Calendrier du mois de mars 2018
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 30/03/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LUKSIC Juan Diego (PSE)
Impact of a large earthquake in Chile on school learning outcomes
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
MICHELACCI Claudio (Einaudi Institute)
*
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
CARANTINO Benjamin (Paris School of Economics)
The Carbon Footprint of Suburbanization: Evidence from French Household Data
écrit avec Co-authors: M. Lafourcade and C. Blaudin du Thé
How does urban form impacts households' fuel consumption and driving emissions. We answer this question using French survey data between 2001 to 2011. The use of these three rich individual surveys helps control for selection issues, as some households may live in a location consonant to their socioeconomic characteristics or travel predispositions. In addition, we also use instrumental variables to control for simultaneity between fuel consumption and population settlements. The results suggest that, by choosing to live at the fringe of a metropolitan area instead of a city-center, the sample mean-household bears an extra-consumption of approximatively six fuel tanks per year. More generally, doubling residential density results in an annual saving of approximatively two tanks per household, but this gain might be larger if compaction is coupled with smaller distances to city-centers, improved public transport and reduced pressure for road construction in the metropolitan area. Moreover, the relationship between urban population and driving emissions is bell-shaped: small cities compensate lack of either density or mass transit systems by job-housing centralization.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
PASCALI Luigi (U Pompeu Fabra)
Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy
écrit avec J. Mayshar, O. Moav and Z. Neeman, CEPR Discussion Paper 10742
We propose that the development of social hierarchy following the Neolithic Revolution was due to the ability of the emergent elite to appropriate crops from farmers, rather than a result of increased productivity, as usually maintained. Since cereals are easier to appropriate than roots and tubers, we argue that regional variations in the suitability of land for the cultivation of these di§erent crop types can account for differences in the formation of hierarchies and states. Our empirical investigation supports a causal effect of the cultivation of cereals on hierarchy,and the lack of a similar effect of land productivity
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SANKTJOHANSER Anna (TSE)
Optimally Stubborn
I consider a bargaining game with two types of players - rational and stubborn. Rational players choose demands at each point in time. Stubborn players are restricted to choose from the set of ``insistent'' strategies that always make the same demand and never accept anything less. However, their initial choice of demand is unrestricted. I characterize the equilibria in this game. Relative to the case with exogenous behavioral types, strong behavioral predictions emerge: in the limit, players randomize over at most two demands. However, unlike in a world with exogenous types, there is Folk theorem like payoff multiplicity.
Behavior seminar
Du 29/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
CULLEN Julie(HBS)
PEREZ-TRUGLIA Ricardo(UCLA Anderson School of Management)
How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons
Abstract: We study how employees learn about the salaries of their peers and managers, and how those beliefs affect their own behavior. We conducted a field experiment with a sample of 2,000 employees from a multi-billion-dollar corporation. We combine rich data from surveys and administrative records with an experiment that provided some employees with accurate information about the salaries of others. First, we document large misperceptions about salaries and identify some of the sources of these misperceptions. Second, we find significant behavioral elasticities with respect to the perceived salaries of other employees. These effects are different for horizontal and vertical comparisons: while higher perceived peer salary decreases effort, output and retention, higher perceived manager salary has a positive effect on those same outcomes. We discuss evidence on the underlying mechanisms, and implications for pay inequality and pay transparency.
Behavior Working Group
Du 29/03/2018 de 10:00 à 11:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SINGH Juni()
GIULIO Iacobelli(PSE)
Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal
Economic History Seminar
Du 28/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GRANDI Elisa (PSE)
Face-off in Bogota. Transnational networks and lending practices in World Bank early missions (Colombia 1949-1954)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 27/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RAVALLION Martin (Georgetown University)
CHEN Stéphanie(University of Chicago)
Bounds on Welfare-Consistent Global Poverty Measures
New measures of global poverty are presented that take seriously the idea of relative-income comparisons but also acknowledge a deep identification problem when the latent norms defining poverty vary systematically across countries. Welfare-consistent measures are shown to be bounded below by a fixed absolute line and above by weakly-relative lines derived from a theoretical model of relative-income comparisons calibrated to data on national poverty lines. Both bounds indicate falling global poverty incidence, but more slowly for the upper bound. Either way, the developing world has a higher poverty incidence but is making more progress against poverty than the developed world.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 26/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GUERDJIKOVA Ani (Université de Grenoble)
Heuristic Modes of Decision Making and Survival in Financial Markets
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 26/03/2018 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S19 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
LIGONNIERE Samuel (ENS Paris Saclay)
Fisherian Deflation and Debt Maturity
How does debt maturity structure affect Fisherian deflation? By introducing debt maturity in a Fisherian deflation model, I demonstrate how it could trigger financial crises. Using a stock-flow analysis, I show that long-term debt could alleviate the risk of current binding collateral constraint, but an excessive reliance could generate future binding collateral constraints over long horizons. It is empirically confirmed by a study based on 122 developing countries over the period 1970-2012. I highlight that debt maturity structure is a good early-warning indicator of Fisherian deflation, which provides information that adds up to the level of external debt.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 26/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Sara (MIT)
Regulatory Distortion: Evidence from Uber’s Entry Decisions in the US
There is a large and long-standing literature on the distortionary effects of regulations on the functioning of markets. A newer strand of this literature focuses on licensing regulations, such as state-specific licensing of teachers and hairdressers. We seek to add to this literature with the specific case of ride-hailing services, such as Uber. We assemble a new and comprehensive data set of
250 US cities and their regulations regarding hackney services. We specify a stylized profit model for Uber, which is a function of these regulations, and estimate the parameters of the profit function using observed Uber entry decisions into these cities. Our data set and empirical strategy allow us to estimate the differential effects of particular types of regulations, separating out regulations governing safety, governing operations, and erecting entry barriers. We find that safety regulations do not have a distortionary effect on the functioning of the market for hackney services and evading them does not increase Uber’s profits. We find evidence that Uber’s profits are increased, however, by their ability to evade regulatory entry barriers and regulations governing operations. In other words, those regulations do have a significant distortionary effect on the market.
To the extent that safety-related regulations are welfare-enhancing and those erecting entry barriers are welfare-decreasing, our results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of Uber’s entry.
Du 23/03/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 23/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:30
salle/18 MSE-Paris 1, 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris
RAGOT Xavier (OFCE)
Changements organisationnels en Europe : Economie et Politique
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 22/03/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-13
JAIMOVICH Nir (University of Zurich) *;
La séance est annulée
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
DO Quy-Toan (The World Bank)
The Price Elasticity of African Elephant Poaching
écrit avec Andrei A. Levchenko, Lin Ma, Julian Blanc, Holly Dublin, and Tom Milliken.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BAUMANN Léonie (University of Cambridge )
Identifying the best agent in a network.
This paper develops a mechanism for a principal to allocate a prize to the most valued agent when agents have a knowledge network. The principal does not know any agent's value but any two linked agents know each other's values. Agents compete for the prize and send costless private messages about their own value and the values of others they know to the principal. Agents can lie only to a certain extent and only lie if it increases their chances of winning the prize. A mechanism that determines each agent's chances of winning for any possible message profile is proposed. We show that with this mechanism, there exists an equilibrium such that the most valued agent wins with certainty if every agent has at least one link; if the network is a star or complete, then the most valued agent wins with certainty in every equilibrium.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
ELLISON Sara (MIT)
Dynamics of the Gender Gap in High Math Achievement
écrit avec Co-author: Ashley Swanson
This paper examines the dynamics of the gender gap in high math achievement over the high school years using data from the American Mathematics Competition. A clear gender gap is already present by 9th grade and the gender gap widens over the high school years. High-achieving students must substantially improve their performance from year to year to maintain their within-cohort rank, but there is nonetheless a great deal of persistence in the rankings. Several gender-related differences in the dynamics contribute to the widening of the gender gap, including differences in dropout rates and in the mean and variance of year-to-year improvements among continuing students. A decomposition indicates that the most important difference is that fewer girls make large enough gains to move up substantially in the rankings. An analysis of students on the margin of qualifying for a prestigious second stage exam provides evidence of a discouragement effect: some react to falling just short by dropping out of participating in future years, and this reaction is more common among girls.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 21/03/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
UDRY Chris (Northwestern University)
Information, Market Access and Risk: Addressing Constraints to Agricultural Transformation in Northern Ghana
Farm yields in northern Ghana are 75-80% below agronomic potential. This yield gap is the motivation for the overall shape of agricultural policy in the region. We describe the preliminary results of a 4 year RCT of a set of five interventions designed to overcome barriers to productivity gains on smallholder farms. Farmers were provided with access to community-based, high frequency agricultural extension services, with access to lower transaction-cost access to improved inputs, to introductory grants of rainfall index insurance, to daily updates on remote market prices of output, and to short-term rainfall forecasts. Neither yield nor agricultural profits respond strongly to any, or all, of these interventions on average. Treatment effects vary strongly across rainfall outcomes, and by gender of the cultivator.
Economic History Seminar
Du 21/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MONTALBO Adrien (SUSSEX)
Economic resources and primary schooling in the early nineteenth-century France
The Guizot Law of 1833 was the first step undertaken in France towards the organization
of primary schooling at a national level, making it mandatory for municipalities more
than 500 inhabitants to open a primary school for boys. To this date, primary schooling
was mostly managed by municipal authorities who could freely decide to subsidise schools
or to let them be entirely funded through schooling fees paid by families. A national
survey was conducted in 1833 to determine the location of the existing primary schools.
Exploiting the data coming from this survey at the arrondissements (departmental districts)
and municipal levels, I investigate the economic determinants of primary schooling
spreading in France before the Guizot Law. I first show that economic resources and
population dispersion were key in explaining primary schools’ presence, municipal grants
and higher enrolment rates. The percentage of municipalities with schools along with the
percentage of teachers provided with an accommodation, a classroom, a fixed salary or an
occupation by municipalities were indeed higher in wealthier districts. Then, I show that
the pattern of this investment was also depending on the population deciles municipalities
were belonging to. Finally, I investigate the link between municipal grants and enrolment
rates. Local authorities acted to lower the level of fees in the schools they subsidised,
which reduced the costs of education borne by families and contributed to increase enrolment
rates. Primary schooling thus developed mostly in areas where it was economically
valuable, through the concomitant action of municipalities and families, which divided
the burden of education costs.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 20/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus - R1-13
LUKSIC Juan Diego (PSE)
Impact of a large earthquake in Chile on school learning outcomes
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 20/03/2018 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
DORN David (U. Zurich and CEPR)
Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from U.S. Patents.
écrit avec David Autor, Gordon Hanson, Gary Pisano and Pian Shu.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 20/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PIKETTY Thomas (EHESS-PSE)
Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right. Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017)
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 19/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
YARIV Leeat (Princeton University)
On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets
écrit avec with SangMok Lee
Stability is often the goal for matching clearinghouses, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. We study the wedge between stability and utilitarian efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a rich preference class. The speed at which efficiency of stable matchings converges to its optimum depends on the underlying preferences. Furthermore, for severely imbalanced markets governed by idiosyncratic preferences, or when preferences are sub-modular, stable outcomes may be inefficient asymptotically. Our results can guide market designers who care about efficiency as to when standard stable mechanisms are desirable.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 19/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MAYOL Alexandre(PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne )
MILLOCK Katrin(PSE)
Accelerating diffusion of climate-friendly technologies: a network perspective
écrit avec with Solmaria Halleck Vega and Antoine Mandel
Abstract 1: We introduce a methodology to estimate the determinants of the formation
of technology diffusion networks from the patterns of technology
adoption. We apply this methodology to wind energy, which is one of the
key technologies for climate change mitigation. Technology diffusion occurs
at the firm level, but it is influenced by policy and we study how policy
affects network formation at a country level. Our results emphasize that
long-term economic and trade relationships, as measured in particular by
economic integration, are key determinants of technological diffusion. Specific
support measures seem less relevant for the diffusion per se, although
they might play a crucial role from an industrial perspective.
Abstract 2: This article analyzes how the local political organization (in France, the level of the single municipality, the union of communes (Syndicats) or supermunicipality (communaut de communes) and the management mode (public or private) can influence the performance of the public service. The impact of these organizational configurations on costs has never been studied simultaneously by the literature. We first propose a theoretical model based on a principal-agent problem to analyze them together. Then, from a panel of French water services, we observe empirically that these different organizational ombinations have an impact on the price.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 16/03/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JAROTSCHKIN Alexandra (PSE)
Diffusion of (non-)discriminatory culture: Evidence from Stalin's ethnic deportations.
écrit avec Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (PSE) and Alain Blum (INED,EHESS)
Development Economics Seminar
Du 15/03/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
FAFCHAMPS Marcel (Stanford University )
Can Referral Improve Targeting? Evidence from a Vocational Training Experiment
Abstract
We seek to improve the targeting of agricultural extension training by inviting past
trainees to select future trainees from a candidate pool. Some referees are rewarded or
incentivized. Training increases the adoption of recommended practices and improves per-
formance on average, but not all trainees adopt. Referred trainees are 3.7% more likely
to adopt and randomly selected trainees, but rewarding or incentivizing referees does not
improve referral quality. When referees receive ?nancial compensation, average adoption
increases and referee and referred are more likely to coordinate their adoption behavior. Ad-
dtional adopters induced by incentivizing referral adopt imperfectly and incur losses from adoption; they also tend to abandon the new practices in the following year.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 15/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BAHAR Dany (Brookings)
Diasporas, return migration and comparative advantage: a natural experiment of Yugoslavian refugees in Germany
écrit avec Andreas Hauptmann (IAB), Cem Ozguzel (PSE), Hillel Rapoport (PSE)
During the early 1990s Germany received over half-million Yugoslavians escaping war. By 2000, most of these refugees were repatriated. In this paper we exploit this episode to provide causal evidence on the role migrants play in expansion of the export baskets of their home countries after their return. We find that the elasticity of exports to return migration is between 0.1 and 0.25 in industries were migrants were employed during their stay in Germany. In order to deal with endogeneity issues we use historic rules of random allocation of asylum seekers across different German states to construct an instrumental variable for the treatment. We find our results to be externally valid when expanding the sample to all countries. We also find that the effect is over 10
times stronger for migrant workers in white collar occupations, as opposed to non-white collars. Similarly, the effect is 3 and 4 times larger upon return migration of workers with occupations intensive in analytical and cognitive tasks (as opposed to manual ones) and with high problem-solving content (as opposed to low content), respectively. Our results point to knowledge diffusion as the main channel driving the link between
migration and productivity as measured by changes in comparative advantage.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 15/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 PARIS
KOPYLOV Igor (University of California, Irvine)
Combinatorial Subjective State Spaces
I construct subjective state spaces S for preferences over finite menus. The additive representation of Kreps (1979) is relaxed to a weaker model called coherent aggregation. This model improves the identification of subjective states in several ways. First, the minimal size of S can be specified explicitly in terms of preferences. It allows combinatorial applications: starting from monotonic preferences over menus that have at most k elements, one can identify subjective state spaces that have up to k states. Second, coherent aggregation can be non-monotonic and hence, accommodate preferences for commitment. The case of singleton S delivers Gul and Pesendorfer's (2005) model of changing tastes. Third, the coherent aggregation model has equivalent interpretations in terms of incomplete dominance relations and choice functions that are both induced}endogenously by preferences. The induced dominance has a Pareto representation with subjective states. The induced choice function C is rationalized via strict maximization of subjective states. The path-independence of C characterizes the case where all subjective states are linear orders, as in Aizerman and Malishevski (1981).
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 15/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
LICHTER Andreas (IZA)
The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany
écrit avec Co-authors: Max Löffler and Sebastian Siegloch
We investigate the long-run effects of government surveillance on trust and economic performance. We study the case of the Stasi in socialist East Germany, which implemented one of the largest state surveillance systems of all time. Exploiting regional variation in the number of spies and the specific administrative structure of the system, we combine a border discontinuity design with an instrumental variables approach to estimate the long-term causal effect of government surveillance after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We find that a larger spying density in the population led to persistently lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-reunification Germany. We also find evidence of substantial and long-lasting economic effects of Stasi spying, resulting in lower income and higher exposure to unemployment.
Behavior seminar
Du 15/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
HANAKI Nobuyuki (Universite Cote d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG)
An experimental analysis of the effect of Quantitative Easing
In this paper we report the results of a repeated experiment in which a central bank buys bonds for cash in a quantitative easing (QE) operation in an otherwise standard asset market setting. The experiment is designed so that bonds have a constant fundamental value which is not affected by QE under rational expectations. By repeating the same experience three times, we investigate whether participants learn that prices should not rise above the fundamental price in the presence of QE. We find that some groups do learn this but most do not, instead becoming more convinced that QE boosts bond prices. These claims are based on significantly different behaviour of two treatment groups relative to a control group that doesn't have QE.
Economic History Seminar
Du 14/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SALISBURY Laura (York University)
Marrying for Money: Evidence from the First Wave of Married Women's Property Laws in the U.S.
Marriage can substitute for formal business contracts, especially in environments that lack a well established system of contract or corporate law. In such settings, marriage can facilitate the efficient organization of labor and capital. In this paper, we explore the pooling of capital as an explicit motive for marriage. We measure the impact of a class of married women's property acts introduced in the American South during the 1840s on assortative matching in the marriage market. These laws did not grant married women autonomy over their separate estate; they merely shielded their property from seizure by their husbands' creditors. This had the dual effect of mitigating downside risk while restricting a husband's ability to borrow against his wife's property; it also preserved the bulk of the wife's assets as inheritance for the couple's children. Using a newly compiled database of linked marriage and census records, we show that these laws were associated with an overall increase in assortative mating, suggesting that the ability to pool capital importantly contributed to the gains from marriage. At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in the effect in different regions of the joint men's and women's wealth distribution. We provide an interpretation for these results.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 13/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - R1-13
SEGù Mariona ()
Do short-term rent platforms affect rents? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 13/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PERSAUD Alexander (University of North Carolina Asheville)
A (Paid) Passage to India:Migration and revealed willingness to pay for upper-caste status
How much are upper-caste individuals willing to pay for upper-caste status? Traditional dis-crimination models view discrimination from the vantage point of a group that receives worsetreatment due to its non-economic characteristics vis-a-vis a reference group. Discriminatedgroups pay a cost in the labor market for these characteristics. However, the corollary may betrue: a privileged group may pay a fee in order to receive better, rather than equal, treatment.In the case of caste, I hypothesize that high-caste Indians abroad are willing to pay more toreturn to India and reap the labor and non-labor benefits of high-caste status. I utilize uniquedata on indentured Indians in Fiji in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. This contextremoves confounding labor-market factors and cleanly identifies the gross value of upper castes.I show that the lower bound of the value of the highest castes in north India roughly 2.5 years’gross wages. Robustness using hypothesized inter-caste hierarchies lead to the same orderingand diminishing effects as caste status falls. The effects are entirely driven by men, as women’scaste status appears delinked from return migration. My results show some of the first evidencequantifying a caste’s value and speak to caste’s persistence today.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VANNETELBOSCH Vincent (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)
R&D Network Formation with Myopic and Farsighted Firms
We analyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopoly when each
?rm bene?ts from the research done by other ?rms it is connected to. Firms can be either
myopic or farsighted when deciding about the links they want to form. Which R&D
networks are likely to emerge with farsighted or myopic ?rms? Which ?rms are more
likely to occupy key positions in the R&D network? What is the relationship between the
stable R&D network structures and the social welfare? We propose the notion of myopic-
farsighted stable set to determine the R&D networks that emerge when some agents are
myopic while others are farsighted. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of networks
satisfying internal and external stability with respect to the notion of myopic-farsighted
improving path. Stable R&D networks consist of two components where the larger group
of ?rms derive from their R&D collaborations a greater competitive advantage relative to
the other group. If there is a majority of myopic ?rms, they form two components of nearly
equal size. However, if more than half of the ?rms are farsighted, the largest component
comprises roughly three-quarters of ?rms, with farsighted ?rms having in average a higher
degree and betweenness centrality than myopic ?rms. However, some myopic ?rms may
have a high (if not the highest) betweenness centrality. Thus, even if myopic ?rms are
less active in terms of R&D collaborations they may play a crucial role for spreading the
innovation within the component. Suppose now that, in addition of myopic and farsighted
private ?rms, some ?rms are public ones. We show that (myopic or farsighted) public
?rms can help to stabilize some e¢ cient R&D networks by occupying key positions in
the networks. Finally, we study the dynamics of R&D networks starting from an initial
state where all ?rms are myopic, and where at each subsequent period some myopic ?rms
become farsighted.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/03/2018 de 13:00 à 14:00
Room S19 MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 12/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, Salle R1-13
TAYLOR Scott (Calgary) *;
La séance est annulée
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 09/03/2018 de 13:15 à 14:15
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
OBERLANDER Lisa ()
TV exposure, food consumption and health outcomes - evidence from Indonesia
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 09/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:30
S/18 MSE-Paris 1,106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris)
BERAMENDI Pablo (Duke University, Department of Political Science)
Economic and Political Inequality (book presentation)
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 08/03/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
DELACROIX David (UC Louvain)
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
ZHAO Wei (HEC Paris)
Optimal bridge players among separated networks.
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal bridge problem among multiple separated separated networks and examines optimal targeting of players, groups and central planner. We find that the optimal choice (new links connect with other groups) of the group coincides with the individual’s rational choice. But, the best choice for the central planner may be different from the individual’s rational choice. We have shown how player’s centrality is going to be affected due to combination of separated networks, and how this is related to the self-loops and Bonacich centrality of these separated networks. We construct an exact index to identify the key bridge players linking up whom will mostly increase aggregate equilibrium effort and aggregate equilibrium welfare, and we find that the key bridge players may consist of neither each group’s key players nor central players. We provides its implications on company merge, optimal targeting, community merge and network design.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 08/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
The Entertaining Way to Behavioral Change
écrit avec Co-authors: Eliana La Ferrara and Victor Orozco
We test the effectiveness of an entertainment education TV series, MTV Shuga, aimed at providing information and changing attitudes and behaviors related to HIV/AIDS. Using a simple model we show that "edutainment" can work through an "information" or through a "conformity" channel. We conducted a randomized controlled trial in urban Nigeria where young viewers were exposed to Shuga or to a non-educational TV series. Among those who watched Shuga, we created additional variation in the "social messages" they received and in the people with whom they watched the show. We find significant improvements in knowledge and attitudes towards HIV and risky sexual behavior. Treated subjects are twice as likely to get tested for HIV 6 to 9 months after the intervention. We also find reductions in STDs among women. Our experimental manipulations of the social norm component did not produce significantly different results from the main treatment. Also, we don't detect significant spillovers on the behavior of friends who did not watch Shuga. The "information" effect of edutainment thus seems to have prevailed in the context of our study.
Behavior seminar
Du 08/03/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
BAUMARD Nicolas (DéPARTEMENT D'ETUDES COGNITIVES DE L'ENS)
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Since the Industrial Revolution, human societies have experienced a high and sustained rate of economic growth. Recent explanations of this sudden and massive change in economic history have held that modern growth results from an acceleration of innovation. But it is unclear why the rate of innovation drastically accelerated in England in the 18th century. An important factor might be the alteration of individual preferences with regard to innovation due to the unprecedented living standards of the English during that period, for two reasons. First, recent developments in economic history challenge the standard Malthusian view according to which living standards were stagnant until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial England enjoyed a level of affluence that was unprecedented in history. Second, Life History Theory, a branch of evolutionary biology, has demonstrated that the human brain is designed to respond adaptively to variations in resources in the local environment. In particular, a more favorable environment (high resources, low mortality) triggers the expression of future-oriented preferences. In this paper, I argue that some of these preferences – a lower level of time discounting, a higher capacity to accept losses, a lower materialistic orientation and a higher tendency to explore – are likely to increase the rate of innovation. I review the evidence regarding the impact of affluence on preferences in contemporary we well as in past populations, and conclude that the impact of affluence on neuro-cognitive systems may partly explain the modern acceleration of technological innovations and the associated economic growth.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 07/03/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MESNARD Alice()
MESNARD Alice()
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Development Economics Seminar
Du 07/03/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
MESNARD Alice()
MESNARD Alice()
Do men and women have equal access to health care ? Evidence on health care utilisation in Nigeria
écrit avec Elisa Cavatorta, Wendy Janssens
Economic History Seminar
Du 07/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
NELSON Scott (University of Georgia)
A Nitroglycerin Apocalypse
This talk will explore the relationship between stabilized nitrates and states, from the formation of empires based on gunpowder in the fifteenth century to the role of nitroglycerin in destroying them after 1868. Topics will include new tunnels in the international network (Suez, Mt. Cenis, and the Appalachian mountains), how grain storage centers moved as transcontinental cables emerged, and suggest how stabilized nitroglycerin contributed to the international panic of 1873.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 06/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - R2-20
HOTTE Rozenn ()
Marriage Payments and Wife's Welfare: All you need is love
co-written with Sylvie Lambert
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 06/03/2018 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
BAHAR Dany (Brookings)
Diasporas, return migration and comparative advantage: a natural experiment of Yugoslavian refugees in Germany
écrit avec Andreas Hauptmann, Cem Ozguzel and Hillel Rapoport
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 06/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Sara(MIT)
PATHAK Parag(MIT)
The efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools
écrit avec Parag Pathak
Several public K-12 and university systems have recently shifted from race-based affirmative
action plans to race-neutral alternatives. This paper explores the degree to which race-neutral
alternatives are effective substitutes for racial quotas using data from the Chicago Public Schools
(CPS), where a race-neutral, place-based affirmative action system is used for admissions at highly
competitive exam high schools. We develop a theoretical framework that motivates quantifying the
efficiency cost of race-neutral policies by the extent admissions decisions are distorted more than
needed to achieve a given level of diversity. According to our metric, CPS’s race-neutral system is
24% and 20% efficient as a tool for increasing minority representation at the top two exam schools,
i.e. about three-fourths of the reduction in composite scores could have been avoided by explicitly
considering race. Even though CPS’s system is based on socioeconomic disadvantage, it is actually
less effective than racial quotas at increasing the number of low-income students. We examine
several alternative race-neutral policies and find some to be more efficient than the CPS policy.
What is feasible varies with the school’s surrounding neighborhood characteristics and the targeted
level of minority representation. However, no race-neutral policy restores minority representation
to prior levels without substantial inefficiency, implying significant efficiency costs from prohibitions
on affirmative action policies that explicitly consider race.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 05/03/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MIERENDORFF Konrad (University College London)
Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention
écrit avec with Yeon-Koo Che
We consider a dynamic model of information acquisition. Before taking an action,
a decision maker may direct her limited attention to collecting different types
of evidence that support alternative actions. The optimal policy combines three
strategies: (i) immediate action, (ii) a contradictory strategy seeking to challenge
the prior belief, and (iii) a confirmatory strategy seeking to confirm the prior. The
model produces a rich dynamic stochastic choice pattern as well as predictions in
settings such as jury deliberation and political media choice.
Keywords: Wald sequential decision problem, choice of information, contradictory
and confirmatory learning strategies, limited attention.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 05/03/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
IOSSA Elisabetta (University of Rome Tor Vergata)
Project Choice and Innovation Policy: the case for Public Procurement
écrit avec with Alessandro De Chiara
There is a long standing policy debate on the role and design of innovation policies. In this paper, we develop a model of project choice with competition for funding and compare: (i) A Demand-side approach, in which the public authority restricts the type of research project eligible for funding, with (ii) A Supply-side approach, in which the public authority chooses its preferred project among those submitted. The authority can verify the characteristics of the projects submitted by the firms, but does not know which other projects the firms have available. We compare the two approaches from the point of view of the authority and in terms of social welfare, considering both small projects which the firm could self-finance and larger projects which would not be implemented absent public funds. We identify under which conditions a Demand-side approach is preferable in terms of allocative efficiency and investment incentives.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 01/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
HA-HUY Thai (Université de Cergy )
A Not so Myopic Axiomatization of Discounting
écrit avec Jean-Pierre Drugeon
This article builds an axiomatization of inter-temporal trade-offs that makes an explicit account of the distant future and thus encompasses motives related to sustainability, transmission to offsprings and altruism. The focus is on separable representations and the approach is completed following a decision-theory index based approach that is applied to infinite dimension streams. This enlightens the limits of the commonly used flat tail intensity requesites for the evaluation of utility sequences: in this article, these are supersed and replaced by an axiomatic approach to optimal myopy degrees that in its turn precedes the determination of optimal discount. The overall approach is anchored on the new and explicit proof of a temporal decomposition of the preference orders between the distant future and the close future itself directly anchored on the determination of the optimal myopia degrees. The argument is shown to provide a novel understanding of temporal biases with the scope for a distant future bias when the finite dimensional gets influenced by the infinite dimensional. The reference to robust orders and pessimism-like axioms finally allows for determining tractable representations for the indexes.