Calendrier du mois de mai 2016
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 31/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
CARBONNIER Clément (U. Paris 8 Vincennes-St Denis, LED & Sciences Po, LIEPP)
Progressive profile of local taxes and territorial disparities of public goods and purchasing power
Local taxes'progresive profile may be determined through three main channels: i) the way tax bases are calculated, ii) the schedules of rates and iii) the differences of taxation between territories partially segregated on income. The present paper aims at documenting these issues, taking profit of local government accounting data, aggregate tax returns at the level of these jurisdictions and the European SILC survey on households living conditions. Housing tax has globally a slightly progressive profile because of exemptions and reductions (ii) and positive correlation between local tax burden per capita and local mean income (iii). This second progressivity determinant is driven by two causes: on the one hand, the central government equalization between local jurisdictions through an overall operating grant depending on local mean income; on the other hand, the positive correlation between the size of territories and both the mean income and the local public expenditure. Nevertheless, due to a regressive tax base (i) and a larger number of exempted households in lower income territories (iii), housing tax is regressive among non-exempted households. Similar qualitative results are found for land taxes, with a globally more regressive pattern. Taking local purchasing power into account leads to progressivity attenuation (or regressivity accentuation), but the qualitative results stands.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 30/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
NOELDEKE Georg (Basel University)
The Implementation Duality
écrit avec Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
Texte intégral
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 30/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 27/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
TREIBICH Carole (AMSE)
Estimating misreporting in condom use: Evidence from a list experiment among female sex workers in Dakar
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 27/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE, room 115
PALACIOS-HUERTA Ignacio (LSE)
Beautiful Game Theory : Economics and Psychology in the Field
SÉANCE EXCEPTIONNELLE
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 27/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE - SALLE S/18
FERNANDEZ-URBANO Roger (UNIVERSITY CARLOS III, MADRID)
Recessions and Normative-Mimetic Isomorphism in Worldwide States Structures, 1970-2013
écrit avec Alicia García(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Laura Orellana (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Du 26/05/2016 de 14:00 à 15:00
() The effect of private standards on developing countries’ export performance and product sourcing behavior. Evidence from the Peruvian asparagus export sector; écrit avec Miet Maertens
La séance est annulée
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 26/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE)
tba
Development Economics Seminar
Du 25/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
NEILSON Christophe NEILSON (Princeton)
THE EFFECTS OF EARNINGS DISCLOSURE ON COLLEGE ENROLLMENT DECISIONS
écrit avec Justine Hastings and Seth D. Zimmerman
We test the impact of information about institution- and major-specific labor market outcomes on
college enrollment decisions using a randomized controlled trial administered within the online Chilean
federal student loan application process. Using linked secondary and post-secondary education records
and tax returns for fourteen cohorts of Chilean high school graduates, we created measures of past-cohort
earnings for nearly all institution and major combinations in the Chilean higher education system.
Applicants were asked a series of survey questions about their enrollment plans and their beliefs about
earnings and cost outcomes. Following the survey questions, randomly selected applicants were given
information on earnings and costs for past students at their planned enrollment choices, as well as
access to a searchable database that allowed them to compare earnings and costs across degrees. Students
have unbiased but highly variable beliefs about costs, and upward-biased beliefs about earnings outcomes.
Poorer students have less accurate information and choose lower-earning degrees conditional on baseline
ability and demographics. While treatment has no effect on whether students enroll in postsecondary
education, it does cause low-SES students to enroll in degrees where earnings net of costs were higher
for past enrollees. Though effect sizes are small, they substantially exceed the cost of implementing
the disclosure policy.
Economic History Seminar
Du 25/05/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
SCHULARICK Moritz ()
In Debt We Trust, U.S. Household Debt 1950-2013.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 24/05/2016 de 17:30 à 18:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
AMMON Christina(University of Warwick)
AMMON Christina(University of Warwick)
*
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 24/05/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle 114 (106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris)
ALLEN T. (Dartmouth College)
Volatility and the Gains from Trade
écrit avec D. Atkin
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 24/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
GOUPILLE-LEBRET Jonathan (CNRS, University of Lyon)
Measuring the Distribution of Wealth: Methods and Evidence for France 1800-2013
écrit avec B. Garbinti et T. Piketty
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 23/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
KLEIN Paul (SU)
Relational Contracts with Private Information: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs
écrit avec Matthias Fahn (München University)
We analyze a relational contracting problem, in which the principal has some private
information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus pay-
ments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship was
lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may
introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output
is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated
over time even if prospects remain bad.
Industrial Organization
Du 23/05/2016 de 12:00 à 13:15
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
REY Patrick (TSE)
Competitive Cross-Subsidization
écrit avec Zhijun Chen (Monash University)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 23/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 20/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
TRAKO Iva (Pse)
The Impact of Conflict Displacement on Education and Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Post-War Kosovo
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 20/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE - SALLE S/18
RAFFERTY Mike (University of Sydney)
Financial Derivatives as Social Policy beyond Crisis
écrit avec Dick Bryan (University of Sydney, Australia)
Discussant: Thibault Darcillon (DREES)
RISK Working Group
Du 19/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
HUBER Martin (University of Fribourg)
Testing a nudge policy to reinforce mutualization
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
GALASSO Emanuela (World Bank )
Bundled Discounts and Foreclosure in Wholesale Markets
écrit avec Enrique Ide
Can a multi-product firm offer bundled-discounts to foreclose a more efficient single-product supplier? We show that the degree of downstream competition is key. Bundled-discounts are successful in depriving single-product rivals of scale economies only to the extent that buyers are disorganized and their valuations heterogeneous. This holds when suppliers deal directly with final consumers, or when they sell to retailers that compete intensely in downstream markets, but it is lost in the case of retail monopolies. These results are robust to alternative timing assumptions and different ways to model scale economies.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 19/05/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
TREISMAN Dan (UCLA)
*
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 18/05/2016 de 18:00 à 19:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
RASERA Frédéric (Centre Max Weber) TBA;
La séance est annulée
Du 18/05/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
STEINER Jakub (CERGE-EI and University of Edinburgh) *;
La séance est annulée
Economic History Seminar
Du 18/05/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
MICHAEL Huberman (Université de Montréal)
International competition in cotton textiles before 1914
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
BARTELS Charlotte (DIW Berlin)
Top incomes in Germany, 1871-2011
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 13/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE - Salle S/18
HUBERMAN Michael (U.Montreal)
The 100-year Welfare State
Discussant: Michaël Zemmour (U. Lille 1, CLERSE/LIEPP Sciences Po)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
RITZBERGER Klaus (IAS Vienna)
The Curse of Poverty and the Blessings of Wealth
If productivity in a society is low, then the only equilibrium involves inefficiently selfish (autarkic) behavior. If productivity is sufficiently high, then there are several equilibria that realize substantial welfare gains through reciprocal behavior. Equilibria for productive societies are distinguished by how they treat the wealth distribution. While conservative societies preserve the distribution, egalitarian behavior further improves welfare by transfers. Yet, both conservative and egalitarian (productive) societies exclude the poorest, even though that involves a welfare loss. So, there are a social and an individual poverty trap. The first is technological, the second behavioral.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 12/05/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Sciences Po
BESLEY Tim (*) *;
La séance est annulée
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 11/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
MAS Alexandre (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY)
Does Disclosure affect CEO Pay Setting? Evidence from the Passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 10/05/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences économiques, salle du 6ème étage (106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris)
MCLAREN J. (VIRGINIA)
*Are Immigrants a Shot in the Arm to the Local Economy? http://www.nber.org/papers/w21123.
écrit avec Gihoon Hong (Pusan National University)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 10/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
DURANTE Ruben (UPF)
One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa
écrit avec E. Depetris-Chauvín
Can successful collective experiences that prime patriotic sentiments reduce inter-ethnic tensions and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa? We examine this question by looking at the case of football. Combining survey data for over 35,000 respondents in 20 countries with information on over 70 official games by African national football teams between 2000 and 2015, we document that individuals interviewed in the days following a victory of their country's national team are 3 to 4% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than those interviewed in the days before the match. The estimated effect is sizeable (i.e. a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification), and robust to controlling for country-year, language group, and even match fixed effects. National team's victories are also associated with an increase in trust in others, especially in people of different ethnicity, but have no impact on trust in the government or support for the incumbent. We also find that social unrest (i.e, riots, strikes, protests, and repression) significantly decreases in the two weeks following a victory in the Africa Cup of Nations or the FIFA World Cup finals. Finally, using exogenous variation from close qualification to the CAN tournament, we find that countries whose teams (barely) qualified experience significantly less internal conflict in the six months following the qualification than countries whose teams (barely) did not; this effect is particularly large for unexpected qualifications. Our findings suggest that, even in regions where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, transitory patriotic shocks can reinforce national identity, reduce inter-ethnic mistrust and have a tangible impact on conflict intensity.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
ORTOLEVA Pietro (Princeton) Deliberately Stochastic.;
La séance est annulée
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 09/05/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
RITZBERGER Klaus ()
Development Economics Seminar
Du 04/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
BAU Natalie (UCLA)
Can Policy Crowd Out Culture ?
Policies may change the returns to transmitting cultural norms to the next generation with the unintended consequence of changing cultural practices. I study cultural norms that determine whether boys or girls support their parents in their old age in Indonesia and Ghana. These norms play the dual role of increasing old age support while relieving incomplete contracting problems between parents and children. Therefore, parents invest more in the human capital of the child who is more likely to care for them in old age. In both Indonesia and Ghana, the entry and expansion of pension plans crowds out human capital investment in the children targeted by these norms. Moreover, consistent with a model where transmission of the norm is costly, the pension plan also crowds out the practice of the norm. Thus, policy crowds out culture.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 04/05/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
HERGHELEGIU Cristina (ENS-PSE)
The political economy of non-tariff measures
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 03/05/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
JULIA CAGE (SCIENCE PO)
The Production of Information in an Online World
écrit avec Nicolas Hervé (INA) ; Marie-Luce Viaud (INA)
Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce. Who are the main providers of original news in the online world, and how are they rewarded for this? What are the benefits of breaking out a story, and how does information propagate? This paper addresses these issues by exploiting a unique dataset including all online content produced in French language by the universe of general information media outlets in France during year 2013. We develop a topic detection algorithm that identifies each news story, trace the timeline of each story and perform a plagiarism detection algorithm to distinguish between original reporting and copy-and-paste. We then merge this content data with data on investment in news gathering and daily audience to investigate the costs and benefits of information production. We first show that about 50% of all online information is copy-and-paste, with large variations across media outlets. We then highlight the specific role played by the French news agency: AFP has the largest newsroom and is the main provider of original information, reflecting the use of an adequate copyright system. We next find a positive relationship between the number of journalists and the quantity of original news production. Using daily-level variations, we finally show that producing original news leads to a statistically significant increase in online audience, but that the magnitude of this audience effect is very low. This illustrates the need to develop new paywall or copyright models.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/05/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
STEINER Jakub (CERGE-EI and University of Edinburgh)
Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
écrit avec Filip Matejka (CERGE-EI) and Colin Stewart (University of Toronto)
We solve a general class of dynamic rational-inattention problems in which an agent
repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The
solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased towards
an optimal default rule that depends only on the history of actions, not on the realized
state. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the status quo bias; (ii) inertia in
actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy
and delay in decision-making.