Calendrier du 26 avril 2018
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 26/04/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
MAAREK Paul (University of Cergy-Pontoise)
Ethnic Favoritism: Winner Takes All or Power Sharing? Evidence from school constructions in Benin
écrit avec Co-authors: Pierre André and Fatoumata Tapo
Ethnic favoritism often distorts public policies in fractionalized countries, especially in Subsaharan Africa. We estimate the impact of a change in the ethnic group of the education minister and of the president on school construction in Benin. We estimate difference in differences and regression discontinuities based on the dates of the changes, and we find that school constructions are more frequent when the district is coethnic with a new education minister, but less frequent when the district is coethnic with a new president. The effects are very large in magnitude: a coethnic education minister approximately doubles the number of school constructions, a coethnic
president approximately divides this number by two. These results suggest that the president does not systematically favor his own ethnic group but has to share power in order to survive. By appointing politicians from other ethnic groups in the government, she redistributes power to these groups, as ministers have the discretionary power to favor their own group. This specific pattern of ethnic favoritism vanishes after the democratization of Benin, in 1991. The checks and balances created by democracy seemingly prevented ethnically targeted public policies.
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