Calendrier du 23 novembre 2017
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 23/11/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R1-09
KEISTER Todd (Rutgers University)
Bailouts, Bail-ins and Banking Crises
écrit avec Yuliyan Mitkov (Rutgers University)
Texte intégral
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
GUILLOT Malka ()
Who payed the 75% tax on millionaires? Optimization of salary incomes and incidence in France
Using several administrative datasets, I study the impact of temporary tax on top wage income earners, implemented for 2013 and 2014 only and known as the "75% tax above 1 million euros''. The tax takes the form of a new marginal tax rate of 50% on gross annual salary income above one million euros, which translates into an increase by 10ppt of the overall top marginal tax rate on wage earners from 64% to 74%. About 400 employers paid the tax each year and about 1000 employees were concerned. I document that the incidence of the tax was shared among employers and employees. Yet, the bigger the firm, the more incident on employers it was. Conversely, the smaller the firm, the larger the incidence on wage. Taking advantage of the short term nature of the tax, I show that the tax triggered important optimization response of wage earners, taking the form of time-shifting. I do not see any income-shifting nor any migration response. I study the elasticity of the pre-tax labour income to the net-of-tax rate (1 minus the marginal tax rate) and find an elasticity of 0.3, that I interpret as pure optimization.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle H402, Sciences Po - 28 rue des Saints-Pères, Paris 75007
SUNDE UWE (University of Munich )
Malaria Risk and Civil Violence
écrit avec joint with Matteo Cervellati and Elena Esposito
Using high-resolution data from Africa over the period 1998-2012, this paper investigates the hypothesis that a higher exposure to malaria increases the incidence of civil violence. The analysis uses panel data at the 1o grid cell level at monthly frequency. The econometric identification exploits exogenous monthly within-grid-cell variation in weather conditions that are particularly suitable for malaria transmission. The analysis compares the effect across cells with different malaria exposure, which affects the resistance and immunity of the population to malaria outbreaks. The results document a robust effect of the occurrence of suitable conditions for malaria on civil violence. The effect is highest in areas with low levels of immunities to malaria. Malaria shocks mostly affect unorganized violence in terms of riots, protests, and confrontations between militias and civilians, rather than geo-strategic violence, and the effect spikes during short, labor-intensive harvesting periods of staple crops that are particularly important for the subsistence of the population. The paper ends with an evaluation of anti-malaria interventions.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PREVET Antoine (PSE/Université Paris 1)
Information Management by a Budget constrained Principal
This paper contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features: a limited budget. In a principal-agent model with moral hazard and bounds on transfers, I study an information design problem where the principal can either choose to be transparent and fully reveal information before the agent takes action, or remain opaque. On the one hand, transparency makes it possible for the principal to engage her limited budget only when the expected gain is worth the implementation cost. On the other hand, opacity does not allow for tailor-made contracts but rather ensures optimal incentives. I show that transparency is more likely to be optimal for the principal when the task is less valuable and the budget is lower. Furthermore, the optimal information structure is derived, requiring that the agent be told only what action to undertake.