Calendrier du mois de novembre 2017
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 30/11/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21.
BILBIIE Florin (Cambridge)
The New Keynesian Cross: Understanding Macro Policies with Hand-to-Mouth Households
Behavior seminar
Du 30/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
48, bld Jourdan PARIS (75014) Salle R1-09
VAN DEN BERG Gerard (University of BRISTOL)
Conditions Early in Life and the Ensuing Shape of the Age-Earnings Profile over the Full Working Life
écrit avec (joint with public eco, see public eco)
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 30/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45
VAN DEN BERG Gerard (University of BRISTOL)
Conditions Early in Life and the Ensuing Shape of the Age-Earnings Profile over the Full Working Life
écrit avec Jointly organized with Behavior
Adverse conditions in utero and around birth are known to exert long-run effects on health and cognitive ability at high ages. We investigate at what ages these effects start to affect individual labor earnings. We distinguish between nutritional shortages early in life and exposure to stress without nutritional components. To this aim we consider various types of adverse contextual conditions in early life and we exploit the variation in temporal and regional exposure to these conditions, among birth cohorts in Germany born in 1935-1950. This includes bombardments on the civilian population and famines. We use population register data covering tens of millions of individuals, providing individual-merged records of birth place, birth date and the individual age-earnings profile over the full working life. These are merged with historical sources of daily bombardments per municipality and local food rations. The data volume as well as the daily recordings of exposure allow us to make precise inference on the ages at which effects on earnings are strongest.
Behavior Working Group
Du 30/11/2017 de 11:30 à 12:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
COMOLA Margherita(PSE)
RUSINOWSKA Agnieszka (Paris 1)
VILLEVAL Marie Claire(CNRS - University of Lyon)
An experiment on strategic targeting in networks
Economic History Seminar
Du 29/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FERNIHOUGH Alan (Queen's University)
Less is More? The Child Quantity-Quality Trade-Off in Early 20th Century England and Wales
Less is More? The Child Quantity-Quality Trade-Off in Early 20th Century England and Wales
Whilst the child quantity-quality (QQ) model is theoretically well-established, the empirical literature offers only partial support. Motivated by the limited causal empirical evidence in both historic and contemporary societies, this study examines the relationship connecting fertility and child quality for individual families in England and Wales at the start of the 20th century. Using data from the 1911 census returns, I estimate whether reductions in family size reduce the probability of leaving school. To account for the endogenous nature of fertility decisions, I use the sex composition of the first two births in families with at least two children as an instrumental variable (IV) for family size. Overall, I find evidence in support of a child QQ effect, as children in the 13--15 age cohort born into smaller families were more likely remain in school. Whilst the IV results are very similar to the non-IV ones, one drawback is that the IV estimates are quite imprecise.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 28/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ÖZGÜZEL Cem (CES & IZA)
Great Recession and Labor Market Adjustments of Workers
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 28/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BERMAN Yonatan (King's College London)
Drivers of wealth inequality in the United States: the surprising impact of savings.
Du 28/11/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
() *;
La séance est annulée
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
APESTEGUIA Jose ()
Separating Predicted Randomness from Noise
Abstract: Given observed stochastic choice data and a model of stochastic choice, we offer a methodology that allows to separate the data representing the randomness that is inherent to the model from what is noisy behavior. In so doing, we quantify the maximal fraction of the data consistent with the model. We show how to implement our approach to any model of stochastic choice. We then study the case of four well-known models, that capture different notions of randomness. Finally, we illustrate our results with an experimental dataset.
Du 27/11/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S3 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
() *;
La séance est annulée
Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/11/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CASSI Lorenzo (Université Paris 1, PSE)
Mergers and inventive activities in the pharmaceutical sector
écrit avec with Carmine Ornaghi (University of Southampton)
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 24/11/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TONDINI Alessandro (Paris School of Economics)
Entrepreneurs as Role Models: Promoting Entrepreneurial Aspirations among High School Students in South Africa
écrit avec Luc Behaghel (PSE, INRA), David Margolis (PSE, CNRS), Patrizio Piraino (UCT)
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 23/11/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R1-09
KEISTER Todd (Rutgers University)
Bailouts, Bail-ins and Banking Crises
écrit avec Yuliyan Mitkov (Rutgers University)
Texte intégral
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
GUILLOT Malka ()
Who payed the 75% tax on millionaires? Optimization of salary incomes and incidence in France
Using several administrative datasets, I study the impact of temporary tax on top wage income earners, implemented for 2013 and 2014 only and known as the "75% tax above 1 million euros''. The tax takes the form of a new marginal tax rate of 50% on gross annual salary income above one million euros, which translates into an increase by 10ppt of the overall top marginal tax rate on wage earners from 64% to 74%. About 400 employers paid the tax each year and about 1000 employees were concerned. I document that the incidence of the tax was shared among employers and employees. Yet, the bigger the firm, the more incident on employers it was. Conversely, the smaller the firm, the larger the incidence on wage. Taking advantage of the short term nature of the tax, I show that the tax triggered important optimization response of wage earners, taking the form of time-shifting. I do not see any income-shifting nor any migration response. I study the elasticity of the pre-tax labour income to the net-of-tax rate (1 minus the marginal tax rate) and find an elasticity of 0.3, that I interpret as pure optimization.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle H402, Sciences Po - 28 rue des Saints-Pères, Paris 75007
SUNDE UWE (University of Munich )
Malaria Risk and Civil Violence
écrit avec joint with Matteo Cervellati and Elena Esposito
Using high-resolution data from Africa over the period 1998-2012, this paper investigates the hypothesis that a higher exposure to malaria increases the incidence of civil violence. The analysis uses panel data at the 1o grid cell level at monthly frequency. The econometric identification exploits exogenous monthly within-grid-cell variation in weather conditions that are particularly suitable for malaria transmission. The analysis compares the effect across cells with different malaria exposure, which affects the resistance and immunity of the population to malaria outbreaks. The results document a robust effect of the occurrence of suitable conditions for malaria on civil violence. The effect is highest in areas with low levels of immunities to malaria. Malaria shocks mostly affect unorganized violence in terms of riots, protests, and confrontations between militias and civilians, rather than geo-strategic violence, and the effect spikes during short, labor-intensive harvesting periods of staple crops that are particularly important for the subsistence of the population. The paper ends with an evaluation of anti-malaria interventions.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 23/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PREVET Antoine (PSE/Université Paris 1)
Information Management by a Budget constrained Principal
This paper contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features: a limited budget. In a principal-agent model with moral hazard and bounds on transfers, I study an information design problem where the principal can either choose to be transparent and fully reveal information before the agent takes action, or remain opaque. On the one hand, transparency makes it possible for the principal to engage her limited budget only when the expected gain is worth the implementation cost. On the other hand, opacity does not allow for tailor-made contracts but rather ensures optimal incentives. I show that transparency is more likely to be optimal for the principal when the task is less valuable and the budget is lower. Furthermore, the optimal information structure is derived, requiring that the agent be told only what action to undertake.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 22/11/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
A Theory of Experimenters
écrit avec Sylvain Chassang (New York University), Sergio Montero (University of Rochester) and Erik Snowberg (University of British Columbia)
Abstract
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model
experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-o s between subjective
expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters'
preference for randomization, and clari es the circumstances in which randomization
is optimal: when the available sample size is large enough or robustness
is an important concern. We illustrate the practical value of such a framework by
studying the issue of rerandomization. Rerandomization creates a trade-o between
subjective performance and robustness. However, robustness loss grows very slowly
with the number of times one randomizes. This argues for rerandomizing in most
environments.
JEL Classi cations: C90, D78, D81
Keywords: experiment design, robustness, ambiguity aversion, randomization, rerandomization
Du 22/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
() *;
La séance est annulée
Economic History Seminar
Du 22/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
IRIGOIN Alejandra (London School Of Economics)
Standard Error: the problems for economic historians from (mis)taking Spanish American silver as commodity money, 1778?1820
An important stream of recent scholarship on issues of global economic history has used
silver grains to produce comparable estimates of living standards and market integration in
the so called Great Divergence. Considering silver as commodity money they have
standardised local prices and wages to the purchasing power of silver in each economy.
However, as shown for the case of 1800s China and the US (Irigoin 2009, 2013), silver in the
form of the Spanish American peso enjoyed a price in different markets which was relatively
independent of its intrinsic value. In other words silver had also a monetary value.
Revisiting a high frequency series of the price of silver bullion and specie in Britain through
the 18th and early 19th century, the paper first: estimates the premium – and its variation?
that specie had over bullion in the London market and secondly: discusses the implications
of using of silver as commodity for comparative purposes. Thirdly and more importantly it
also qualifies established interpretations on the economic development of Latin America in
the aftermath of its independence from Spain.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 21/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:15
R1-13
FASANI Francesco (Queen Mary – University of London)
Border Policies and Unauthorized Flows: Evidence from the Refugee Crisis in Europe
écrit avec joint with Tommaso Frattini
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 21/11/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
MANOVA Kalina (Oxford)
*The Origins of Firm Heterogeneity: A Production Network Approach
écrit avec A. Bernard (Dartmouth Tuck), E. Dhyne (NBB), A. Moxnes (Oslo), and G. Magerman (ECARES).
This paper quantifies the origins of firm size heterogeneity when firms are interconnected in a production network. We document new stylized facts about the universe of buyer-supplier relationships among all firms in Belgium during 2002-2014. These facts motivate a model in which firms buy inputs from upstream suppliers and sell to downstream buyers and final demand. Firms can be large not only because they have high production capability (i.e. productivity or product quality), but also because they interact with more, better and larger buyers and suppliers, and because they are better matched to their buyers and suppliers. The model delivers an exact decomposition of firm size into supply an demand margins with firm, buyer/supplier and match components. We establish three empirical results. First, demand factors explain 81% of firm size heterogeneity, while supply factors only 19%. Second, nearly all the variation on the demand side (99%) is driven by sales to other firms rather than final demand. By contrast, 88% of the variation on the supply side reflects heterogeneity in own production capability and 12% comes from input suppliers. Third, the extensive margin of the production network dominates the intensive margin. Most of the variance in the network demand and network supply components of firm size is determined by the number of customers and suppliers, rather than their size or capability. Second most important is that firms transact more with
partners that are simultaneously more capable and better bilateral matches.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 21/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ASSOUAD Lydia (PSE)
Measuring lnequality in the Middle East 1990-2016: The World’s Most Unequal Region?
écrit avec F. Alvaredo and T. Piketty
In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate the level and evolution of income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990-2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 61%, as compared to 36% in Western Europe, 47% in the USA and 55% in Brazil. This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil-rich and population-rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under-estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment
Du 21/11/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
() *;
La séance est annulée
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 21/11/2017
JAROTSCHKIN Alexandra (PSE)
Diffusion of (Non-)Discriminatory Culture: Evidence from Stalin's Ethnic Deportations
écrit avec Ekaterina Zhuravskaya and Alain Blum
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 20/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ESPONDA Ignacio (UC Santa Barbara )
Equilibrium in Bayesian Markov Decision Processes
écrit avec Demian Pouzo
Abstract:
We provide an equilibrium framework for modeling the behavior of an agent who holds a simplified view of a dynamic optimization problem. The agent faces a Markov Decision Process, where a transition probability function determines the evolution of a state variable as a function of the previous state and the agent's action. The agent is uncertain about the true transition function and has a prior over a set of possible transition functions; this set reflects the agent's (possibly simplified) view of her environment and may not contain the true function. We define an equilibrium concept and provide conditions under which it characterizes steady-state behavior when the agent updates her beliefs using Bayes' rule. Unlike the case for static environments, however, an equilibrium approach for the dynamic setting cannot be used to characterize those steady states where the agent perceives that learning is incomplete. Two key features of our approach is that it distinguishes between the agent's simplified model and the true primitives and that the agent's belief is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 20/11/2017 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUSO Tomaso (DIW (Berlin) )
The Effect of Retail Mergers on Prices and Variety: An Ex-post Evaluation
écrit avec Elena Argentesi, Paolo Buccirossi, Roberto Cervone, Alessia Marrazzo
Astract
We use an original dataset on Dutch supermarkets to assess the effect of a merger that was conditionally approved by the Dutch Competition Authority (ACM) on prices and on the depth of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in the merger's effects and we further control for selection on observables when defining our control group. We find that the merger did not affect individual products' prices but it led the merging parties to reposition their assortment and increase average category prices. While the low-quality target stores reduced the depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer's stores, the latter increased their product variety. By analyzing the effect of the merger on category prices, we find that the target most likely dropped high price products, while the acquirer added more of them. These findings suggests that the merging firms reposition their product offerings in order to avoid cannibalization and lessen local competition. We further show that other dimensions of heterogeneity such as market concentration, whether a divestiture was imposed, and the re-branding strategy of the target stores are important to explain the post-merger dynamics. A simple theoretical model of local-market assortment competition explains most of our findings.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 20/11/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
CORREA José (Universidad de Chile)
*
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 17/11/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STEIN Mattea (PSE)
Re-forming links: Effects of a randomized training on business network changes among small enterprises in Uganda
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 16/11/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
OIKONOMOU Rigas (UC Louvain)
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 16/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
MOULIN Hervé (University of Glasgow)
Fair Mixture of Public Outcomes
écrit avec joint with H. Aziz and A. Bogomolnaia
Abstract : We revisit probabilistic voting under dichotomous preferences where, as on Facebook, agents report that they like/dislike every outcome. We focus on two often conflicting normative concerns. Minorities should not be crushed by the opposing majority; and the size of the support for a given outcome should increase its weight: numbers matter. The Unanimous Fair Shares property adresses both concerns by giving to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size. Individual Fair Shares weakens UFS by only guaranteeing to each agent a 1/n-th influence on the outcome (where n is the total number of agents).
Given that we cannot combine Efficiency, Incentive Compatibility (Strate- gyproofness) and Unanimous, or even Individual, Fair Shares, we propose second best mechanisms achieving two of these three design goals.
The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a simple variant of the classic random dictator, is Strategyproof and guarantees Unanimous Fair Shares. It is much easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule. In numerical simulations its inefficiency is consistently low.
The efficient Egalitarian rule guarantees Individual Fair Shares and is Excludable Strategyproof: this weakens Strategyproofness by ensuring that an agent is excluded from consuming those public outcomes she reportedly dislikes. But numbers do not matter: the rule treats a unanimous group of agents exactly as if it contains a single agent.
The efficient Nash rule (maximizing the product of utilities) offers much stronger welfare guarantees than both above, in particular it achieves core stability if any group of agents can enforce any outcome with a probability proportional to its size. But the rule fails even the excludable form of Strategyproofness.
We also uncover several challenging open questions
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 16/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45
MAGNAC Thierry (Toulouse School of Economics)
A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets
Matching markets often require recruiting agents, "programs," to costly screen "applicants" who are agents on the other side. A market is congested if programs have to screen too many applicants. A cost associated with application submission is a Pigouvian tax to mitigate the negative externality imposed on programs by applicants. A higher cost reduces congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to some programs, which may, however, put match quality in jeopardy. We measure the effects of such Pigouvian taxes by studying variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with differential application costs. Using data collected in a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we show that a (small) application cost effectively reduces congestion without sacrificing matching quality.
Behavior seminar
Du 16/11/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BRANDTS JORDI (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics )
Centralized vs. Decentralized Management: An Experimental Study
We study the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management using a new experimental game, the decentralization game. This game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product type. Both divisions benefit from coordinating their product types, but each prefers to coordinate on products that are close to its local tastes. The central manager aims to maximize the sum of division payoffs. Which product type achieves this goal varies with taste shocks that are known to the divisions but not the central manager. Under centralization, the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving the divisions’ messages about the state of the world (i.e., the taste shock); under decentralization, the divisions choose their own products. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization than under decentralization. Communication between divisions and suggestions from central managers modestly improves performance under decentralization. Nonetheless, centralization remains the best-performing organizational form.
Du 15/11/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
MBITI ISAAC (University of Virginia)
*
Economic History Seminar
Du 15/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LEMERCIER Claire (CNRS)
Studying apprenticeship in 18th- and 19th-century Paris. Mixing the qualitative and the quantitative
écrit avec Clare Crowston (University of Illinois)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 14/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
ROQUEBERT Quitterie (PSE)
Decentralization of long-term care policies in France: do departmental policy variations affect the professional home care utilization by the disabled elderly?
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 14/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LOPEZ-FORERO Margarita (Université d’Evry, Paris-Saclay)
International Sourcing and Employment in Times of Financial Crisis: The case of France
écrit avec Jean-Charles Bricongne and Fabrizio Coricelli
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 13/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
KREMER Michael (Harvard University)
Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors
A firm raises capital from heterogeneous investors to fund a project. The
project is implemented only if the total capital raised exceeds an initially unknown
threshold, and the firm offers payments depending on project implementation.
We study the firm’s optimal self-financing scheme that maximizes its payoff subject
to all investors participating being the unique equilibrium outcome. The
optimal scheme features full collateral: if the project is not implemented, each
investor is refunded her capital. Under implementation, however, net returns differ
across investors. If the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave,
the firm offers higher returns to larger investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in
investor size raises the firm’s payoff.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 13/11/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S3 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
COTTERLAZ Pierre (Sciences Po)
The Percolation of Knowledge across Space
écrit avec Arthur Guillouzouic Le Corff (Sciences Po)
This paper provides an explanation for the persistent spatial frictions in knowledge diffusion. We argue that the underlying spatially-clustered network of innovators contributes to generating the effect attributed to distance on international knowledge flows. First, we present evidence that knowledge disseminates within a network of firms by delving into their citation behaviour. We find that firms are more likely to cite patents known by their contacts than comparable patents unknown by their contacts. We then incorporate this finding into a dynamic network formation model. The theoretical predictions hold remarkably well in the data: innovator sizes are Pareto distributed, and an increasing relationship exists between the size of an innovator and the distance at which it cites. Combining these two features is sufficient to generate a negative distance elasticity of knowledge flows.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 13/11/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEMENTIEV Andrei (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow))
Contracting out public services to asymmetric partnerships
ABSTRACT:
The paper studies an organisational structure of contracting out public utilities to an asymmetric partnership between the local authorities and a vertically integrated firm. Being fiscally constrained and politically motivated the government delegates pricing decision in the downstream market to a partnership while the upstream market for essential input is not regulated directly. The accompanying regulatory instrument, namely the net budget transfer, is valued at the social cost of public funds and can be set ex post making the firm’s participation constraint non-binding. A negative budget transfer effectively extracts the firm’s rent in the non-regulated upstream market and depends on the corporate structure of the partnership. We build a formal model that predicts that local authorities with relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer when the profit margin in the downstream market falls. The empirical support for this finding is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011-2015. The effect of the share structure on the relationship between the compensation ratio and farebox ratio is captured by the interaction variable highlighting the nonlinear effect. The failure to fully compensate operational losses in the transportation market is interpreted as a system of pseudo-franchising contracts in the Russian suburban railway transport that, to some extent, reflects political preferences of the local authorities in the country.
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 10/11/2017 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE - PARIS 1 - ROOM 116
SAVAGE MIKE (LSE)
*
écrit avec Mike SAVAGE (LSE)
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 09/11/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
CHALLE EDOUARD (polytechnique)
*
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 09/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Sciences Po, salle H402 - 28 rue des Saints-Pères 75007 Paris
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
Information Delivery under Endogenous Communication: Experimental Evidence from the Indian Demonetization
écrit avec Emily Breza, Arun Chandrasekar and Ben Golub
To register: https://doodle.com/poll/yfi8msbhtdbrcs3h
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 09/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45
BRYSON Alex (University College London)
Union Density, Productivity, and Wages
We exploit tax-induced exogenous variance in the price of union membership to identify the effects of changes in firm union density on firm productivity and wages in the population of Norwegian firms over the period 2001 to 2012. Increases in union density lead to substantial increases in firm productivity and wages having accounted for the potential endogeneity of unionization. The wage effect is larger in more productive firms, consistent with rent-sharing models.
Behavior seminar
Du 09/11/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
48, bld Jourdan PARIS (75014) salle R2-21
SICILIANI Luigi (University of YORK)
Competition and Equity in Health Care Markets (with Odd Rune Straume, University of Minho)
We provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under a fixed price regime to investigate (i) whether hospital competition, as measured by an increase in fixed prices or increased patient choice, increases or reduces the gap in quality between high- and low-quality hospitals, and as a result, (ii) whether competition increases or reduces (pure) health inequalities. The answer to the first question is generally ambiguous, but we find that that the scope for competition to result in quality convergence across hospitals is larger when the marginal health gains from quality decrease at a faster rate. Whether competition increases inequalities depends on the type of inequality. If marginal health gains decrease at a sufficiently slow rate, health inequalities due to postcode lottery will increase (decrease) whenever competition induces quality dispersion (convergence). Competition reduces health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients if patient composition effects, due to high-severity patients being more likely to exercise choice, are small.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 08/11/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd jourdan 75014 Paris
BHARADWAJ Prashant (UCSD)
Displacement and Development: Long Term Impacts of the Partition of India.
The partition of British India in 1947 resulted in one of the largest and most
rapid migrations in human history. This paper examines how areas affected by the
partition fare in the long run. Using migrant presence as a proxy for the intensity
of the impact of the partition, and district level data on agricultural output
between 1911-2009, we find that areas that received more migrants have higher
average yields, are more likely to take up high yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds,
and are more likely to use agricultural technologies. These correlations are more
pronounced after the Green Revolution in India. Using pre-partition data, we show
that migrant placement is uncorrelated with soil conditions, agricultural infrastructure,
and agricultural yields prior to 1947; hence, the e?ects are not solely
explained by selective migration into districts with a higher potential for agricultural
development. Migrants moving to India were more educated than both the
natives who stayed and the migrants who moved out. Given the positive association
of education with the adoption of high yielding varieties of seeds we highlight
the presence of educated migrants during the timing of the Green Revolution as a
potential pathway for the observed effects.
Economic History Seminar
Du 08/11/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCALONE Francesco (Université de Bologne)
Neonatal mortality, Cold Weather and Socio-Economic Status in two Northern Italian Rural Parishes from 1820 to 1900
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 07/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
PITON Sophie (PSE)
CANCELLED - Economic Integration and the Non-tradable sector: the European Experience
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 07/11/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
O'ROURKE Kevin (Oxford)
* Empire, distance, and British exports 1700-1900
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEHNENDA Asma (PSE)
Absence, Substitutability and Productivity: Evidence from Teachers
Worker absence is a frequent phenomenon but little is known on its effects on productivity nor on organizations’ strategies to cope with this temporary disruptive event through substitute workers. Using a unique French administrative dataset matching, for each absence spell, each missing secondary school teacher to her substitute teacher, I find that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. On average, tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 30 % of this negative impact while contract substitute teachers do not have any statistically significant impact. This result has important implication for public policy in the context of the shortage of tenured teachers in disadvantaged areas, where contract teachers are more and more concentrated.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 06/11/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LAUERMANN Stephan (Bonn)
Costly Advice"
écrit avec Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston College)
Abstract
We study a scenario in which a receiver is collecting non-binding advice for a binary decision from partially informed senders who can send binary messages. This reflects situations such as non-binding voting of shareholders on a management proposal. Under complete information, the preferences of the receiver and the senders are aligned but there is a conflict of interest over the trade-off of Type I and Type II errors. Existing work shows that for many such situations, the bias prohibits the transmission of any information. Here, in contrast to this work, we consider a setting in which one of the messages is costly. For example, there are positive costs of voting but no costs of abstention. We show that informative advice is given in any equilibrium. When there are many senders, with costly advice, the outcome is equivalent to the one under complete information.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 06/11/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BOURGEON Jean-Marc ()
Green Technology Adoption and the Business Cycle
écrit avec Margot Hovsepian
Abstract :
We analyze the adoption of green technology in a dynamic economy
affected by random shocks where demand spillovers are the main driver of
technological improvements. Firms' beliefs and consumers' anticipations
drive the path of the economy. We derive the optimal policy of
investment subsidy and the expected time and likelihood of reaching a
targeted level of environmental quality under economic uncertainty. This
allows us to estimate the value that should be given to the environment
in order to avoid an environmental catastrophe as a function of the
strength of spillover effects.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 06/11/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
SAVANI Rahul (University of Liverpool )
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/11/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 bv Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BERVOETS Sébastien (CNRS/GREQAM )
Doping and competition uncertainty