Calendrier du 15 février 2018
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MACé Antonin (PSE)
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TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
CHONé Philippe (ENSAE)
Partial exclusivity
écrit avec joint with Laurent Linnemer and Thibaud Vergé
This papers offers a new rationale for exclusive agreements. Long-term business partners have a common interest to agree on an option to deal on an exclusive basis, while keeping the possibility to revert to a competitive process (auction) should the surplus of an internal deal turn out to be low. Partial exclusivity occurs in equilibrium in the sense that competition takes place with positive probability. Although there is no rent extraction à la Aghion and Bolton (1987), such lock-up agreements harm competitors (and total welfare) by depriving them of business opportunities. Compared to Bulow and Klemperer (1996), the possibility of long-term contracting calls into question the efficacy of auctions relative to negotiations
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
PHILIPPE Arnaud (Bristol University)
Incarcerate one to calm the others? Spillover effects of incarceration among criminal groups
What is the effect of incarcerating a member of a group on her criminal partners? I answer this question using administrative data on all convictions in France between 2003 and 2012. I exploit past joint convictions to identify 34,000 groups. Using a 48-month individual panel that records later criminal activity and sentencing, I find that the incarceration of a peer is associated with a 5% decrease in the conviction rate in groups of two individuals. Exploiting within-group heterogeneity, I show that offenders who have the characteristics of leaders are not affected by their followers but exert influence on them. Lastly, I show that the effect derives from lower criminogenic behavior and not from a loss of criminal human capital or from better information on the risks associated with crime.
Texte intégral
Behavior seminar
Du 15/02/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
Jourdan salle R2-21
ADVANI Arun (University College London)
nsurance Networks and Poverty Traps
Poor households regularly borrow and lend to smooth consumption, yet we see much less borrowing for investment. This cannot be explained by a lack of investment opportunities, nor by a lack of resources available collectively for investment. This paper provides a novel explanation for this puzzle: investment reduces the investor's need for informal risk sharing, weakening risk-sharing ties, and so limiting the amount of borrowing that can be sustained. I formalise this intuition by extending the canonical model of limited commitment in risk-sharing networks to allow for lumpy investment. The key prediction of the model is a non-linear relationship between total income and investment at the network level -- namely there is a network-level poverty trap. I test this prediction using a randomised control trial in Bangladesh, that provided capital transfers to the poorest households. The data cover 27,000 households from 1,400 villages, and contain information on risk-sharing networks, income, and investment. I exploit variation in the number of program recipients in a network to identify the location of the poverty trap: the threshold level of capital provision needed at the network level for the program to generate further investment. My results highlight how capital transfer programs can be made more cost-effective by targeting communities at the threshold of the aggregate poverty trap.