Agenda du séminaire Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 06/05/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
Consider an economy with equal amounts of N types of goods, to
be allocated to agents with strict quasi-convex preferences over lotteries. We show that ex-ante, all feasible and Pareto efficient allocations
give almost all agents binary lotteries. Therefore, even if all preferences are the same, some identical agents necessarily receive different
lotteries. Our results provide a simple criterion to show that many
popular allocation mechanisms are ex-ante inefficient. Assuming the
reduction of compound lotteries axiom, social welfare deteriorates by
first randomizing over these binary lotteries. Efficient full ex-ante
equality is achieved if agents satisfy the compound independence axiom.
DILLENBERGER David (UPenn) Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences
écrit avec Uzi Segal
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 13/05/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
R1-09
We link two approaches to biased belief formation: non-Bayesian updating rules and model misspecification. Each approach has advantages: updating rules transparently capture the underlying bias and are identifiable from belief data; misspecified models are `complete' and amenable to general analysis. We show that misspecified models can be decomposed into an updating rule and forecast of anticipated future beliefs. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an updating rule and belief forecast to have a misspecified model representation, show the representation is unique, and construct it. This highlights the belief restrictions implicit in the misspecified model approach. Finally, we explore two ways to select belief forecasts---introspection-proof and naive consistent---and derive when a representation of each exists.
HAUSER Daniel (Aalto) Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification
écrit avec Aislinn Bohren
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 27/05/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
LIZZERI Alessandro (Princeton) *
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 03/06/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
R1-09
MATEJKA Filip (CERGE-EI) *
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 10/06/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
R1-09
LIU Ce (Michigan State University) *
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Le 17/06/2024 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
R1-15
NUNEZ Mathias (CREST - Ecole Polytechnique) *