We examine the eect of pharmaceutical patent protection on the speed of drug launch,
price, and quantity in 60 countries from 2000-2013. The World Trade Organization required
its member countries to implement a minimum level of patent protection within a specied
time period as part of the TRIPS Agreement. However, members retained the right to impose
price controls and to issue compulsory licenses under certain conditions. These countervailing
policies were intended to reduce the potential static losses that result from reduced competition
during the patent term. Using detailed patent data at both the product and country levels,
we exploit the fact that selection into \treatment" with a post-TRIPS patent is exogenously
determined by compliance deadlines that vary across countries. We nd that patents have
important consequences for access to new drugs: in the absence of a patent, launch is unlikely.
That is, even when no patent barrier exists, generic entry may not occur. Conditional on launch,
patented drugs have higher prices but higher sales as well. The price premium associated with
patents is smaller in poorer countries. Price discrimination across countries has increased for
drugs patented post-TRIPS and prices are negatively related to the burden of disease, suggesting
that countervailing policies to oset expected price increases may have had the intended eects.