Calendrier du 09 avril 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/04/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEB Rahul (University of Toronto, combined with TSE)
Screening (#FakeNews) in the Attention Economy
A substantial fraction of the online economy is financed by attention: frequently, consumers do not pay for the content they access and, instead, clicks are monetized by content providers (via advertising). We study a novel dynamic principal-agent framework in which the principal (a consumer) decides in each period if she should pay costly attention to the agent (a content provider), privately known to be genuine or fake. Genuine providers choose whether or not to release stochastically arriving content of varying quality whereas "fake news" sources can generate fake news at will. The consumer's payoff depends on the (publicly observed and quality dependent) realized accuracy of the content. Our main result demonstrates how the presence of fake news sources distorts the behavior of genuine content providers: in all equilibria (subject to a mild refinement), both poor quality content (by genuine providers) and fake news (by fake news sources) must occur on path. These distortions are features of the attention economy and do not arise if the principal can commit or use transfers.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/04/2018 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S19 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
HASANNUDIN ZENATHAN (Paris 1 )
*
Régulation et Environnement
Du 09/04/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAGNEPAIN Philippe (Université Paris 1, PSE)
Market power and volatility in the airline industry
écrit avec With A. Belova, P. Gagnepain, et S. Gauthier
In a strategic game where firms compete against each other, the set of rationalizable strategies for each player entails all the best responses to the other’s decisions. The theoretical litterature
has suggested that the uniqueness of the rationalizable outcomes coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game. This paper proposes an empirical test of the existence of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly. We focus on the U.S. airline industry and develop a theoretical model of competition on each route. It is assumed that airlines are not always able to predict perfectly the behavior of the competitors which can result in multiplicity of rationalizable outcomes. Based on the supply and demand ingredients of our model, we construct a stability criterion which guarantees uniqueness. We conclude that more than 90% of the local markets observed in the U.S. airline industry have reached the unique possible Nash equilibrium. As a by-product, we also identify the main determinants which prevent firms from reaching an equilibrium. We show in particular that local markets which include a higher number of competitors are the ones where the quantity produced is more volatile.