Calendrier du 11 janvier 2018
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 11/01/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
LANDAUD Fanny (NHH)
From Employment to Engagement? Stable jobs, Temporary Jobs and Cohabiting Relationships
Over the past forty years, it has become increasingly difficult for young men and women to enter the labor market, especially with a permanent contract. In parallel, men and women are waiting longer to get married or enter a first cohabiting relationship. To shed light on the connection between those two trends, this paper develops a timing-of-events analysis using Abbring and van den Berg empirical model (Abbring and van den Berg (2003)). This analysis shows that both stable and temporary jobs increase the instantaneous probability to enter a first cohabiting relationship, but the impact of a first stable job is much stronger than the impact of a first temporary job (it is about 3 times larger). Also, the impact of a first job is similar across gender for younger cohorts, while it used to be much stronger for men than women for older cohorts. Finally, among younger cohorts there are little effects that go from cohabiting relationships to employment, whereas the employment chances of women in older cohorts used to be strongly negatively impacted by cohabitation.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/01/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
VEIEL Rafael ()
Strategic Type Spaces
Universal type spaces provide a representation of players’ information that allows to derive the set of interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions in any game. They also provide the appropriate structure for the study of ICR sensitivity to information. However, the resulting procedure to compute the set of ICR actions in a given game is often unnecessarily complex, as the universal type space contains types that are redundant for this game. Furthermore, no representation equivalent to the universal type space is known for alternative solution concepts such as interim independent rationalizability (IIR). We offer a way to study the set of rationalizable (in the sense of ICR or IIR, or other) actions in any given game. We introduce strategic type spaces as minimal representations of all strategically relevant information that allow to derive the set of rationalizable actions in this game. These strategic type spaces are characterized by a network structure, and provide an adequate framework for studying sensitivity of strategic behavior to information.