Calendrier du 26 mars 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 26/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GUERDJIKOVA Ani (Université de Grenoble)
Heuristic Modes of Decision Making and Survival in Financial Markets
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 26/03/2018 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S19 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
LIGONNIERE Samuel (ENS Paris Saclay)
Fisherian Deflation and Debt Maturity
How does debt maturity structure affect Fisherian deflation? By introducing debt maturity in a Fisherian deflation model, I demonstrate how it could trigger financial crises. Using a stock-flow analysis, I show that long-term debt could alleviate the risk of current binding collateral constraint, but an excessive reliance could generate future binding collateral constraints over long horizons. It is empirically confirmed by a study based on 122 developing countries over the period 1970-2012. I highlight that debt maturity structure is a good early-warning indicator of Fisherian deflation, which provides information that adds up to the level of external debt.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 26/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Sara (MIT)
Regulatory Distortion: Evidence from Uber’s Entry Decisions in the US
There is a large and long-standing literature on the distortionary effects of regulations on the functioning of markets. A newer strand of this literature focuses on licensing regulations, such as state-specific licensing of teachers and hairdressers. We seek to add to this literature with the specific case of ride-hailing services, such as Uber. We assemble a new and comprehensive data set of
250 US cities and their regulations regarding hackney services. We specify a stylized profit model for Uber, which is a function of these regulations, and estimate the parameters of the profit function using observed Uber entry decisions into these cities. Our data set and empirical strategy allow us to estimate the differential effects of particular types of regulations, separating out regulations governing safety, governing operations, and erecting entry barriers. We find that safety regulations do not have a distortionary effect on the functioning of the market for hackney services and evading them does not increase Uber’s profits. We find evidence that Uber’s profits are increased, however, by their ability to evade regulatory entry barriers and regulations governing operations. In other words, those regulations do have a significant distortionary effect on the market.
To the extent that safety-related regulations are welfare-enhancing and those erecting entry barriers are welfare-decreasing, our results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of Uber’s entry.