust exemption for the setting up of syndicates in the insurance industry. Pools are constituted to provide insurance for undiversifiable and/or new risks for which insurers with private expertise are capacity constrained. Our objective is to study if such syndicates improve insurance supply. Organizing this supply amounts to sharing a common value divisible good between capacity constrained and privately informed agents with a reserve price. Pools turn out to operate as a uniform price auction with an “exit/re-entry” option that we compare to a discriminatory auction where no specific agreements are needed. Both auction formats lead to different coverage/premium tradeoffs. If at least one insurer provides an optimistic expertise, the pool offers both lower premiums and higher coverage. This result is reversed when all insurers are pessimistic about the risk. Static comparative results with respect to capacity constraints and reserve price are provided

Behavior seminar

Du 21/09/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00

PSE 48, bld Jourdan 75014 PARIS Salle R2-21

LAPORTE Audrey (University of TORONTO)

Why Should Rational Smokers Find it Difficult to Quit?  Introducing Uncertainty into the Rational Addiction Model





One problem with the Becker-Murphy model of Rational Addiction, at least in the eyes of many public health specialists, is that it does not explain why so many rational, forward looking, smokers should apparently find it so hard to quit, especially since the terminal conditions are part of an intertemporal optimization problem.  In this paper we apply techniques of stochastic control theory to introduce uncertainty into the individual’s perception of how her stock of addiction will accumulate over time as a consequence of her time path of smoking.  We assume that addiction capital is basically unobservable, so she cannot adjust her smoking behaviour according to a feedback policy rule but instead builds uncertainty into her consumption plan from the beginning.  We discuss the differences between the equation explaining her lifetime smoking trajectory in the deterministic and stochastic cases, and find that the quadratic utility function which underlies the familiar lead-lag consumption form of rational addiction equation is not, in fact, capable of allowing for the type of uncertainty which we consider here.

Behavior Working Group

Du 21/09/2017 de 09:30 à 10:30

Development Economics Seminar

Du 20/09/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00

salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

SUKHTANTAR Sandip (University of Virginia )

General Equilibrium Effects of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence from India



écrit avec Karthik Muralidharany and Paul Niehausz




Abstract Public employment programs play a large role in many developing countries' anti-poverty strategies, but their impact on poverty reduction will depend on both direct program effects as well as indirect effects through changes induced in market wages and employment. We estimate both e ects, exploiting a large-scale experiment that improved the implementation of India's rural employment guarantee scheme. Despite constant scal outlays, the earnings of lowincome households rose 13.3%, driven overwhelmingly by market (90%) as opposed to program earnings (10%). Low-skilled wages increased by 6.1% and days without paid work fell 7.1%, while migration, land utilization and prices were una ected. The market effects on wages, employment, and income also spilled over into neighboring sub-districts, and estimates that adjust for these spillovers are substantially larger, typically double the unadjusted magnitudes. These results highlight the importance of general equilibrium e ects in program evaluation, and the feasibility of studying them using large-scale experiments.

Economic History Seminar

Du 20/09/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

ASANTE Kofi (IAAST)

Fiscal Imperative and Colonial Power in the 19th Century Gold Coast


PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Du 19/09/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00

GUILLOT Malka (PSE)

The 75% tax on wages above 1 million in France: what behavioural responses?


Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 19/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

SOLOW Ben ()

Labor Market Effects of the Affordable Care Act: Evidence from Tax Notches



écrit avec Kavan Kucko & Kevin Rinz




States that declined to raise their Medicaid income eligibility cutoffs to 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) created a “coverage gap” between their existing, often much lower Medicaid eligibility cutoffs and the FPL, the lowest level of income at which the ACA provides refundable, advanceable “premium tax credits” to subsidize the purchase of private insurance. Lacking access to any form of subsidized health insurance, residents of those states with income in that range face a strong incentive, in the form of a large, discrete increase in post-tax income (i.e. an upward notch) at the FPL, to increase their earnings and obtain the premium tax credit. We investigate the extent to which they respond to that incentive. Using the universe of tax returns, we document excess mass, or bunching, in the income distribution surrounding this notch. Consistent with Saez (2010), we find that bunching occurs only among filers with self-employment income. Specifically, filers without children and married filers with three or fewer children exhibit significant bunching. Analysis of tax data linked to labor supply measures from the American Community Survey, however, suggests that this bunching likely reflects a change in reported income rather than a change in true labor supply. We find no evidence that wage and salary workers adjust their labor supply in response to increased availability of directly purchased health insurance.



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Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 18/09/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

MYLOVANOV Tymofiy (University Pittsburgh) *;

La séance est annulée

Régulation et Environnement

Du 18/09/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00

Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

TOEWS Gerhard(Oxcarré, Oxford University)
MAVI Can Askan(Univ. Paris I - PSE)

Resource discoveries and FDI bonanzas: An illustration from Mozambique



écrit avec Pierre-Louis Vézina, King's College London



Texte intégral

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 14/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Campus Jourdan - Salle R1-09

CAROLI Eve (Université Paris Dauphine)

Escaping Social Pressure on Dismissals: the Role of Fixed-Term Contracts


Development Economics Seminar

Du 13/09/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00

salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

WILLIS Jack (Harvard University )

Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya



écrit avec Lorenzo Casaburi




The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate for pay-at-harvest insurance is 72%, compared to 5% for the standard pay-upfront contract, and take-up is highest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes provide evidence on the role of liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk. Finally, evidence from a natural experiment in the United States, exploiting a change in the timing of the premium payment for Federal Crop Insurance, shows that the transfer across time also affects insurance adoption in developed countries.

Economic History Seminar

Du 13/09/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

MILHAUD Cyril (PSE)

Fragmentation of capital markets in early modern Spain? Composite monarchies and their jurisdictions


Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 12/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

GUYON Nina ()

Is Desegregation Possible? Evidence from Social Housing Demolitions in France


Behavior seminar

Du 07/09/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00

PSE 48, bld JOURDAN salle R2-21

ESPINOSA Romain (Université Paris 2, CRED)

Laws and Norms: Experimental Evidence with Liability Rules?





We conduct an experiment where participants choose between actions that provide private benefits but may also impose losses on strangers. Three legal environments are compared: no law, strict liability for the harm caused to others, and an efficiently designed negligence rule where damages are paid only when the harmful action causes a net social loss. Legal obligations are either perfectly enforced (Severe Law) or only weakly so (Mild Law), i.e., material incentives are then nondeterrent. We investigate how legal obligations and social norms interact. Our results show that liability rules strengthen pro-social behavior and suggest that strict liability has a greater effect than the negligence rule.

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 05/09/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

TEYSSIER Geoffrey ()

Inequality of Opportunity: New Measurement Methodology and Impact on Growth


Behavior Working Group

Du 01/09/2017

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)




This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.