Calendrier du mois de février 2018
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 27/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - Room R1-13
RANALDI Marco (PSE)
On the Measurement of Functional Income Distribution
The present work proposes a framework for the analysis of inequality in income composition. Hinging on the recent work by Ranaldi (2017), we here propose a metric of income-factor polarization, the Income-Factor Polarization Index (If), that captures the extent to which two income sources, notably profits and wages, are polarized across the distribution of income. We measure income-factor polarization as the distance between the Polarization Curve for Income Source and the Zero-Polarization Curve, suitably normalized. The former is the cumulative distribution of income source across the population with individuals being indexed by their income rank, and the latter is the benchmark of zero inequality in income composition, defined as the situation in which each individual has the same population share of profits and wages (Ranaldi, 2017). The greater the distance, the higher the polarization. We show that the index narrows down to a single one the two conditions for the rising share of capital income to increase overall income Gini introduced by Milanovic (2017), which is: If > 0. The methodology is finally illustrated via an empirical application on the case of Italy.
Here is the corresponding working paper : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01379229v3/document
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 27/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ANGELUCCI Charles (MIT Sloan)
The Medieval Roots of Inclusive Institutions: From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 23/02/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SARDOSCHAU Sulin (PSE)
Children of War: Violence and Health after the 2003 Iraq Invasion
Du 22/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 22/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
ROSENBAUM Philip (Copenhagen Business School)
Does the Timing of the First Childbirth Matter? New Approach on Danish Register Data
Economic History Seminar
Du 21/02/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VELDE François ()
Lottery Loans in the Eighteenth
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 20/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - R1-13
FRYER Roland G. (Harvard University)
From manufacturing to services: the impact of structural change on the value of housing
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 20/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VERHAGEN Annelore (Maastricht University)
Does Active Living affect school performance?
This paper investigates whether stimulating physical activity in everyday life affects primary school performance. We use data from the Active Living field experiment, which aims to increase active transportation and active play among 8-12 year-olds living in low-SES areas in the Netherlands. Difference-in-differences estimations reveal that while Active Living increases time spent on physical activity during school hours, it negatively affects school performance, especially among the worst-performing students. Our results suggest that although physical exercise may be beneficial for health, stimulating active play can have negative effects on educational outcomes.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 19/02/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CREPIN Anne-Sophie ()
Inertia in risk; improving economic models of catastrophes
écrit avec Eric Nævdal
We provide a new way to model endogenous catastrophic risk termed inertia risk, which accounts for dynamic lags between physical variables and the hazard rate—a characteristic which is often observed in real life problems. For example the stock of some particular species in an ecosystem might influence the level of stress (or resilience) in that system, which is a slowly changing variable compared to the species dynamics. When the level of stress passes a critical threshold the ecosystem undertakes a regime shift, a rapid, substantial and persistent change in the system. In such context the inertia hazard rate defines the risk that the system will shift in the next period of time, which depends on both variables. We show that the added realism in our risk model has intuitive appeal and significantly impacts optimal solutions. With inertia risk, the probability that a catastrophe will ever occur may span the entire interval [0, 1]. This as opposed to the standard approach where this probability is either zero or one. We also show how inertia risk may generate path dependency as the hazard rate depends on learning about how risk is distributed in state space. We illustrate the implications for policy in a simple model of climate change. The optimal solution with inertia depends on parameters, such as damage and discount rates in a qualitatively different way compared to the standard approach. Hence for problems with lagged effects, where inertia risk is a more realistic way to represent risk, using the standard models of catastrophic risk that discard these lagged effects could generate substantially flawed policy recommendations.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 16/02/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DESCHENES Sarah (PSE)
Household structure, son preference and domestic violence in Burkina Faso
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MACé Antonin (PSE)
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TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
CHONé Philippe (ENSAE)
Partial exclusivity
écrit avec joint with Laurent Linnemer and Thibaud Vergé
This papers offers a new rationale for exclusive agreements. Long-term business partners have a common interest to agree on an option to deal on an exclusive basis, while keeping the possibility to revert to a competitive process (auction) should the surplus of an internal deal turn out to be low. Partial exclusivity occurs in equilibrium in the sense that competition takes place with positive probability. Although there is no rent extraction à la Aghion and Bolton (1987), such lock-up agreements harm competitors (and total welfare) by depriving them of business opportunities. Compared to Bulow and Klemperer (1996), the possibility of long-term contracting calls into question the efficacy of auctions relative to negotiations
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 15/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
PHILIPPE Arnaud (Bristol University)
Incarcerate one to calm the others? Spillover effects of incarceration among criminal groups
What is the effect of incarcerating a member of a group on her criminal partners? I answer this question using administrative data on all convictions in France between 2003 and 2012. I exploit past joint convictions to identify 34,000 groups. Using a 48-month individual panel that records later criminal activity and sentencing, I find that the incarceration of a peer is associated with a 5% decrease in the conviction rate in groups of two individuals. Exploiting within-group heterogeneity, I show that offenders who have the characteristics of leaders are not affected by their followers but exert influence on them. Lastly, I show that the effect derives from lower criminogenic behavior and not from a loss of criminal human capital or from better information on the risks associated with crime.
Texte intégral
Behavior seminar
Du 15/02/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
Jourdan salle R2-21
ADVANI Arun (University College London)
nsurance Networks and Poverty Traps
Poor households regularly borrow and lend to smooth consumption, yet we see much less borrowing for investment. This cannot be explained by a lack of investment opportunities, nor by a lack of resources available collectively for investment. This paper provides a novel explanation for this puzzle: investment reduces the investor's need for informal risk sharing, weakening risk-sharing ties, and so limiting the amount of borrowing that can be sustained. I formalise this intuition by extending the canonical model of limited commitment in risk-sharing networks to allow for lumpy investment. The key prediction of the model is a non-linear relationship between total income and investment at the network level -- namely there is a network-level poverty trap. I test this prediction using a randomised control trial in Bangladesh, that provided capital transfers to the poorest households. The data cover 27,000 households from 1,400 villages, and contain information on risk-sharing networks, income, and investment. I exploit variation in the number of program recipients in a network to identify the location of the poverty trap: the threshold level of capital provision needed at the network level for the program to generate further investment. My results highlight how capital transfer programs can be made more cost-effective by targeting communities at the threshold of the aggregate poverty trap.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 14/02/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
MANI Anandi (University of Oxord, Blavatnik School of Government)
COGNITIVE DROUGHTS‡
écrit avec Guilherme Lichand (University of Zurich, Dept. of Economics)
This paper tests whether uncertainty about future rainfall affects farmers’ decision-making
through cognitive load. Behavioral theories predict that rainfall risk could impose a psychological tax on
farmers, leading to material consequences at all times and across all states of nature, even within
decisions unrelated to consumption smoothing, and even when negative rainfall shocks do not materialize
down the line. Using a novel technology to run lab experiments in the field, we combine survey
experiments with recent rainfall shocks to test the effects of rainfall risk on farmers’ cognition, and find
that it decreases farmers’ attention, memory and impulse control, and increases their susceptibility to a
variety of behavioral biases. Effects are quantitatively important, equivalent to losing 25% of one’s
harvest at the end of the rainy season. Evidence that farmer’s cognitive performance is relatively less
impaired in tasks involving scarce resources suggests that the effects operate through the mental
bandwidth mechanism.
Economic History Seminar
Du 14/02/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RUEDA Valeria (Oxford)
Political unification and geographic economic disparities in Italy 1861-71
écrit avec Brian A’Hearn
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 13/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - R2-20
BECERRA-VALBUENA Luis (PSE)
Do the ENSO events affect air quality and health in Bogota?
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 13/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ANDREESCU Marie(PSE)
BRYSON Alex(University College London)
SANTINI Paolo()
Do unions have egalitarian wage policies for their own employees? Evidence from exhaustive earnings data in the US
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALOS-FERRER Carlos (Zurich Center for Neuroeconomics (ZNE), University of Zurich)
Imperfect Bayesians: A Process Model and Evidence from Response Times
People are not Bayesians. Or are they? This work discusses a simple process model of faulty decision making where deliberative processes standing in for Bayesian updating compete with simpler heuristics, resulting in predictable error and response-time patterns. The predictions are then tested in a decision-making experiment on belief updating where opposite biases can occur, representativeness (overweighting the sample information due to stereotypical appearances) and conservatism (overweighting the prior).
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/02/2018 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S19 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
REVERDY Camille (University of Paris 1 )
The Export Potential of Services
écrit avec Yvan Decreux and Julia Spies
Régulation et Environnement
Du 12/02/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
COLO Philippe(PSE)
FODHA Mouez(Université Paris 1, PSE)
Environmental Tax Reform under debt constraint
This article analyzes the impacts of Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) when the government is constrained not to increase the public debt-to-output ratio. We consider an
overlapping generations model with pollution. Public spending for pollution abatement are …nanced by tax revenues and public debt. We show that keeping constant the public
debt-output ratio is not an obstacle to attain a double dividend, i.e. an increase of both (i) environmental quality and (ii) aggregate consumption. First, if the capital stock is
low and the pollution abatement is large enough, a successful ETR consists in a rise of the environmental tax, compensated by a decrease of the income tax. Secondly, we show
that the environmental tax revenues may help reduce the public debt-output ratio. We give conditions (on the initial level of the environmental tax and the debt-output ratio)
such that an increase of the environmental tax, budget-balanced by a decrease of the debt-output ratio may also achieve a double dividend. We conclude that public debt crisis
should not compromise ETR, instead, environmental tax revenues could be part of the solution.
Du 09/02/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
BARRERA Oscar (PSE)
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Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 09/02/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GARRIGA Santiago (Paris School of Economics)
Cash for Whom? Incidence of a Conditional Cash Transfer in Argentina
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MACé Antonin (PSE)
On the Weights of Sovereign Nations
écrit avec Rafael Treibich
We study the design of voting rules for committees representing
heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when participation
in the committee is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting
groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for
participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for
which the incentive to participate is the lowest. When collective
decisions are not enforceable, cooperation is enabled by the
satisfaction of more stringent constraints, that may require granting
a veto power to certain countries. The model has important
implications for the problem of apportionment, the allocation of
voting weights to countries of varying populations, where it provides
a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller
countries.
Behavior Working Group
Du 08/02/2018 de 10:00 à 11:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz)
An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility
Economic History Seminar
Du 07/02/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOVIN Yajna (PSE)
Income Inequality: The case of Overseas Departments of France- Long Run Trends and Comparisons
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 06/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - Room : R2-20
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 06/02/2018 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
ECKEL C. (Munich)
TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING? EXPORTERS, MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS AND LABOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
écrit avec Stephen R. Yeaple
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 06/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALSTADSAETER Annette (NMBU)
Accounting for Business Income in Measuring Top Income Shares: Integrated Accrual Approach Using Individual and Firm Data from Norway
Business income is important in the upper tail of the personal income distribution, but the extent to which it is captured by measures of personal income varies substantially across tax regimes. Using linked individual and firm data from Norway, we are able to attribute business income to personal owners as it accrues rather than when it is realized. This adjustment leads to an increase in top income shares, and the size of this effect varies dramatically depending on the tax regime in place. After a tax reform in 2005 that created strong incentives to retain earnings within businesses, the increase was massive: accounting for earnings retained in the corporate sector leads to more than doubling of the share of income of top 0.1% in some years. Furthermore, adjusting for retained earnings stabilizes the composition of the top income group before and after the reform. We also show that the response is driven by majority owners in closely held firms and facilitated through indirect ownership. As the result, traditional measures of top income shares become misleadingly low (even when accounting for capital gains). We speculate on the implications of our findings for levels and trends in top income shares observed in other countries. In particular, we note that the major tax reforms of the 1980s in the United States correspond to a shift toward business income being passed through to personal owners, and argue that top income shares constructed using income tax statistics before 1987 are likely to be significantly understated relative to those afterwards.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 05/02/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SPRUMONT Yves (Université de Montréal)
Strategy-proof Choice of Acts
écrit avec Eric Bahel
We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of nature. We offer a complete characterization of all strategyproof and ex-post efficient SCFs. The chosen act must pick the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent's top outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all the states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 05/02/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEZIN Emeline ()
The Economics of Green Consumption, Cultural Transmission and Sustainable Technological Change.
A model shows that systematic interactions between green consumer culture and sustainable technologies can give rise to path dependency in sustainable innovation processes. The theory includes (i) green preferences formed through cultural transmission which involves rational socialization actions, (ii) innovation endogenously directed to sustainable or unsustainable sectors depending on culture through market size effects. When interactions between green culture and technology are strong enough, the dynamics exhibits complementarities resulting in path dependency. Two long-term outcomes emerge. A green equilibrium (with strong green culture and an environmentally benign technology), a brown equilibrium (with weak green culture and a pollution-intensive technology). The model has important implications for the cost of environmental policies. Moreover, the theory enables the study of an important disregarded issue, i.e., the political sustainability of environmental taxes.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 02/02/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
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La séance est annulée
Du 02/02/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JAROTSCHKIN Alexandra (PSE)
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TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 01/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LARAKI Rida (CNRS et Lamsade)
Acyclic Gambling Games
écrit avec J. Renault
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology of the title comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino. Under natural assumptions (such as continuous running payoff and non expansive transitions), we consider for each discount factor the value $v_lambda$ of the $lambda$-discounted stochastic game and investigate its limit when $lambda$ goes to 0 (players are more and more patient). We show that under a strong acyclicity condition, the limit exists and is characterized as the unique solution of a system of functional equations: the limit is the unique continuous excessive and depressive function such that each player, if his opponent does not move, can reach the zone when the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without degrading the limit value. The approach generalizes and provides a new viewpoint on the Mertens-Zamir system coming from the study of zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. A counterexample shows that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, convergence of $(v_lambda)$ may fail.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 01/02/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
MELLY Blaise (University of Bern)
Generic Inference on Quantile and Quantile Effect Functions for Discrete Outcomes
écrit avec Co-authors: V. Chernozhukov, I. Fernandez-Val, and K. Wuethrich
Quantile and quantile effect functions are important tools for descriptive and
inferential analysis due to their natural and intuitive interpretation. Existing inference
methods for these functions do not apply to discrete and mixed continuous-discrete random
variables. This paper offers a simple, practical construction of the simultaneous
confidence bands for quantile and quantile effect functions. It is based on a natural transformation
of simultaneous confidence bands for distribution functions, which are readily
available for many problems. The construction is generic and does not depend on the
nature of the underlying problem. It works in conjunction with parametric, semiparametric,
and nonparametric modeling strategies and does not depend on the sampling scheme.
We apply our method to characterize the distributional impact of insurance coverage on
health care utilization and obtain the distributional decomposition of the racial test score
gap. Our analysis generates new, interesting empirical findings, and complements previous
analyses that focused on mean effects only. In both applications, the outcomes of
interest are discrete rendering existing inference methods invalid for obtaining uniform
confidence bands for quantile and quantile effects functions.