Agenda du séminaire Economic History Seminar
Economic History Seminar
Le 15/05/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1.09
Comment écrire une histoire économique sans archives ? Comment évaluer des volumes de production ou de consommation à partir de chiffres parfois nombreux mais disparates, recensés dans des régions différentes et dans des conditions souvent imprécises, voire douteuses ? Comment comparer des prix quand les monnaies diffèrent d’une région à l’autre, en incluant des monnaies « privées », circulant sur les marchés et plus ou moins tolérées par les autorités locales ? Bref, qu’est-ce qu’une histoire économique sans quantification fiable ? C’est à ce défi qu’est confronté l’historien de la Chine impériale au tournant du premier et du second millénaires, alors que les textes et l’archéologie attestent que l’empire des Song connaissait un essor sans précédent de l’économie marchande, soutenue par un développement des instruments financiers dont le premier papier-monnaie émis à partir de 1024. Le présent exposé cherchera à montrer que l’interprétation des données disponibles, y compris chiffrées, permet cependant de mettre en évidence la cohérence des mécanismes qui permit aux différents échelons de l’État dynastique de diversifier leurs finances tout en faisant de la Chine un des grands carrefours des échanges asiatiques.
LAMOUROUX Christian (EHESS) Histoire économique et données en miettes — comment écrire l'histoire économique de la Chine des Song (960-1279) ?
Economic History Seminar
Le 22/05/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1.09
This paper studies technology absorption around the world in the late nineteenth
century. We construct several novel datasets to test the idea that the codification of
useful knowledge in the vernacular was necessary for countries to absorb the technologies
of the Industrial Revolution. Using the rapid and unprecedented codification
of useful knowledge in Meiji Japan as a natural experiment, we show that productivity
growth in Japan was higher in industries that had a higher supply of Western
useful knowledge, but only after the Japanese government undertook a large public
good investment to provide this knowledge to its citizens. We find no similar patterns
in other parts of the world which did not codify knowledge. Taken together,
our findings shed new light on the frictions associated with technology diffusion, and
offer a novel take on why Meiji Japan was unique among non-Western countries in
successfully industrializing during the first wave of globalization.
*
JUHASZ Reka (UBC) Codification and Technology Absorption: Evidence from Trade Patterns
écrit avec Réka Juhász, Shogo Sakabe, David E. Weinstein,
Economic History Seminar
Le 05/06/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R2.01
SALEH Mohamed (LSE) *
Economic History Seminar
Le 12/06/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1.09
MOSHRIF Rowaida (PSE) Long-run Land inequality and Land Reform in Egypt (1896-2020)
Economic History Seminar
Le 19/06/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1.15
Do candidates who share a tribal identity with voters outperform candidates who do not? Considerable research has examined this question in the Middle East, but in many of these key cases autocratic regimes supported political institutions that reinforced tribal ties, making it hard to discern the independent effect of tribal identity on voter behavior. We revisit this question in (at the time) democratic Tunisia, where post-independence governments tried to uproot tribal identity, making it a “least likely” case to uncover tribal influence on election outcomes. To estimate the effect of tribal influence on voting, we match an historical dictionary of Tunisian tribes to surnames from the universe of both registered voters and candidates from Tunisia’s recent local elections (2018). We find preliminary evidence consistent with the claim that tribal affiliations do “matter:” lists whose candidates share a tribal identity with the underlying population consistently outperform lists who do not share this identity. Our work suggests that despite decades of policies designed to suppress tribes, tribal identity exerted a measurable effect on local politics during a period of democratic transition
KOEHLER-DERRICK Gabriel () Tribal Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from 6 Million Tunisian Voter Records
Economic History Seminar
Le 26/06/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1-15
PHATTHANASINH Emmanuel () Un déclin de Paris sous Louis XIV ? Étudier les dynamiques urbaines à travers les prix des loyers
Economic History Seminar
Le 03/07/2024 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
R1.09
To be politically viable, a Revolution needs the support of key interest groups that benefit from the survival of the new regime. The redistribution of clergy property during the French Revolution created a group –the new owners of clergy assets- whose wealth depended on the Revolution’s fate, thus increasing political support for the Revolution. This land redistribution policy had long-run consequences on political support for republicanism. Using data on elections during the beginning of the Third Republic, we show that the sale of clergy assets during the French Revolution substantially reduced support for anti-Republican candidates. Our results suggest that Republicans may not have prevailed in the 1870s without the liquidation of the Church's wealth 80 years earlier. The sale of Church assets reduced Catholic worship and increased Protestant worship. We use the presence of monasteries prior to the Reformation and the Commercial Revolution as instruments to suggest our findings are causal. Finally, we rule out a reduction in landed inequality as the main channel explaining the effect of this revolutionary land redistribution on politics and ideology.
ROUANET Louis (University of Texas at El Paso in the Department of Economics and Finance.) Long live the Republic: The political consequences of revolutionary land redistribution