Calendrier du 19 mars 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 19/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
YARIV Leeat (Princeton University)
On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets
écrit avec with SangMok Lee
Stability is often the goal for matching clearinghouses, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. We study the wedge between stability and utilitarian efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a rich preference class. The speed at which efficiency of stable matchings converges to its optimum depends on the underlying preferences. Furthermore, for severely imbalanced markets governed by idiosyncratic preferences, or when preferences are sub-modular, stable outcomes may be inefficient asymptotically. Our results can guide market designers who care about efficiency as to when standard stable mechanisms are desirable.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 19/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MAYOL Alexandre(PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne )
MILLOCK Katrin(PSE)
Accelerating diffusion of climate-friendly technologies: a network perspective
écrit avec with Solmaria Halleck Vega and Antoine Mandel
Abstract 1: We introduce a methodology to estimate the determinants of the formation
of technology diffusion networks from the patterns of technology
adoption. We apply this methodology to wind energy, which is one of the
key technologies for climate change mitigation. Technology diffusion occurs
at the firm level, but it is influenced by policy and we study how policy
affects network formation at a country level. Our results emphasize that
long-term economic and trade relationships, as measured in particular by
economic integration, are key determinants of technological diffusion. Specific
support measures seem less relevant for the diffusion per se, although
they might play a crucial role from an industrial perspective.
Abstract 2: This article analyzes how the local political organization (in France, the level of the single municipality, the union of communes (Syndicats) or supermunicipality (communaut de communes) and the management mode (public or private) can influence the performance of the public service. The impact of these organizational configurations on costs has never been studied simultaneously by the literature. We first propose a theoretical model based on a principal-agent problem to analyze them together. Then, from a panel of French water services, we observe empirically that these different organizational ombinations have an impact on the price.