It is well known that multi-sender signalling games have a plethora of equilibria. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) proposes a refinement criterion unprejudiced belief to demonstrate that the no distortion fully revealing equilibrium is the only "plausible" equilibrium. After Bagwell and Ramey (1991), unprejudiced belief refinement is often used in refining equilibria in multi-sender signaling games. This paper examines the relationship between unprejudiced belief and a standard equilibrium refinement based on Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) strategic stability. We first show that iterative forward induction in the spirit of Proposition 6 of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) gives the same prediction as Bagwell and Ramey (1991). However, when senders compete for the receiver we can find fully revealing equilibria (possibly distorted) which survives our forward induction while unprejudiced fully revealing equilibrium does not exist.