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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 18 mars 2024

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 18/03/2024 de 17:00 à 18:30

R1-09

ORTOLEVA Pietro (Princeton)

When to decide: Timing of choice in Parallel Search



écrit avec Can Urgun

Econometrics Seminar

Du 18/03/2024 de 16:15 à 17:30

CREST

WINDMEIJER Frank (University of Oxford)

The Falsification Adaptive Set in Linear Models with Instrumental Variables that Violate the Exclusion or Conditional Exogeneity Restriction





Masten and Poirier (2021) introduced the falsification adaptive set (FAS) in linear models with a single endogenous variable estimated with multiple instrumental variables (IVs). The FAS reflects the model uncertainty that arises from falsification of the baseline model. We show that it applies to cases where a conditional exogeneity assumption holds and invalid instruments violate the exclusion assumption only. We propose a generalized FAS that reflects the model uncertainty when some instruments violate the exclusion assumption and/or some instruments violate the conditional exogeneity assumption. If there is at least one relevant instrument that satisfies both the exclusion and conditional exogeneity assumptions then this generalized FAS is guaranteed to contain the population parameter of interest in large samples.

Paris Migration Economics Seminar

Du 18/03/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1-14

GOBBI Paula(Université Libre de Bruxelles)
D AMELIO Tommaso(Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Inheritance and Migration: Evidence from 19th Century Italy





In the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, Italy experienced extensive emigration flows that have been affecting the life and the economy of the country until today. In this paper we show that inheritance rules affected decisions regarding migration at the time. We exploit the quasi natural experiment provided by the Napoleonic invasion and the consequent introduction of the Code Civil, and the variability across the peninsula, to perform a difference-in-differences analysis. To do so, we build three novel datasets: one on the use of impartible inheritance at pre-unitary state level, one on inheritance practices among noble families from testaments, and one on migration before the unification of Italy, obtained through genealogical data. At the state level, we find that the change from impartible to partible inheritance led to an increase in the probability of migrating between 5 and 15%. At the family level, we perform a triple difference estimation based on the information on the inheritance practices of the nobility. For noble families, turning to partible inheritance increased the probability of migrating out of Italy by 20%.

Regional and urban economics seminar

Du 18/03/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-09

SINGH Abhijeet (PSE)

*


Régulation et Environnement

Du 18/03/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-09

SINGH ABHIJEET Manpreet (PSE)

Supplier rationing and allocation efficiency: case of renewable energy auctions in India





This paper studies allocation efficiency of auctions for solar and wind energy capacity creation, conducted by Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). These auctions have helped create 54 gigawatts of renewable electricity capacity in India. SECI’s auctions usually have large procurement targets, which are beyond the capacity of a single firm. The auctions are open descending bid format, where bidders publicly reveal their capacity constraint and bid on the selling price of their electricity. The market clearing price is the one with least excess demand, and a residual award is provided to the last exiting bidder. In this paper, I show that such rationing rule and asymmetric capacities of bidders lead to inefficient allocation. I further use SECI’s bidding data to structurally estimate the cost distribution of the bidders, and through a simple simulation exercise, show that a sealed bid version reduces probability of inefficient selection by 20-33 percent points without affecting the payoffs.