Calendrier du 04 avril 2024
Du 04/04/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 04/04/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
XEFTERIS Dimitrios (University of Cyprus)
Information aggregation with delegation of votes
écrit avec Amrita Dhillon, Grammateia Kotsialou, Dilip Ravindran
Liquid democracy is a system that combines aspects of direct democracy and representative democracy by allowing voters to either vote directly themselves, or delegate their votes to others. In this paper we study the information aggregation properties of liquid democracy in a setting with heterogeneously informed truth-seeking voters -- who want the election outcome to match an underlying state of the world -- and partisan voters. We establish that liquid democracy admits equilibria which improve welfare and information aggregation over direct and representative democracy when voters' preferences and information precisions are publicly or privately known. Liquid democracy also admits equilibria which do worse than the other two systems. We discuss features of efficient and inefficient equilibria and provide conditions under which voters can more easily coordinate on the efficient equilibria in liquid democracy than the other two systems.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 04/04/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-21
PHILIPPE Arnaud (Bristol University)
Building Criminal Networks in Prison Evidence from French cellmates
This paper examines the impact of prison connections on re-incarceration, using comprehensive data on prisoners' cell assignments in France from 2016 to 2022. It documents that having one additional cellmate with a drug-related conviction increases re-incarceration for drug crimes ((+7.1%) in the year after release) while encountering an extra cellmate with property crime convictions raises the probability of property crimes ((+5.2%)). The number of other cellmates has no effect, and other types of recidivism remain unaffected. Peers encountered in prison also affect where infractions eventually occur. Lastly, the influence of cellmates is more pronounced when they share similar characteristics.
Behavior seminar
Du 04/04/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2-21
SHALVI Shaul (Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam)
Ignorance by Choice: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Underlying Motives of Willful Ignorance and Its Consequences
People sometimes avoid information about the impact of their actions as an excuse to be selfish. Such “willful ignorance” reduces altruistic behavior and has detrimental effects in many consumer and organizational contexts. We report the first meta-analysis on willful ignorance, testing the robustness of its impact on altruistic behavior and examining its underlying motives. We analyze 33,603 decisions made by 6,531 participants in 56 different treatment effects, all employing variations of an experimental paradigm assessing willful ignorance. Meta-analytic results reveal that 40% of participants avoid easily obtainable information about the consequences of their actions on others, leading to a 15.6-percentage-point decrease in altruistic behavior compared to when information is provided. We discuss the motives behind willful ignorance and provide evidence consistent with excuse-seeking behaviors to maintain a positive self-image. We investigated the moderators of willful ignorance and address the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our findings on who engages in willful ignorance, as well as when and why