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INSERT INTO `bor_seminaires_agenda` VALUES (3864,'WATANABE','Yasutora','HKUST Business School  Hong Kong University of Science and Technology','','','','','','Entry by Merger: Estimates from a Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities','','','','','','','2014-11-17','12:00:00','13:30:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3865,'KOS','Nenad','Bocconi - Milan','','','','','','Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder.','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/KOS2015INF.pdf','','','2015-01-12','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3866,'HENRANDEZ-LAGOS','Pablo','NYU','','','','','','Political Identity and Trust','','','We explore how political identity affects trust. Using an incentivized experimental survey we vary information about partners\' partisan identity to elicit trust behavior and beliefs. By eliciting beliefs, we are able to assess whether differences in trust rates are due to stereotyping or a \"taste for discrimination.\" By measuring actual trustworthiness, we are able to determine whether beliefs are statistically correct. We find that trust is pervasive and depends on the partisan identity of the trustee. Differential trust rates are explained by incorrect stereotypes about the other\'s lack of trustworthiness rather than by a \"taste for discrimination.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/HER2015POL.pdf','','','2015-01-19','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3757,'MOREIRA','Humberto','FGV/EPGE-Fundation Getulio Vargas- Escola Brasileira de Economia ','','','','','','Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard','Co-author : Daniel Gottlieb','','We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Agents have private\r\ninformation about the distribution of outputs conditional on each effort and, possibly, the cost of effort.\r\nWe prove existence, characterize the solution, and establish several general properties of the resulting\r\nmultidimensional screening problem. A positive mass of types with low conditional probabilities of\r\nsuccess gets a constant payment and zero rents. Exclusion is desirable if and only if it is first-best\r\nefficient. Unlike in pure adverse selection models, there is distortion everywhere: the region of types\r\nwho exert high effort is contained in the interior of the first-best high-effort region. Under additional\r\nconditions, the optimal mechanism offers only finitely many contracts. For example, if the agent is\r\nrisk neutral and has limited liability, all agents are offered a single contract. Our model, therefore,\r\nprovides a multidimensional screening rationale for the lack of rich menus of contracts observed in\r\ncertain environments. We apply our framework to multidimensional generalizations of canonical\r\nmodels in insurance, regulation, and optimal taxation and show that it generates novel results.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/MOR2014SIM.pdf','','','2014-09-29','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital -  Salle du 6ème étage ) 75013 Paris <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3843,'','','PSE','','','','','','*','GOUPILLE Jonathan (PSE) : \"Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches in France\"\r\n<br><br>\r\nBrice FABRE (PSE) : \"The trade-off between taxes and fees: evidence from French municipalities\"\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2014-10-07','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3834,'ROSSI','Pauline','PSE','','ROUANET','Léa ','PSE','','Gender Preferences in Africa : a Comparative Analysis of Fertility Choices','','','','','','','2014-09-26','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3835,'MURARD','Elie ','PSE','','','','','','The impact of migration on family left-behind: estimation in presence of intra-household selection of migrants','','','','','','','2014-10-10','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3836,'DANIELE','Gianmarco','Vrije Universiteit Brussel','','','','','','Street vendors, incentives and self-regulation: a field study in urban India','Co-author(s) : Denni TOMMASI (ULB)','','','','','','2014-10-24','12:45:00','13:45:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3837,'DIMRI','Aditi ','PSE','','','','','','Household Composition and Decision-Making: Living with In-Laws in India','','','','','','','2014-11-07','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ense101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3838,'VANDEN EYNDE','Oliver ','PSE','','','','','','Job Performance in the Kenyan Police (1940-1970)','','','','','','','2014-11-21','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3839,'VALENCIA CAICEDO','Felipe ','Pompeu Fabra / LSE','','','','','','The Mission: Economic Persistence, Human Capital Transmission and Culture in South America','','','','','','','2014-12-05','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3840,'IMBERT','Clément','*','','','','','','Short-Term Migration and Rural Workfare Programs: Evidence from India','','','','','','','2014-12-12','12:45:00','13:45:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3841,'LIBOIS','François','UNamur / PSE','','','','','','Firewood Collections and Economic Growth in Rural Nepal 1995-2010: Evidence from a Household Panel','','','','','','','2014-12-19','12:45:00','13:45:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3842,'BERTELLI','Olivia','PSE','','','','','','Fertility, food security and agriculture production in times of climate shocks','','','','','','','2015-01-16','13:00:00','14:00:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3844,'FERRIERE','Nathalie','PSE','','','','','','Food Aid Allocation: Competition or Coordination?','','','','','','','2014-10-21','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3845,'HOUNGBONON','Georges Vivien','PSE','','','','','','The impact of entry and merger on the pricing of multiproduct firms','','','','','','','2014-11-18','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3846,'LIBOIS','François','PSE','','','','','','Privatization of the commons: Evidence from the implementation of the Forest Rights Act in Udaipur, Rajasthan, India','','','','','','','2014-12-02','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3847,'MOHAMED','Imen Ben','PSE','','','','','','Credit shocks, wage bargaining and monetary policy : a DSGE approach','','','','','','','2014-10-15','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE - salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3848,'BRYAN','Gharad','LSE','','','','','','The Costs of Spatial Labor Misallocation: Evidence from Indonesia','','','','','','','2015-01-28','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3849,'BOGART','Dan','UC-Irvine','','','','','','There can be no Partnership with the King’: Regulatory Uncertainty and  Investment in Britain’s East India Monopoly','','','\'There can b e no Partnership with the King\':\r\nRegulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of\r\nEngland\'s East Indian Merchant Empire\r\n\r\nDan Bogart\r\ny\r\nJanuary 2015\r\nAbstract\r\nThe English East India Company help ed build Britain\'s colonial empire, but the\r\nCompany struggled for much of its early history due to a violotile regulatory environ-\r\nment. This pap er argues that the Company\'s p erformance was hindered by instability\r\nand incapacity of English institutions as late as the mid eighteenth century. It gives a\r\nbrief history of the torturous renegotiations over its monop oly trading privileges and\r\nthe scal demands by the monarchy. It also analyzes the eects of p olitical instabil-\r\nity, warfare, and scal capacity on the Company\'s investment in shipping tonnage.\r\nRegressions show the growth of shipping tonnage declined signicantly when there\r\nwere changes in government ministers, when Britain was at war in Europ e and North\r\nAmerica, and when shipping capacity exceeded central government tax revenues. The\r\nndings p oint to the signicance of regulatory institutions in Britain\'s development and\r\nits links with p olitics and war. They also provide a unique insight into how regulations\r\nand investment change as institutions evolve.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/DAN2015THE.pdf','','','2015-03-04','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3850,'ALSAN','Marcella','University of Stanford','','','','','','The Gendered Impact of Young Children\'s Health on Human Capital: Evidence from Turkey','','','','','','','2015-03-25','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3851,'MUNSHI','Kaivan','University of Cambridge','','','','','','Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-Urban Wage Gap','Co-author(s) : Mark Rosenzweig','','We provide an explanation for large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India that is based on the trade-off between consumption-smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income-gains from migration. Our theory generates two key predictions, which we verify empirically: (i) relatively wealthy households within the caste who benefit less from the redistributive (surplus-maximizing) network will be more likely to have migrant members, and (ii) households facing greater rural income-risk (who benefit more from the insurance network) are less likely to have migrant members. Structural estimates of the model show that even small improvements in formal insurance decrease the spatial misallocation of labor by substantially increasing migration.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/KAI2015NET.pdf','','','2015-04-22','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3852,'DIPPEL','Christian','UCLA','','','','','','THE RENTS FROM TRADE AND COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS: REMOVING THE SUGAR COATING','Co-author(s) : Avner Greif and Daniel Trefler','','We are especially indebted to Jim Robinson who, in the initial stages of the project when we were\r\nwallowing in case studies drawn from disparate times and places, encouraged us to focus on the British\r\nEmpire and the under-exploited Colonial Blue Book data. We are also indebted to Elhanan Helpman\r\nfor his encouragement in exploring the relationship between international trade and domestic institutions.\r\nWe benefited from discussions with Daron Acemoglu, Lee Alston, Magda Bisieda, Kyle Bagwell,\r\nStanley Engerman, James Fenske, Murat Iyigun, Suresh Naidu, Diego Puga, Alan Taylor, and seminar\r\nparticipants at Boulder, CIFAR, LSE, Ryerson, Stanford, Toronto (Law Faculty), Western, the World\r\nBank, UC Davis, and UC San Diego. Trefler gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Social\r\nSciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). All three co-authors gratefully acknowledge\r\nthe support of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, CIFAR Program in Institutions, Organizations,\r\nand Growth, Toronto, ON M5G 1Z8. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not\r\nnecessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.','','','','2015-05-20','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3853,'SEKHRI','Sheetal','University of Virginia','','','','','','Agricultural Trade and Depletion of Groundwater','Co-author(s) : Paul Landefeld','','Globalization can lead to either conservation or depletion of natural resources that are used in the production of traded goods. Rising prices may lead to better resource management. Alternatively, stronger incentives to extract these resources may exacerbate their decline- especially in open access institutional frameworks. We examine the impact of agricultural trade promotion on the groundwater extraction in India using nationally representative data from 1996-2005. We find evidence that trade promotion led to increased extraction of the reserves. In areas deemed over-exploited by the government,\r\ngroundwater depleted by an additional 2.5 meter or 1 within district standard deviation. This large decline had economically signicant distributive consequences. While large and marginal farmers did not experience any real welfare changes, we detect a 1 standard deviation decline in real mean per capita expenditure for small farmers in such areas. We also quantify the social cost of groundwater depletion due to increased agricultural trade. Our findings indicate that the monetized value of depleted groundwater could be atleast as high as 1 billion US dollars in 1991 dollar terms.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/AGR2015SHE.pdf','','','2015-06-10','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3855,'RASUL','Imran','University College London','','','','','','State-Building Through Compulsory Schooling: The Response of American States to Mass Migration in the Nineteenth Century','co-author(s) : Oriana Bandiera [LSE], Myra Mohnen UCL] and Martina Viarengo [Graduate Institute, Geneva]','','','','','','2014-10-16','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3856,'DRACA','Mirko',' University of Warwick','','','','','','On Target? The Impact of Sanctions on Listed Firms in Iran','','','','','','http://personal.lse.ac.uk/draca/','2014-11-13','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3857,'DRAZEN','Allan','U Maryland','','','','','','Structural Estimation of the Effects of Term Limits','Co-autheur(s) : Boragan Aruoba and Razvan Vlaicu','','This paper proposes a structural approach to the estimation of the effects of term\r\nlimits. A structural approach also allows us to measure the welfare effects of different\r\nterm limit lengths. We identify and quantify discipline and selection effects using U.S.\r\ngubernatorial elections data for 1950-2007. We find that the possibility of re-election\r\nprovides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection\r\neffect, though it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance.','','','','2014-12-04','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3928,'SPIEGLER','Ran','University College London - Tel Aviv University','','','','','','Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations','','','I present a framework for analyzing decision making under imperfect understanding of the environment’s correlation structure. The decision maker faces an objective long-run probability distribution p over a number of variables (including his own action). He is characterized by a directed acyclic graph R over the set of variable labels. His subjective belief factorizes according to R, via the standard Bayesian-network formula. This belief distortion implies that the decision maker’s long-run behavior may a\r\neffect his perception of the consequences of his actions. I characterize the cases when it does, and\r\ndefine accordingly a \"personal equilibrium\" notion of subjectively optimal choice. The framework provides a simple graphical representation\r\nof various belief biases (coarse reasoning, reverse causality, attribution errors), subsuming recent models of boundedly-rational equilibrium\r\nexpectations as special cases. The framework’s potential for economic\r\napplications is demonstrated with a few stylized examples','','','http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/BN.pdf','2015-02-02','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSe101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'semrfou','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3859,'','WIP (Work In Progress)','*','','','','','','meeting WIP','Andrea Garnero(doctorant PSE : Workforce diversity and productivity in France)\r\n<br><br>\r\nDamien Vandendriessche    (doctorant PSE : Can we measure happiness? The impact of framing effects)\r\n<br><br>\r\nClémentine Van Effenterre     (doctorante PSE : Understanding the gender gap in science - Evidence from France)','','','','','','2014-10-01','11:00:00','12:30:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'WIP','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3860,'VASCONCELOS',' Helder','University of Porto and CEPR','','','','','','Why entrepreneurs choose risky R&D projects - but still not risky enough','Co-author(s) : Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard, Per Hjertstrand, Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson','','Entrepreneurs face higher commercialization costs than incumbents. We show that this\r\nimplies that entrepreneurs will choose more risky projects than incumbents, aiming to reduce\r\ntheir high expected marginal commercialization cost. However, entrepreneurs may select too\r\nsafe projects from a social point of view, since they do not internalize the business steal-\r\ning e¤ect. We also show that commercialization support induces entrepreneurship but may\r\nlead to mediocre entrepreneurship by inducing entrepreneurs to choose less risky projects,\r\nwhereas R&D support encourages entrepreneurship without a¤ecting the type of entrepre-\r\nneurship. Using Swedish patent citation data, we ?nd empirical support for predictions of\r\nthe model.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/HEL2014WHY.pdf','','','2014-10-13','12:00:00','13:30:00','1ensa004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'io','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4004,'','','*','','','','','','Une évaluation du « Comprehensive Assessment » de la BCE','Guillaume Arnould <br> Salim Dehmej ','','','','','','2015-04-01','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE (salle B2.2)','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4005,'FERRIERE','Nathalie','PSE','','','','','','Do other donors react to EU food aid?','','','','','','','2015-04-07','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4006,'COMBE','Julien','PSE','','','','','','The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence','','','','','','','2015-04-15','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE (salle B2.2)','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3985,'FUMAGALLI','Chiara','University of Bocconi','','','','','','Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure','','','','','','','2015-04-13','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3990,'FERRANDO ','Mery ','UCL and PSE','','','','','','\"Educational Outcomes of Minorities: the Impact of Politicians\"','','','','','','','2015-05-07','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3991,'RAZIN','Ronny ','LSE','','','','','','Bayesian Peer Influence','','','','','','','2015-06-22','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-05-05',NULL,NULL),(3969,'LEVIN','Jonathan','Stanford','','','','','','Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?:Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction','Co-author : Andrzej Skrzypaczy\r\n\r\n','','','http://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/CCA.pdf ','','','2015-04-13','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3970,'BOBTCHEFF','Catherine','Toulouse School of Economics','','','','','','More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing','Co-author : Raphaël Levy','','We consider a real option model in which a cash-constrained entrepreneur learns prior to investing, but at a speed which is private information. The  entrepreneur seeks outside funding, and uses the timing of his investment to signal his condence in the venture, and accordingly obtain cheaper credit. In the benchmark case with no informational friction, we show that the optimal investment date may be nonmonotonic or decreasing in learning speed, depending on the prior NPV of the project: better learning increases the value of the option, but also increases the speed of updating. In the presence of asymmetric information, the cash constraint may result in distortions in the investment timing policy, and the ine ciency is higher the more stringent the constraint. In addition, the welfare loss is sometimes higher for projects of higher quality. Ine cient investment policy may take both the form of over-investment (hurried investment as compared to the benchmark), when both entrepreneur types learn su ciently fast, and of under-investment (delayed investment), when the slow-learning type does not learn fast enough. Therefore, the severity of the cash constraint a ects the magnitude of the timing distortion, but not its direction.','','','','2015-05-04','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-03-30',NULL,NULL),(3971,'ALAOUI','Larbi','University Pompeu Fabra','','','','','','Endogenous Depth of Reasoning\" écrit avec Antonio Penta','','','We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player\'s `depth of reasoning\' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent\'s cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function of the player\'s cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the game theoretical sophistication of the player; the benefit instead is related to the game payoffs. Behavior is in turn determined by the individual\'s depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoning process of the opponent. Thus, in our framework, payoffs not only affect individual choices in the traditional sense, but they also shape the cognitive process itself. Our model delivers testable implications on players\' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test the model\'s predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs over payoffs and opponents, as well as beliefs over opponents\' beliefs. The results of this experiment, which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games, strongly support our theory. We also show that the predictions of our model are highly consistent, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with well-known unresolved empirical puzzles. Our approach therefore serves as a novel, unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows for predictions across games.','','','','2015-05-11','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-03-30',NULL,NULL),(3972,'AL NAJJAR','Nabil','Northwestern','','','','','','\"This Time is Different..\"','','','Systematic deviations from ostensibly rational beliefs appear in many economic, financial, and business contexts. This paper introduces a steady-state competitive equilibrium model (Hopenhayn (1992),   Melitz (2003)) where firms maximize expected profit and hold beliefs that are calibrated with market aggregates. Firms agree that the aggregates accurately describe the distribution of productivities of others, but believe their own productivity is drawn from a better distribution.  Each firm believes its own project is special, that `this time is different.\'   In the steady-state, all firms and outside observers agree that market participants are, on average, over-optimistic and that there is over-entry. The equilibrium response to this collective `bias\' is a combination of lower prices, higher failure rates, and tighter credit. Corporate financing arrangements are determined in equilibrium, and display a combination of credit-rationing and funding at rates that firms view as too high.','','','','2015-05-18','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3973,'POSTLEWITE','Andrew ','University of Pennsylvania','','','','','','Informational size and two-stage mechanisms','Co-author : Richard P. McLean (Rutgers University)','','','http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/%7Eapostlew/paper/pdf/two%20stage.pdf','','','2015-06-01','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3974,'SALANIE','Bernard','Columbia','','','','','','What do Matching Models Predict?','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/SemRoyJuin2015.pdf','','','2015-06-08','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-05-19',NULL,NULL),(3975,'KARTIK','Navin','Columbia','','','','','','A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Signaling Games','Co-authors :  Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen ','','','','','','2015-06-15','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3976,'PASCALOU','Alain','ex-directeur technique du club du FC Le Mans ','','','','','','Accompagner des jeunes stagiaires pros et faire face à leur environnement','','','','','','','2015-03-18','17:30:00','19:00:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3977,'The eighth edition of the \"NGOs,','','*','','','','','','*','<br><br>\r\nMireille Chiroleu-Assouline (University Paris I, Paris School of Economics)<br>\r\n\"Merchants of Doubt: Lobbying Strategy when Scientific Credibility is Uncertain\" (with Thomas Lyon) \r\n<br><br>\r\nMichel Maietta (Action Against Hunger and IRIS)<br>\r\n\"Humanitarian access in crisis : risk aversion and innovation stalemate\"\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2015-05-19','14:00:00','18:00:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ONG','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3978,'BELLEFLAMME','Paul','UCL','','','','','','Strategic Promotion and Release Decisions in the Movie Market','Co-author(s) : Dimitri Paolini','','We study how production and promotion budgets can play a strategic\r\nrole for movie studios to secure the most profitable release dates\r\nby scaring off the competition. In a game-theoretic setting, where two\r\nstudios choose their budget before simultaneously setting the release\r\ndate of their movie, we prove that two equilibrium configurations are\r\npossible: either releases are simultaneous (at the demand peak) or\r\nthey are staggered (one studio delays the release of its movie so as to\r\navoid any overlap with the other movie). Interestingly, in the latter\r\nequilibrium, the first-mover secures its position by investing more in\r\nproduction and promotion than the second-mover. We test the predictions\r\nof our theoretical model on a dataset that comprises more than 1500 American movies released in ten countries from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2013. Our empirical analysis largely confirms\r\nthat higher budgets allow studios to move release dates closer to the\r\ndemand peaks.','','','','2015-03-16','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'io','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3815,'GILES','John','World Bank','','','','','','Migrant Opportunity and the Educational Attainment of Youth in Rural China','Co-author(s) : Alan de Brauw','','In this paper, we investigate how reductions of barriers to migration a¤ect the decision of middle school graduates to attend high school in rural China. Change in the cost of migration is identified using exogenous variation across counties in the timing of national identity card distribution, which made it easier for rural migrants to register as temporary residents in urban destinations. After taking care to address potential strengths and weaknesses of our identification strategy, we find a robust negative relationship between migrant opportunity and high school enrollment. The mechanisms behind the negative relationship are suggested by observed increases in the subsequent employment rates of high school age young adults in both local and migrant non-agricultural activities with increases in the share of village residents working as migrants outside the village.','','','','2014-11-12','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3908,'RODRIGUEZ','Ángel López','Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona','','','','','','Cross-ownership, R&D spillovers and Antitrust Policy','Co-author(s) : Xavier Vives','','','','','','2014-12-15','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3733,'The 6th NGO - Programme','','*','','','','','','','14:30-15:30 - Marie-Christine Apedo-Amah (Aix-Marseille University): <br>\"Implementing a development project with local private firms: how the legal structure of the firms and the risk aversion of workers determine the choice of the provider\"<br>\r\n\r\n15:30-16:00 Coffee Break <br>\r\n\r\n16:00-17:00 - Moritz Hennicke (Cergy University), <br>\r\n\"The Political Economy of Advocacy NGOs\"<br>\r\n\r\n17:00-18:00 - Discussion around ongoing and future work\r\n\r\n','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/HEN2014BIR.pdf','','','2014-09-30','14:00:00','18:00:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ONG','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3800,'STRZALECKI ','Tomasz','Harvard','','','','','','Stochastic choice and revealed perturbed utility','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/STR2014STO.pdf','','','2014-12-15','17:00:00','18:15:00','','Maison des Sciences Économiques (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle 115) 75013 Paris <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3756,'Sergei','SEVERINOV','UBS, Visiting PSE','','','','','','Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/SEV2014STR.pdf','','','2014-09-22','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE(106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle 6ème étage)75647 PARIS cedex 13',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3791,'HOPKINS ','Ed','Edinburgh School of Economics','','','','','','Inequality, Gender and Risk-Taking Behaviour','','','This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers a theoretical explanation of how risk-taking varies with gender, relative position and inequality. Individuals about to participate in a tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both consumption and tournament rewards. While this risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Indeed, the poorest will be risk loving if the value of the worst reward is sufficiently low. Further, the level of equality of wealth that is compatible with stability, that is gives no incentive to gamble, is increasing in the equality of rewards. Thus, inequality in rewards can cause inequality in wealth. Finally, in a marriage-matching version of the tournament, it is found that the more numerous gender will be more risk taking.\r\n','','','','2014-10-06','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75647 PARIS cedex 13 <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3792,'SZALAY ','Dezso','BONN','','','','','','Smooth, strategic communication','','','We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players\' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical environment - featuring symmetric loss functions and elliptically distributed parameters - in which the Sender\'s expected utility depends only on the first moment of his posterior. Despite disagreement about the use of underlying signals, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in differentiable strategies in which the Sender can credibly communicate posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to Sender and Receiver, respectively. We characterize extensive forms in which the quality of information is optimally designed of equal importance to Sender and Receiver so that the best equilibrium in terms of ex ante expected payoffs is a smooth communication equilibrium. The quality of smooth equilibrium communication is entirely determined by the correlation of interests. Senders with better aligned preferences are endogenously endowed with better information and therefore give more accurate advice.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/SZA2014SMO.pdf','','','2014-10-13','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE(106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75647 Paris Cedex 13 <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-18',NULL,NULL),(3793,'VARI','Miklos','PSE-EEP','','','','','','Implementing monetary policy in a fragmented monetary union','','','','','','','2014-09-17','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE(106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital -  SALLE B2.2) 75647 Paris - Cedex 13 <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3867,'CHOR ','Davin ','Singapore','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE – Room: tbc  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3868,'','WIP','Work In Progress','','','','','','meeting WIP','<br><br>\r\nBrice Fabre                                         (The trade-off between taxes and fees: evidence from French municipalities)\r\n<br><br>\r\nJonathan Goupille                                (Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches in France)\r\n<br><br>\r\nGeorges Vivien Houngbonon               (Why firms may set higher price markups)\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2014-10-29','11:00:00','12:30:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'WIP','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4024,'UNGARO','Stefano','*','','','','','',' An inquiry on determinants of risk: the French money market between 1880 and 1914','','','','','','','2016-01-19','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ENS0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4009,'MURTIN','Fabrice','OCDE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-10-13','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4011,'WALDENSTROM','Daniel','Université Paris Ouest','','','','','','Intergenerational wealth mobility and the role of inheritance: Evidence from multiple generations','  ','','','','','','2015-09-08','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4013,'Nur','Jamil','PSE','','','','','','Contracting Tenure in a Dual Labor Market','','','','','','','2015-09-22','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4134,'GROSSMAN','G.','University of Princeton','','','','','','Growth, Trade, and Inequality ',' Co-author: E. Helpman','','',' http://www.princeton.edu/~grossman/Growth_Trade_and_Inequality082415.pdf','','','2015-09-22','14:45:00','16:15:00','','Sciences Po(28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405 )','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','COMINTE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4014,'DUPAS','Pascaline','Stanford University','','','','','','','','','','','','','2015-09-29','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4131,'FABER','B.','University of Berkeley','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-09-29','14:45:00','16:15:00','','Sciences Po(28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405)','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','COMINTE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4015,'STEIN','Mattea','*','','','','','','Reforming the Speed of Justice: Evidence from an Event Study in Senegal','','','','','','','2015-10-20','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4016,'DUPRAZ','Yannick','PSE','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-10-27','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4017,'FERRIERE','Nathalie','*','','','','','','How do other donors react to European food aid  allocation ?','','','','','','','2015-11-03','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4018,'VANDA','Almeida','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-11-10','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4019,'SPAENJERS','Christophe','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-11-17','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4020,'FABRE','Brice','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-11-24','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4021,'BOLTZ-LAEMME','Marie ','PSE','','','','','','\"Preference for Hidden Income and Redistribution to Kin and Neighbors: A Lab-in-the-field Experiment in Senegal','','','','','','','2015-12-01','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4022,'MULLEROVA','Alzbeta','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-12-08','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4023,'GARROUSTE','Manon','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-12-15','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4002,'HUANG','Yang','PSE','','','','','','Better off Leaving Your Children behind ? The Impacts of School Fees on Migrants’ Decision to Bring their Children to Host Cities in China','','','','','','','2015-06-16','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','OUI','OUI','OUI','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4003,'ALMEIDA','Vanda','PSE','','','','','','Income inequality and redistribution in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis: the US case','','','','','','','2015-06-30','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3941,'SCHOTTE','Manuel ','Université de Lille 2','','','','','','Pourquoi les footballeurs sont-ils tant payés ? Linéaments d\'une explication socio-historique','','','','','','','2015-02-11','18:00:00','19:30:00','1ENSf100','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3998,'HESKI','Bar Isaac','University of Toronto','','','','','','Multidimensional Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Efficiency','Co-author(s) : Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver','','','','','','2015-06-01','12:00:00','13:15:00','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3997,'DAHL','Gordon','Department of Economics UC San Diego','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-10-06','00:00:12','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3999,'BOUGUEN','Adrien','*','','','','','','Changing Behavior or Changing Perceptions? New Perspectives from a Parental Intervention in South Africa','','','','','','','2015-05-19','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4000,'ARABZADEH','Hamzeh','*','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-05-27','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE (salle B2.2)','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4001,'FABRE','Brice Fabre','PSE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-06-02','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3983,'GAYANT','Jean-Pascal','Université du Mans','','','','','','Comment mesurer l’ImBalance Competitive dans les ligues de football professionnel ?','','','','','','','2015-04-08','17:30:00','19:00:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3956,'','WIP','Work In Progress','','','','','','meeting WIP','<br><br>\r\n\r\nKenneth Houngbedji             \r\n<br>\r\nLand Certification and Child Welfare in Ethiopia\r\n<br><br>\r\nClaudia Hupkau\r\n<br>\r\nFertility and labour supply: new evidence from the UK\r\n<br><br>\r\nAnthony Lepinteur                \r\n<br>\r\nSpousal Working Hours Mismatch and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Germany\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2015-02-25','11:00:00','12:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'WIP','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4007,'ALDAMA','Pierre','*','','','','','','Public debt sustainability under a regime-switching fiscal policy rule','','','','','','','2015-03-03','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE (salle B2.2)','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4008,'ARRONDEL','Luc','PSE-CNRS','','','','','','L\'épargnant français dans la crise : préférences, anticipations et choix de portefeuille','Co-author(s) : André Masson','','','','','','2015-06-18','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENS0004','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3794,'BARTAL','Mehdi','PSE','','','','','','A Subsidy To Reduce Layoffs: Is It Effective?','','','','','','','2014-10-01','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle B 2.2) 75647 Paris Cedex 13 <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3795,'PALME','Joakim ','Uppsala University, Sweden','','','','','','The Paradox of Redistribution Revisited','Discussant: Elvire Guillaud (University Paris 1, CES)','','Welfare States come with different aims. To reduce poverty and inequality figures as a prominent goal, especially in times of rising inequalities. How do we design welfare states to work well as strategies of equality? The ‘Paradox of Redistribution’ (Korpi and Palme, 1998) stated that the more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality. Comparative data for a number of OECD countries concerning the situation in the mid-1980s appeared to be congruent with this hypothesis. More recently, a series of studies seem to call this finding into question. The aim of the present paper is not only to check the validity of some of these claims but also to discuss the political economy argument behind the paradox, examine measurement problems and outline alternative approaches to the study of the relationship between the welfare state and equality. It is argued that we can learn a lot more by (i) putting the generosity and distributive profile of benefit programs into the context of the political economy of the welfare state, (ii) being more specific about program design and target populations, (iii) broadening the perspective of policy instruments, and (iv) extending the accounting framework in order to capture also the \'horizontal\' and \'risk\' redistributions in addition to the \'vertical\' one.<br>','','','','2014-10-07','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE (106-112, blv de l\'Hôpital -  Room 19) 75013 Paris ',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3796,'KUHN','Theresa','University of Amsterdam, Netherlands ','','','','','','Transnational solidarity in the EU. Analysing citizens’ redistributional behaviour in laboratory experiments','Discussant: tba <br>\r\nCo-author(s) : Hector Solaz (University of Birmingham)','','The European sovereign debt crisis and the political turf wars it entailed have\r\nunderlined both the political relevance and the fragile state of transnational solidarity in\r\nthe European Union. In this paper, we study to what degree German and British citizens\r\ndisplay some forms of solidarity with fellow Europeans by analysing their redistributional\r\nbehaviour in laboratory experiments. We examine to what extent people are willing to\r\nredistribute EU-wide, and which personal characteristics make people more generous\r\ntowards other Europeans. Our analyses find that people are most willing to redistribute\r\nlocally rather than nationally or EU-wide, and that people’s orientations towards\r\nEuropean integration are the strongest predictor of transnational redistribution, while\r\npolitical ideology and inequality aversion don’t seem to play a role.','','','','2014-11-18','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE(106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - room 19) Paris 13',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3797,'SPIRE  ','Alexis','Iris, EHESS','','','','','','Comment étudier le rapport à l\'impôt ?','Discussant: Jérôme Gautié (University Paris 1, CES)\r\n\r\n','','','','','','2014-12-16','16:30:00','18:00:00','','Maison des Sciences Économiques (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3798,'CAVAILLE','Charlotte','Harvard University, Center for European Studies','','','','','','Social Policy Preferences in Mature Welfare States: the Role of Reciprocity','Discussant: Elvire GUILLAUD (University Paris 1, CES)\r\n\r\n','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CAV2015SOC.pdf','','','2015-01-20','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-08',NULL,NULL),(3799,'BACCARO','Lucio','University of Geneva, Dpt of Sociology','','','','','','Determinants of Open-Ended Contracts in Europe: The Role of Unemployment and Job Characteristics','Co-authors: J. Galindoa and R. Gökhan Koçera <br>\r\n\r\nDiscussant: Discussant: Bruno Amable (University Paris 1, CES)','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/BAC2015DET.pdf','','','2015-02-03','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3862,'PEDRONO','Justine','Aix Marseille School of Economics','','','','','','Banking leverage with two funding currencies','','','','','','','2014-10-06','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3813,'SOMANATHAN','Rohini','Delhi Shool of Economics','','','','','','Community contracts: An experimental investigation of rule formation in Indian villages','Co-author(s) : Karla Hoff and Pontus Strimling','','','','','','2014-10-01','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ecodeve','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3814,'PATNAM','Manassa','ENSAE-CREST','','','','','','Targeted transfers, inequality, and poverty outcomes from the break up of states : evidence from the réorganization of states in India','Co-author(s) : Amrita DHILLON, Pramila KRISHNAN,  and Carlo PERRONI','','We describe a model of targeted redistribution choices by a self-interested incumbent politician, and use it to derive predictions about public good provision levels and poverty outcomes following secession of a region from a political union. Secession of one of those other regions, by removing private rent-seeking incentives for the incumbent, reduces targeted redistribution in the seceded jurisdiction, raising public good provision and improving the distribution of welfare. The model\'s predictions are examined in light of evidence on inequality and poverty outcomes following the political break-up that resulted in the creation three new Indian states. We use satellite data on night-time lights to proxy for economic activity across new and old state borders. Employing a regression discontinuity design we find a significant decrease in inequality in new states post break-up. Our result indicate that this effect is driven entirely by a decrease in inequality amongst natural resource poor regions in the new states, post break-up.','','','','2014-10-15','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3854,'PAPAIOANNOU','Elias','London Business School','','','','','','Federal Transfer Multipliers: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities','','','','','','https://sites.google.com/site/papaioannouelias/research/working-papers','2014-10-02','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3816,'MOBARAK','Mushfik','University of Yale','','','','','','Can Network Theory based Targeting Increase Technology Adoption?','Co-author(s) : L. Beaman, A. BenYishay and J. Magruder','','In order to induce farmers to adopt agricultural technologies in Malawi, we apply diffusion models of simple and complex contagion on rich social network data from 200 villages in Malawi to identify optimal seed farmers to target and train on the new technologies. A randomized controlled trial compares these theory-driven network targeting approaches to simpler, scalable strategies that either rely on a government extension worker or an easily measurable proxy for the social network (geographic distance between households) to identify seed farmers. Adoption rates over three years are greater in villages that received the theory-based data intensive targeting treatments. The data, interpreted through the lens of the theory, yield insights on the nature of diffusion, and are most consistent with a learning environment where farmers need to know more than one person with knowledge of the technology before they adopt themselves.','','','http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/MNW.pdf','2014-12-03','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3817,'SADOULET','Elisabeth','UC-Berkeley','','de JANVRY','Alain ','UC-Berkeley','','Utility, Risk, and Demand for Incomplete Insurance: Lab Experiments with Guatemalan Cooperatives','Co-author(s) : Craig McIntosh and Felix Povell','','We play a series of incentivized laboratory games with risk-exposed coffee farmers in Guatemala to understand the demand for index-based excess rainfall insurance. By varying risk in systematic ways over a large number of games, we can use numerical techniques to estimate explicit flexible utility functions for each player, and with these to simulate demand under alternate scenarios. We introduce the presence of the types of novel drought risks likely to be driven by global warming and find that these lead to sharp decreases in flood insurance demand, even when the objective benefit of the flood insurance is held constant. The possibility of using group-based mechanisms to smooth idiosyncratic risk is introduced by playing games with group-based products, and by asking farmers to anticipate and deliberate on the extent to which their groups would effectively smooth risk. Our results indicate that elevated weather-driven variance has very different effects if it occurs inside of insured or uninsured states, and that groups provide a very imperfect way of protecting farmers from these risks.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/UTI2015ELI.pdf','','','2015-01-14','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3818,'FERRAZ','Claudio','PUC Rio','','','','','','Human Capital and Development: The Long-Term Legacy of State Sponsored Settlements in Brazil','','','\r\nThis paper examines the effect of human capital on long-run\r\ndevelopment by exploiting variation from a\r\nState policy that attracted educated immigrants into state sponsored\r\nsettlements during the\r\nera of mass migration in Brazil. We show that immediately after the\r\nestablishment of\r\nsettlements, the population living in these areas had higher educational\r\nlevels than elsewhere in the state. At that moment, settlements were\r\nstill similar to other areas, but for educational levels. In 1940\r\nand 2000, after settlements had ceased to exist, populations living\r\nin these areas continued to be more educated. Local communities that\r\ndeveloped from settlements used more educational inputs throughout\r\nthe period and, over time, shifted occupations towards human capital\r\nintensive activities. In 2000, areas corresponding to previous settlements\r\nhad income per capita 15\\% higher than the remainder of the state.\r\nThe evidence indicates that the educational composition of immigrants\r\npersisted through time and led, in the long run, to higher levels\r\nof development.','','','','2014-09-25','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3819,'BENNEDSEN','Morten','INSEAD','','','','','','Family firms and labour market reforms','','','','','','','2014-09-22','12:00:00','13:30:00','','MSE 106-112 bld de l\'hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13 - salle S2 ',NULL,NULL,NULL,'io','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3820,'TOMALA	','Tristan','Visite PSE','','','','','','Atomic Dynamic Congestion Games','Co-authors:  \r\nMarco Scarsini (LUISS), Marc Schroeder (U. Maastricht) & Tristan Tomala (HEC Paris)','','In this paper, we propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games  with atomic players. This approach allows to give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and to study how the steady state is reached, either when players act selfishly, or when the traffic is controlled by  a planner. We model also seasonalities by assuming that departure flows fluctuate periodically with time. We focus mostly on simple networks and\r\n give closed form formulas for the long-run  equilibrium and optimal latencies, as functions of the seasonality. We then derive computations and bounds on the price of anarchy.  We also characterize optimal and equilibrium flows and show that, although they produce different costs, they coincide from some time onwards. ','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/TOM2014DYN.pdf','','','2014-11-03','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle S/2) 75013 Paris <br>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-17',NULL,NULL),(3821,' BRAMOULLE','Yann','Aix-Marseille','','','','','','Altruism in Networks','Co-author : Renaud Bourlès	','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/BRA2014ALT.pdf','','','2014-11-17','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris ',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-17',NULL,NULL),(3822,'LOVO','Stefano','HEC','','','','','','Robust Price Formation','Co-authors : J. Hörner et T. Tomala','','','','','','2014-11-24','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75013 PARIS',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-17',NULL,NULL),(3823,'GALEOTTI','Andrea','Essex','','','','','','Information on consumption’s externalities, monopoly pricing and consumers’  surplus','','','The increase in the information that firms can obtain about the interactions and influences of their consumers motivates two important questions: How does the pricing strategy of a firm reacts to detailed information on consumers\' externalities? Is the availability and use of such information beneficial or detrimental for consumer welfare? We study these questions in a model where a monopoly sells a network good and may price discriminate using information on consumers\' influences and/or on consumers\' susceptibilities to influence. Our framework incorporates a rich set of market products, including goods characterized by global and local network effects. The optimal pricing takes a simple form, which entails a price discount for the influence of consumers and a price premium for their susceptibility; both of these components are a function of the pattern of externalities across consumers. We can determine under which conditions, relative to uniform price, consumer surplus increases. We provide a full characterization of the value of network information for the monopolist.','','','','2014-12-01','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75013 PARIS<BR>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-17',NULL,NULL),(3824,'STANCHEVA','Stephanie','Harvard University','','','','','','Optimal taxation and human capital policies over the life cycle','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/STA2014OPT.pdf','','','2014-12-08','17:00:00','18:15:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75013 PARIS<BR>',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-09-17',NULL,NULL),(3826,'RAY','Anna','Paris School of Economics / Sciences Po','','','','','','The Anatomy of Foreign Direct Investment — World Greenfield and Merger & Acquisition Flows','','','','','','','2014-09-22','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3827,'HINZ','Julian','PSE','','','','','','Time-variant distances in the gravity model: the view from space','','','','','','','2014-09-08','12:00:00','13:00:00','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3962,'GEORGIEFF ','Alexandre','PSE','','','','','','Employment Protection and Subjective Well-Being','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3963,'GEORGIEFF','Alexandre','PSE','','','','','','Employment Protection and Subjective Well-Being','','','','','','','2015-02-24','17:00:00','18:00:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-02-23',NULL,NULL),(3965,'CHOR ','Davin ','Singapore','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE – Room: tbc  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3870,'LEFEBVRE','Mathieu','BETA Université Strasbourg','','','','','','Common components of risk and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30 countries','Co-author(s) : Ferdinand M. Vieider, Ranoua Bouchouicha, Thorsten Chmura, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Michal Krawczyk, Peter Martinsson','','','','','','2014-11-20','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3871,'PONTHIERE','Gregory','PSE Université Paris Est','','','','','','Pollution, mortalité et compensation','','','','','','','2014-12-04','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3872,'VERGNAUD','Jean-Christophe','CNRS Paris 1','','','','','','Stabilité des préférences dans le risque après une expérience à fort impact psychologique','','','','','','','2015-01-22','17:30:00','18:45:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3873,'PESTIEAU','Pierre','Université de Liège','','','','','','Long term care social insurance with two-sided altruism','','','','','','','2015-02-19','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3874,'THOMAS','Julien','ISFA Lyon 1','','','','','','Construction et validation des tables de mortalité prospectives: le contexte de l\'assurance','','','','','','','2015-03-19','17:00:00','18:15:00','','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3875,'ZUBER','Stéphane','CNRS Paris 1','','','','','','Preference diversity and fair intertemporal allocation of consumption','Co-author(s) : Marc Fleurbaey and Grégory Ponthière ','','','','','','2015-04-16','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'GDTRISQ','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3876,'ARRONDEL','Luc','PSE-CNRS','','','','','','L\'épargnant français dans la crise : préférences, anticipations et choix de portefeuille','Co-author(s) : André Masson','','','','','','2015-06-04','18:00:00','19:15:00','1ensA004','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'GDTRISQ','OUI','OUI','OUI','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3877,'GRUJOVIC','Anja','University of Geneva','','','','','','Trade and long term unemployment: A quantitative assessment','Co-author(s) Céline Carrère and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud','','We develop a multi-country, multi-sector, trade gravity model with labour market frictions and long-term equilibrium unemployment. We find that trade liberalisation may lead to a rise in unemployment if it results in labour reallocation towards sectors with higher-than-average labour market frictions. We calibrate the model using panel trade data and estimated sector-specific labour market frictions to quantify the employment and welfare effects of the potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on OECD countries.','','','','2014-11-10','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3878,'','','','','','','','','','14:30-15:30  Michel GENET <br>\r\nGreenpeace, the (beautiful?) and unknown NGO\r\n\r\n15:30-16:00 Coffee Break <br>\r\n\r\n16:00-17:00 Malika Hamadi (Cergy University) <br>\r\nCompetition, Loan Rates and Information Dispersion in Microcredit Market\". <br>\r\n\r\n17:00-18:00 Discussion around ongoing and future work\r\n\r\n\r\n','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/HAM2015COM.pdf','','','2015-01-20','14:00:00','18:00:00','1ENSF100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ONG','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3880,'NUNEZ','Thais','Paris School of Economics / Paris 1','','','','','','International Waste Trade: The Impact of European Regulation on World Trade','','','','','','','2014-11-17','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S17 ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3881,'BEESTERMOELLER','Matthias','Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich','','','','','','A Dissection of Trading Capital: Cultural persistence of trade in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain','','','\r\nWe show that the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy trade significantly more with one another in the aftermath of the collapse of the Iron Curtain than predicted by a standard gravity model. This trade surplus declines linearly and monotonically over time. We argue that these findings suggest that decaying cultural forces explain a significant part of trading capital. We document the rate of decay of these cultural forces.','','','','2014-12-01','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S17 ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3882,'PITON','Sophie','PSE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE Room S17','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3883,'PITON','Sophie','PSE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2014-12-15','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S17','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3884,'AUBRY','Amandine','IRES-Université Catholique de Louvain','','','','','','Migration, FDI and the Margins of Trade','','','','','','','2014-11-24','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S17','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3885,'DUSSAUX','Damien','CERNA / MINES ParisTech','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-01-12','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3886,'RAVASAN','Farshad','PSE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-01-26','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3887,'RAY','Anna','PSE / Sciences Po','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-02-09','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3888,'STREINGRESS','Walter','Banque de France / Université de Montréal','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2015-02-23','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3889,'LOPEZ FORERO','Margarita','*','','','','','','FDI and MPK under Financial Frictions','','','','','','','2014-11-26','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3890,'','','*','','','','','','SEANCE ANNULEE','','','','','','','2014-12-10','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3891,'BEAUD','Stéphane ','UPX et ETT/CMH ','','','','','','Le recrutement social des footballeurs professionnels (français): une vue en longue période ','','','','','','','2014-12-17','17:30:00','19:00:00','1ENSe101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3898,'CHOR ','Davin ','Singapore','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE – Room: tbc  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3900,'CHOR ','Davin ','Singapore','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE – Room: tbc  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris ','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4025,'','','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2014-11-07','14:30:00','16:00:00','','MSE – Salle 6ème, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'','OUI','OUI','OUI','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3909,'KINDERMAN','Daniel','University of Delaware, Dpt  Political Science/ International Relation','','','','','','Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of Business Interests: The New Social Market Initiative and German Employers’ Quest for Liberalization, 2000–2014','','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/KIN2015CHA.pdf','','','2015-03-24','16:30:00','18:00:00','','Maison des Sciences Economiques (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital, room 19) 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3910,'BOLTZ','Marie','PSE','','VILLAR','Paola','PSE','','Preference for unobservable income and informal redistribution in community networks : a lab-the-field experiment in Senegal','','','','','','','2014-12-16','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3911,'','','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2015-01-13','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3915,'RISTINIEMI','Annukka','*','','','','','','A Laffer curve of sovereign debt and liquidity','','','','','','','2015-01-21','17:00:00','18:30:00','','MSE-salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3936,'','','*','','','','','','*','<br><br>\r\n- Clémentine Van Effenterre (PSE): \"Papa does preach: Daughters and preferences towards abortion right\".\r\n<br><br>\r\n- Anthony Lepinteur (PSE): \"Spousal Working Hours Mismatch and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Germany\".\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2015-02-10','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3913,'ESÖ','Peter','Oxford University','','','','','','Persuasion and Pricing','Co-author :  Chris Wallace (University of Leicester)','','','','','','2015-01-05','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2014-12-18',NULL,NULL),(3914,'LAMBA','Rohit','Cambridge','','','','','','Repeated Bargaining: A Mechanism Design Approach','','','Through a model of repeated bargaining between a buyer and a seller, with changing\r\nprivate information on both sides, this paper addresses questions of eciency and\r\ninstitutional structures in dynamic mechanism design. A new technical device in the\r\nform of a history dependent version of payo equivalence is established. A new notion\r\nof interim budget balance is introduced which allows for the role of an intermediary\r\nbut with bounded credit lines. We then construct a mechanism, which provides a\r\nnecessary and sucient condition for eciency under interim budget balance. The\r\nexistence of a future surplus can be used as collateral to sustain eciency, and its size\r\ndetermines the possibility. The mechanism also oers a simple and realistic implementation.\r\nA characterization of ecient implementation under ex post budget balance\r\nis also provided. Further, a characterization for the second best is presented, and\r\nits equivalent Ramsey pricing formulation is established. A suboptimal, but incentive\r\ncompatible mechanism for the second best with intuitive properties is presented.\r\nWhen property rights are \r\nuid, that is, the good can be shared, a folk theorem with\r\na simple mechanism is constructed.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/LAM2015REP.pdf','','','2015-01-26','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3916,'BENHENDA','Asma ','PSE','','','','','','How to Identify Good Teachers? Teacher Evaluations and Student Achievement.','','','','','','','2015-01-27','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3917,'SERGI','Francesco','PSE','','','','','','Quelle méthodologie pour une étude des modèles DSGE ?','','','','','','','2015-02-04','17:00:00','18:30:00','','MSE-salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3918,'NIEDERMAYER','Andras NIEDERMAYER','Uni Mannheim','','','','','','Foreclosure Auctions','Co-author(s) : Artyom Shneyerov (Concordia University, CIREQ, CIRANO) and Pai Xu(University of Hong Kong)','','We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special\r\nfeature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. We get three\r\npredictions: (i) lenders\' bids are bunched at the amount owed, (ii) if all auctions observed\r\nexhibit a common value component, there are gaps in lenders\' bids, (iii) if there are both\r\nindependent private values and common value component auctions, there will be no gaps,\r\nbut non-monotonicity of the probability of sale in the reserve price. Using novel data from\r\nPalm Beach County (US), we show that (i) and (iii), but not (ii) are consistent with the\r\ndata. Further, the data is consistent with the claim that adverse selection plays less of a\r\nrole for securitized than for non-securitized mortgages. Our theory also allows an analysis\r\nof the welfare effect of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosures.\r\n','','','','2015-01-19','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3922,'LAFFERS','Lukas','Norwegian School of Economics ','','','','','','Bounding Average Treatment Effects using Linear Programming','','','This paper presents a method of calculating sharp bounds on the average treatment\r\neffect using linear programming under identifying assumptions commonly\r\nused in the literature. This new method provides a sensitivity analysis of the\r\nidentifying assumptions and missing data in an application regarding the effect\r\nof parent’s schooling on children’s schooling. Even a mild departure from identifying\r\nassumptions may substantially widen the bounds on average treatment\r\neffects. Allowing for a small fraction of the data to be missing also has a large\r\nimpact on the results.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/JMP LUKAS LAFFERS.pdf','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CV LAKAS LAFFERS.pdf','','2015-01-19','12:15:00','13:30:00','1ensA002','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'JOBMARS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3923,'KETZ','Philipp','Brown University','','','','','','Testing near or at the Boundary of the Parameter Space','','','Statistical inference about a scalar parameter is often performed using the two-sided ttest.\r\nIn extremum problems, where the estimator satises the restrictions on the parameter\r\nspace - such as the nonnegativity of a variance parameter -, the test suers from size distortions\r\nwhen the true parameter vector is near or at the boundary of the parameter space.\r\nNevertheless, the two-sided t-test continues to be used when estimates are found to be close\r\nto the boundary. This can be attributed to a lack of inference procedures that appropriately\r\naccount for boundary eects on the asymptotic distribution of the estimator. To address this\r\nissue, we propose an estimator that is asymptotically normally distributed, even when the\r\ntrue parameter vector is near or at the boundary, and the objective function is not dened\r\noutside the parameter space. The novel estimator allows the implementation of several existing\r\ntesting procedures and a new test based on the Conditional Likelihood Ratio statistic\r\n(CLR). Compared to the existing procedures, the new test is easy to implement and has\r\ngood power properties. Moreover, it oers power advantages over the two-sided t-test, when\r\nthe latter controls size. We also show the test to be admissible when inference is performed\r\nwith respect to a scalar parameter. We apply the test to the random coecients logit model\r\nusing data on the European car market and nd more evidence of heterogeneity in consumer\r\npreferences than suggested by the two-sided t-test.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/JMP PHILIPP KETZ.pdf','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CV PHILIPP KETZ.pdf','','2015-01-21','12:30:00','13:45:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'JOBMARS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3924,'DZEMSKI','Andreas','University of Mannheim','','','','','','An empirical model of dyadic link formation in a network with unobserved heterogeneity','','','In this paper I present a new model of dyadic link formation for directed\r\nnetworks that extends the classical model by Holland and Leinhardt 1981.\r\nAgents are endowed with unobserved effects that govern their ability to establish\r\nlinks (productivity) and to receive links (popularity). The unobserved\r\neffects are modelled by a fixed effects approach allowing for arbitrary correlation\r\nbetween the observed homophily component and latent sources of degree\r\nheterogeneity. The model can be estimated by conditional ML but inference\r\nis non-standard due to the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott\r\n1948). I consider estimation of the parametric part of the linking model as\r\nwell as estimation of a measure of network transitivity. Moreover, I suggest a\r\nspecification test for the dyadic model based on predicted transitivity. My\r\napproach overcomes the incidental parameters problem by using explicit\r\ncorrection formulas based on an asymptotic approximation that sends the\r\nnumber of agents to infinity. My simulation design suggests promising finite\r\nsample performance. A linking model neglecting unobserved sources of degree\r\nheterogeneity predicts an insuficient amount of transitivity. This effect is\r\nproven for a stylized model and its empirical relevance is confirmed using\r\ndata on favor networks in Indian villages. In this application, a transitivity\r\nstatistic changes sign when unobserved agent effects are added. This suggests\r\nthat, in the real world, unobserved heterogeneity may be a primary driver of\r\nlocal clustering behavior.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/JMP ANDREAS DZEMKI.pdf','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CV ANDREAS DZEMSKI.pdf','','2015-01-27','12:30:00','13:45:00','1ensA002','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'JOBMARS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3925,'CAMPONOVO','Lorenzo','University of St.Gallen','','','','','','On the Validity of the Pairs Bootstrap for Lasso Estimators','','','We study the validity of the pairs bootstrap for Lasso estimators in linear regression models with random covariates and heteroscedastic error terms. We show that the naive pairs bootstrap does not consistently estimate the distribution of the Lasso estimator. In particular, we identify two different sources for the failure of the bootstrap. First, in the bootstrap samples the Lasso estimator fails to correctly mimic the population moment condition satisfied by the regression parameter. Second, the bootstrap Lasso estimation criterion does not reproduce the sign of the zero coefficients with sufficient accuracy. To overcome these problems we introduce a modified pairs bootstrap procedure that consistently estimates the distribution of the Lasso estimator. Finally, we consider also the adaptive Lasso estimator. Also in this case, we show that the modified pairs bootstrap consistently estimates the distribution of the adaptive Lasso estimator. Monte Carlo simulations confirm a desirable accuracy of the modified pairs bootstrap procedure. These results show that when properly defined the pairs bootstrap may provide a valid approach for estimating the distribution of Lasso estimators.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/JMP LORENZO CAMPONOVO2.pdf','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CV CAMPONOVO LORENZO.pdf','','2015-01-29','12:30:00','13:45:00','','MSE – Room: S/1  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'JOBMARS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3926,'SANT\'ANNA','Pedro H.C. ','Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ','','','','','','Nonparametric Tests for Conditional Treatment Effects with Duration Outcomes','','','This paper proposes new nonparametric tests for treatment eects when the out-\r\ncome of interest, typically a duration, is subjected to right censoring. Our tests are\r\nbased on Kaplan-Meier integrals, and do not rely on distributional assumptions, shape\r\nrestrictions, nor on restricting the potential treatment eect heterogeneity across dif-\r\nferent subpopulations. The proposed tests are consistent against xed alternatives\r\nand can detect nonparametric alternatives converging to the null at the parametric\r\nn????1=2-rate, n being the sample size. Finite sample properties of the proposed tests are\r\nexamined by means of a Monte Carlo study. We illustrate the use of the proposed pol-\r\nicy evaluation tools by studying the eect of labor market programs on unemployment\r\nduration based on experimental and observational datasets.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/JMP P. SANTANNA.pdf','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/CV PEDRO SANTANNA.pdf','','2015-01-30','12:30:00','13:45:00','','MSE – Room: à préciser  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'JOBMARS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3927,'DRUT','Bastien','CNAM','','','','','','Economie du football professionnel ','','','','','','','2015-01-28','18:00:00','19:30:00','1ensA002','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3931,'ATTAR','Andrea','University of Roma Tor Vergata,Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI','','','','','','Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts','Co-authors : Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié\r\n','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/ATT2015MUL.pdf','','','2015-02-09','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3932,'LESHNO','Jacob','Columbia','','','','','','Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition','Co-authors :Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria','','','http://www.columbia.edu/~jl4130/AKL-Unbalanced%20Matching.pdf','','','2015-03-02','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3933,'GANGULI','Jayant','ESSEX','','','','','','Pricing effects of ambiguous private information.','','','','http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154383','','','2015-03-09','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-02-26',NULL,NULL),(3934,'MOULIN','Hervé','University of Galsgow (Visite Polytechnique)','','','','','','One dimensional mechanism design','','','When agents\'allocations are one-dimensional and preferences are convex, the three perenial goals of mechanism design, efficiency, prior-free incentive compatibility and fairness (horizontal equity) are compatible. This has been known for decades in the cases of voting and of division of a non disposable commodity. We show that it is in fact true when the range of allocation profiles is an arbitrary convex and compact set.\r\nExamples include: load balancing with arbitrary flow graph constraints;!coordinating joint work inside a team or across teams, when individual contributions are substitutable or complementary; and any joint venture with a convex technology where each agent provides a single input or consumes a single output. The set of efficient, incentive compatible and fair mechanisms is very rich, and additional requirement such as consistency are needed to identify reasonable candidates.','','','','2015-03-16','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ensE101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-02-17',NULL,NULL),(3935,'DEKEL','Eddie','Economics Department, Northwestern University, and School of Economic','','','','','','Disclosure and Choice','Co-author(s) : Elchanan Ben-Porath and Barton L. Lipman','','An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer\'s expectation of the outcome. With some probability,  the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient : the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk-averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent\'s worst-case equilibrium payoff.','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/EDD2015DIS.pdf','','','2015-03-23','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3937,'MURARD','Elie','PSE','','','','','','How does migration affect individual attitudes towards redistribution? Empirical evidence across European countries.','','','','','','','2015-03-24','17:00:00','18:30:00','1ensreun','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3992,'SPIEGLER','Ran Spiegler','Tel-Aviv University and University College London','','','','','','Search Design and Broad Matching','','','','','','','2015-05-18','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3993,'DUHAUTOIS ','Richard','CEE-recherche','','','','','','Quelques exemples de travaux empiriques sur le football','','','','','','','2015-05-20','17:30:00','19:00:00','1ENSf100','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'FOOT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3994,'','','*','','','','','','*','Asma Benhenda  <br>                   \"How to Identify Good Teachers? Teachers Evaluation and Student Achievement\"\r\n<br><br>\r\nAnne Hilger <br>                           \"Non-cognitive skills, social networks, and labor market outcomes in Bangladesh\"\r\n<br><br>\r\nCamille Terrier\r\n<br>                        \"The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence\"\r\n<br><br>','','','','','','2015-05-20','11:00:00','12:30:00','1ens0010','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'WIP','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3861,'XU','Meina','PSE','','','','','','Intermediaries and quality sorting in China','','','','','','','2014-09-29','12:00:00','13:00:00','','MSE Room S19','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNCINT','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3863,'BECARD','Yvan','PSE','','','','','','Procyclical leverage and Business Cycles','','','','','','','2014-10-29','17:00:00','18:00:00','','MSE - salle B2.2','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PSE-PSI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3982,'JACOBS','Alan','University of British Columbia','','','','','','Inequality and Electoral Accountability: How Voters in the OECD Respond to the Distribution of Economic Gains','Co-authors : T. Hicks and J.S. Matthews <br>\r\nDiscussant: Michael ZEMMOUR (University Lille 1, CLERSE, LIEPP Sciences Po)','','','','','','2015-06-09','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE(106-112, blv de l\'Hôpital-room 19-75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ECOPCIN','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','2015-04-10',NULL,NULL),(3980,'DURAND','Cédric','University of Paris 13, CEPN and CEMI/EHESS','','','','','','Le capital fictif : comment la finance s\'approprie notre avenir','Discussant: Thibault DARCILLON (University Paris 7, CES/LADYSS)\r\n','','','','','','2015-03-31','16:30:00','18:00:00','','MSE (106-112, boulevard de l\'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris',NULL,NULL,NULL,'ecopcin','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3944,'MANIQUET','François','Université de Louvain','','','','','','Fairness and well-being measurement','Co-authors : Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet','','','/ydepot/semin/texte1314/MAN2015FAI.pdf','','','2015-03-30','17:00:00','18:15:00','1ENSE101','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'SEMRFOU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3946,'HOUNGBEDJI','Kenneth','PSE','','','','','','Early Effects of Land Registration in Benin','Co-author(s) : Markus Goldstein, Florence Kondylis, Michael O\'Sullivan and Harris Selod','','','','','','2015-02-13','12:15:00','13:15:00','1ENS101','',NULL,NULL,NULL,'LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3942,'KYLE','Margaret','Mines Paris Tech','','','','','','Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS','joint with Yi Qian ','','We examine the eect of pharmaceutical patent protection on the speed of drug launch,\r\nprice, and quantity in 60 countries from 2000-2013. The World Trade Organization required\r\nits member countries to implement a minimum level of patent protection within a specied\r\ntime period as part of the TRIPS Agreement. However, members retained the right to impose\r\nprice controls and to issue compulsory licenses under certain conditions. These countervailing\r\npolicies were intended to reduce the potential static losses that result from reduced competition\r\nduring the patent term. Using detailed patent data at both the product and country levels,\r\nwe exploit the fact that selection into 	reatment\" with a post-TRIPS patent is exogenously\r\ndetermined by compliance deadlines that vary across countries. We nd that patents have\r\nimportant consequences for access to new drugs: in the absence of a patent, launch is unlikely.\r\nThat is, even when no patent barrier exists, generic entry may not occur. Conditional on launch,\r\npatented drugs have higher prices but higher sales as well. The price premium associated with\r\npatents is smaller in poorer countries. Price discrimination across countries has increased for\r\ndrugs patented post-TRIPS and prices are negatively related to the burden of disease, suggesting\r\nthat countervailing policies to oset expected price increases may have had the intended eects.','','','','2015-02-09','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ensA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3940,'VALSECCHI','Michele','University of Gothenberg','','','','','','Resource Windfalls and Public Goods: Evidence From a Policy Reform in Indonesia','','','','','','','2015-02-11','12:30:00','13:45:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECODEVE','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(3938,'ENIKOLOPOV','Ruben','Institute of Political Economy and Governance - Barcelone','','','','','','Electoral Rules and Political Selection:  Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan','co-author(s) : Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Georgy Egorov','','','','','','2015-02-05','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'PEPES','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4026,'ESTEVEZ BAULUZ','Luis','PSE','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','2016-04-12','12:30:00','13:30:00','1ens0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'LUNSEMI','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4090,'','','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2016-06-03','12:15:00','13:45:00','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','LUNCFDS','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4077,'FINKELSTEIN','Amy','MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT)','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2016-06-08','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ENS0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECOTPPU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4078,'','','*','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2016-05-23','12:00:00','13:15:00','1ENSA004','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'IO','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4079,'MAS','Alexandre','Princeton University','','','','','','*','','','','','','','2016-05-11','12:30:00','14:00:00','1ENS0008','','0000-00-00','00:00:00',NULL,'ECOTPPU','NON','NON','NON','0000-00-00','0000-00-00',NULL,NULL),(4073,'CHOR ','Davin ','Singapore','','','','','','TBA','','','','','','','0000-00-00','00:00:00','00:00:00','','MSE – Room: tbc  106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris 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