Calendrier

Lu Ma Me Je Ve Sa Di
01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08 09 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30          

Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Agenda

Archives du séminaire Behavior Working Group

Behavior Working Group

Le 25/04/2024 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R2-21


Combining response times to choice data helps reveal preferences when decision-makers make mistakes. Evidence accumulation models, such as the Decision Diffusion Model (DDM) or the Linear Ballistic Accumulator, generate a joint distribution of choice and response times given a set of alternatives and their utility. These models have been shown to fit equally well empirical data for a given choice set. However, they generate diverging predictions about the effect of changing the utility of an alternative. In this paper, I clarify theoretically how utility enters these models and how they can be used for revealing preferences. I characterize evidence accumulation models by their range – the set of all distributions that can be generated - and their contrast - the extent to which increasing the utility of one alternative slows down the choice of another. Evidence accumulation models have a similar range, but disagree on the contrast. One implication is that all these models would be equally suitable for revealing preferences if their contrast was properly calibrated.. I propose a tractable framework for this aim and give general conditions under which it is applicable. I illustrate my theoretical results with simulated data from a DDM model.

Mayaux Damien, Mayaux Damien () Utility and Contrast in Evidence Accumulation Models

Behavior Working Group

Le 05/04/2024 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE ( Salle 115)


Previous research has established the central role of an individuals' locus of control (LoC) in influencing subjective well-being. However, earlier studies have predominantly omitted an exploration of potential moderating factors at the country-level and have rarely delved into the influence of LoC on an important yet often-overlooked dimension of well-being—namely, subjective well-being inequality. Addressing these gaps, this study examines the association between individuals' LoC and subjective well-being, considering both the mean and inequality aspects. Additionally, it explores the moderating influence of country’s social values, particularly the individualism-collectivism dimension. Utilizing data from the Integrated Values Survey, comprising 170,000 individuals across 37 countries from 1996 to 2022, our study confirms a strong positive relationship between LoC and subjective well-being while also unveiling a strong negative relationship with subjective well-being inequality. Moreover, it demonstrates that country’s social values exert significant moderation effects on the relationship between LoC and subjective well-being, affecting both the mean level and inequality aspects, albeit in opposing directions. By employing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, our findings support the importance of structural effects. Understanding how increasing LoC shapes people’s wellbeing in a society holds implications for policymaking and contributes to ongoing discussions on collective choice and inequality

Fernandez-Urbano Roger () How Locus of Control Predicts Subjective Well-being and its Inequality: The Moderating Role of Social Values

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/02/2024 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R1-09

DA COSTA Shaun () *

Behavior Working Group

Le 12/01/2024 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE Salle 114


Surveys, ballot measures, donations, and consumer spending alike reveal a growing concern for the welfare of animals. What is driving this phenomenon? Does it follow a general shift toward more universalist attitudes, or are social preferences for humans and animals substitutes? I propose a representative survey experiment to measure the distribution, interdependence, and determinants of universalist attitudes toward various human or animal out-groups. Attitudes would be elicited in two ways: (1) via previously validated hypothetical money allocation tasks between an in-group member and an out-group representative; (2) by allowing respondents to make donations to NGOs that focus on a specific out-group. Subjects would be randomly exposed to a narrative about a direct, positive interaction between an in-group member and an out-group member. This would allow to study the role of perceived distance to the out-group in shaping other-regarding preferences

SCHÜTZ Rafael () The limits to universalism

Behavior Working Group

Le 14/12/2023 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R1-14


In this paper, we study whether variations in gender norms and, significantly, separating the effects of 1st and 2nd order beliefs can affect attitudes towards the preferential promotion of women to senior-level positions. We examine whether providing information on what others believe to be socially acceptable (2nd order) and information that may change personal beliefs (1st order) impacts attitudes towards promoting women. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that aims to disentangle the causal effect of 1st and 2nd order beliefs separately in the context of gender norms

Lago Rodríguez Manuel Estevo () Unraveling Gender Norms: The power of information provision on the preferential promotion of women

Behavior Working Group

Le 17/11/2023 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

SALLE 115 , MSE


For health-related matters, being misinformed leads individuals to make bad decisions. In politics, it is less obvious. Although misinformation has been shown to influence voting decisions, this is not necessarily a deviation from rational voting. An individual might indeed be tricked into a non-rational voting decision, or motivated to opt for the candidate who maximises the utility of their vote. Our aim is to explore the extent to which different kinds of misinformation obstruct rational voting. We propose to study rational voting in the laboratory, as it allows us to control for important factors that are inevitably imprecisely measured using survey data.

Vardaxoglou Laurence () Effect of misinformation on voting in the laboratory

Behavior Working Group

Le 19/10/2023 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R1-14


Discrimination is often believed to be the result of deep-seated prejudice against a minority, or of beliefs that can only change upon the revelation of new information. But social context — in particular, how people behave differently in groups — may be a more important determinant of discrimination than traditional theories of discrimination suggest. This paper shows that involving majority-group members in a group discussion and hiring decision can sharply reduce hiring discrimination against a stigmatized minority. I focus on discrimination against the transgender community in India, a highly visible and economically vulnerable group. In a control condition, participants on average sacri?ce almost double their daily food expenditure to avoid selecting a transgender individual to deliver food to their home. But if they were earlier involved in a group discussion and collective hiring decision with two of their neighbours, they no longer discriminate at all, even when making subsequent choices in private. This effect is stronger than the effect of informing people about the legal rights of transgender people, and the reduction in discrimination partially persists until around 1 month later. The results appear to be driven by the emergence of a strong pro-trans norm in the groups, supported by pro-social reasons for selecting transgender workers that persuade others to discriminate less.

WEBB Duncan () Silence to Solidarity: Using Group Dynamics to Reduce Anti-Transgender Discrimination in India

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/09/2023 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE salle S18


Online marketplaces are full of salient-yet-ambiguous marketing cues that steer consumers towards specific items. Platforms enjoy great freedom in choosing how cues look like (visual design) and which products they are assigned to (attribution mechanism). I study in an online choice experiment the effect of some visual design / attribution mechanism pairs on consumer choice and welfare. My main hypothesis is that, for some visual designs that are overtly positive - a golden thumb, a green circle - participants tend to follow blindly the cue no matter if it is assigned on good or bad items, while for some other visual designs that are salient but less positive - a blue road sign or a message in black font with capital letters - participants perform better than without the cue when it is on the best items and comparably to this baseline otherwise.

Mayaux Damien () Welfare effects of salient marketing cues

Behavior Working Group

Le 09/03/2023 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Anllo Hernan () Outcome context-dependence is not WEIRD: Comparing reinforcement- and description-based economic preferences worldwide

Behavior Working Group

Le 10/11/2022 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Huang Yuchen, Zhexun Mo Fred, Belguise Margot () Meritocracy for the Meritocrats: an Experiment on the Cultural Interpretation of Meritocracy

Behavior Working Group

Le 13/10/2022 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

DEKEL Amit () Testing myopic and farsighted stability concepts: a network formation experiment

Behavior Working Group

Le 15/09/2022 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

STAROPOLI Carine () Impact des tarifs sur les choix de mode de transport

Behavior Working Group

Le 23/06/2022 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

WEBB Duncan () Laws, Norms, and Discrimination: Gay Rights in India

Behavior Working Group

Le 15/04/2022 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE

Korda Hélène () *

Behavior Working Group

Le 18/03/2022 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE (114)

Saucet Charlotte () *

Behavior Working Group

Le 24/02/2022 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan

Huang Yuchen () *

Behavior Working Group

Le 17/02/2022 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan

Chavez Emmanuel () *

Behavior Working Group

Le 04/02/2022 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE (114)

GALBIATI Roberto () Moral behavior: a tale of two images

Behavior Working Group

Le 21/01/2022 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE (114)

Scarelli Thiago () Financial Concerns and Labor Income Discounting

Behavior Working Group

Le 24/06/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

Lobeck Max () Redistributive Preferences when Inequality is an Externality

Morten Nyborg Stostad

Behavior Working Group

Le 27/05/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00




Despite scientific consensus, there is no unanimity among citizens in the beliefs about climate change. Understanding how people form beliefs about climate change and what drives their interpretation of climatic events is essential, especially in developing countries and among agricultural communities, who may most suffer from climate change consequences. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh matched with objective drought data, this paper studies how long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations shape belief formation and accuracy in recollecting past drought events. In order to further investigate how agents interpret these past drought events, I use an instrumental variable approach to test and validate that individuals are subject to confirmation bias. The results show that the probability of overestimating the number of past drought events and the intensity with which individuals overestimate are significantly biased in the direction of their prior beliefs. The findings highlight the need of models that account for behavioral factors such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning to study climate change preference formation, and its implications for effective communication.

Zappalà Guglielmo () Drought exposure and accuracy: Motivated reasoning in climate change beliefs

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/04/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92401995708?pwd=SjU2ZnNWYzh0QnhuNXI4eG56ZXpEZz09

SALAMANCA Andrés () Values of games without transferable utility: An experimental approach

Behavior Working Group

Le 25/03/2021 de 11:30:00 à 12:30:00

Charroin Liza () Rumors diffusion in the lab

Francis Bloch (PSE) and Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech)

Behavior Working Group

Le 11/03/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MUN Sofiia () Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?

Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)

Behavior Working Group

Le 17/12/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/91585525960?pwd=b0Evc2l2VlpuKzJiV1J6T2FSVTRDZz09

Tzintzun Iván () The Causal Effect of Physical Activity on Health in Early Adulthood: A Gene By Environment Instrumental Variables Approach

Lise Rochaix

Behavior Working Group

Le 26/11/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

Zoom TBA

Comola Margherita () Bidding on Links: Experimental Evidence on Multi-object Auctions

Behavior Working Group

Le 13/11/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

Charroin Liza, Comola Margherita, Charroin Liza () Anticonformism: An experiment with matching pennies

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/04/2020 de 15:00:00 à 16:00:00

Lobeck Max () Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution

Behavior Working Group

Le 19/03/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

Lobeck Max () Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)

Behavior Working Group

Le 28/02/2020 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

MSE, Room B2-1

RACHIDI Tobias () Double-sided opportunism in infrastructure investment

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Marian Moszoro

Behavior Working Group

Le 30/01/2020 de 10:30:00 à 11:30:00

R2-20

Mun Soffia () Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/11/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00

MSE Salle S/1

Mikel Hualde () On the aversion to incomplete preferences. An axiomatic approach

Behavior Working Group

Le 23/05/2019 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Jourdan, R2-20

Lobeck Max () Principals' Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents

Behavior Working Group

Le 21/03/2019 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Jourdan R1-14

Mun Soffia () Risk and Ambiguity Preferences: Attitudes of the Self and Beliefs About Others

Behavior Working Group

Le 21/02/2019 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Palminteri Stefano, Basile Garcia () Learning to speculate: A neuroeconomics approach (R1-13)

Behavior Working Group

Le 20/12/2018 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Jourdan, R1-11

Jacquel Pierre () The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach

Behavior Working Group

Le 15/11/2018 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Compte Olivier () A war game

Behavior Working Group

Le 26/10/2018 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

MSE S/18

Wang Olivier () Information curse in financial forecasting

Behavior Working Group

Le 27/09/2018 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

Jourdan: R1-14

Comola Margherita, Merlino Luca Paolo () Social and economic inequality

Behavior Working Group

Le 17/05/2018 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R2-20

Cetre Sophie () Do incentives conflict with fairness

Behavior Working Group

Le 12/04/2018 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Campus Jourdan, R1-16

HEMON Antoine () Should We Take Experimental Recommendations at Face Value ? Social Image Motivation & Self-Sorting in a Public-Good Experiment

Behavior Working Group

Le 29/03/2018 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

Singh Juni, Giulio Iacobelli () Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal

Behavior Working Group

Le 08/02/2018 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

Lobeck Max () An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility

Behavior Working Group

Le 18/01/2018 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

BOUACIDA Elias () Pay-for-certainty, an experiment to elicit (in)complete preferences

Behavior Working Group

Le 14/12/2017 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

salle R1-10, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

LASLIER Jean-François, ARRONDEL Luc, DUHAUTOIS Richard () The shooter anxiety at the penalty kick

Behavior Working Group

Le 30/11/2017 de 11:30:00 à 12:30:00

salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

Comola Margherita, Rusinowska Agnieszka , Villeval Marie Claire () An experiment on strategic targeting in networks

Behavior Working Group

Le 12/10/2017 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00

R1-15

ETILÉ Fabrice () Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions

Behavior Working Group

Le 21/09/2017 de 09:30:00 à 10:30:00

Boulu-Reshef Béatrice, beatrice.boulu-reshef@univ-paris1.fr () Test

Behavior Working Group

Le 01/09/2017 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00




This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.

Boulu-Reshef Béatrice, beatrice.boulu-reshef@univ-paris1.fr () Behavior Working Group

Behavior Working Group

Le 23/06/2017 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris

Boulu-Reshef Béatrice, beatrice.boulu-reshef@univ-paris1.fr () "Evaluating average confidence (psychology) towards a bargaining task (economics)"

Behavior Working Group

Le 01/06/2017 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

Dorin Camille () Socio-economic status and redistribution behavior: an experiment

Behavior Working Group

Le 27/04/2017 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

Boulu-Reshef Béatrice, beatrice.boulu-reshef@univ-paris1.fr () An experimental approach to preventive behavior

Behavior Working Group

Le 23/03/2017 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

Room R1-14, Jourdan

ETILÉ Fabrice, YIN Rémi () Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment

Behavior Working Group

Le 03/02/2017 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

Room 115, Maison des Sciences Economiques

BOULU-RESHEF Béatrice () Towards the management of donors: Experiments in the lab and in the field on charitable donations to a Arts firm

Behavior Working Group

Le 01/12/2016 de 11:00:00 à 11:45:00

A2 room, Jourdan

SENIK Claudia () Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion

Behavior Working Group

Le 25/11/2016 de 10:00:00 à 10:45:00

B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

HEMON Antoine () Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments

Behavior Working Group

Le 13/10/2016 de 10:45:00 à 11:45:00

DSS room, Building B, 2nd floor, Jourdan

BOUACIDA Elias () Indifference or Indecision: an Experiment using Choice Correspondences

Behavior Working Group

Le 00/00/0000 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00

B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

HEMON Antoine, Vardaxoglou Laurence, SAVEY Lily () Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments