Calendrier du 29 mars 2018
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
MICHELACCI Claudio (Einaudi Institute)
*
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
CARANTINO Benjamin (Paris School of Economics)
The Carbon Footprint of Suburbanization: Evidence from French Household Data
écrit avec Co-authors: M. Lafourcade and C. Blaudin du Thé
How does urban form impacts households' fuel consumption and driving emissions. We answer this question using French survey data between 2001 to 2011. The use of these three rich individual surveys helps control for selection issues, as some households may live in a location consonant to their socioeconomic characteristics or travel predispositions. In addition, we also use instrumental variables to control for simultaneity between fuel consumption and population settlements. The results suggest that, by choosing to live at the fringe of a metropolitan area instead of a city-center, the sample mean-household bears an extra-consumption of approximatively six fuel tanks per year. More generally, doubling residential density results in an annual saving of approximatively two tanks per household, but this gain might be larger if compaction is coupled with smaller distances to city-centers, improved public transport and reduced pressure for road construction in the metropolitan area. Moreover, the relationship between urban population and driving emissions is bell-shaped: small cities compensate lack of either density or mass transit systems by job-housing centralization.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
PASCALI Luigi (U Pompeu Fabra)
Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy
écrit avec J. Mayshar, O. Moav and Z. Neeman, CEPR Discussion Paper 10742
We propose that the development of social hierarchy following the Neolithic Revolution was due to the ability of the emergent elite to appropriate crops from farmers, rather than a result of increased productivity, as usually maintained. Since cereals are easier to appropriate than roots and tubers, we argue that regional variations in the suitability of land for the cultivation of these di§erent crop types can account for differences in the formation of hierarchies and states. Our empirical investigation supports a causal effect of the cultivation of cereals on hierarchy,and the lack of a similar effect of land productivity
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SANKTJOHANSER Anna (TSE)
Optimally Stubborn
I consider a bargaining game with two types of players - rational and stubborn. Rational players choose demands at each point in time. Stubborn players are restricted to choose from the set of ``insistent'' strategies that always make the same demand and never accept anything less. However, their initial choice of demand is unrestricted. I characterize the equilibria in this game. Relative to the case with exogenous behavioral types, strong behavioral predictions emerge: in the limit, players randomize over at most two demands. However, unlike in a world with exogenous types, there is Folk theorem like payoff multiplicity.
Behavior seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
CULLEN Julie(HBS)
PEREZ-TRUGLIA Ricardo(UCLA Anderson School of Management)
How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons
Abstract: We study how employees learn about the salaries of their peers and managers, and how those beliefs affect their own behavior. We conducted a field experiment with a sample of 2,000 employees from a multi-billion-dollar corporation. We combine rich data from surveys and administrative records with an experiment that provided some employees with accurate information about the salaries of others. First, we document large misperceptions about salaries and identify some of the sources of these misperceptions. Second, we find significant behavioral elasticities with respect to the perceived salaries of other employees. These effects are different for horizontal and vertical comparisons: while higher perceived peer salary decreases effort, output and retention, higher perceived manager salary has a positive effect on those same outcomes. We discuss evidence on the underlying mechanisms, and implications for pay inequality and pay transparency.
Behavior Working Group
Du 29/03/2018 de 10:00 à 11:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SINGH Juni()
GIULIO Iacobelli(PSE)
Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal