Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 17/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1-09 Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

MEHMOOD Sultan (New Economic School)

Judiciary’s Achilles Heel: Executive Control via Appointment Power

How does an increase of executive constraints impact the judiciary? We exploit a change in judicial selection procedure in a weak democracy, from the president selecting the judges to the selection of judges through a judicial commission, to ascertain the causal effects of an increase in executive constraints on judicial independence. By exploiting the across-district and over-time variation in reform exposure generated by random exit of judges, we are able to ascertain the causal effect of this reform on judicial outcomes. We find that this reform has a large effect on judicial independence. In particular, we show that the change in the selection procedure of judges caused a 20% reduction in state victories. This increase in independence does not come at the expense of increased case delay. Furthermore, the analysis of mechanisms reveal that the steepest fall in state victories occurred in less politically connected districts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the new appointment procedure also incentivised the incumbent judges to adjudicate against the state more often, though less so than the judges appointed under the new selection procedure.