GENDER DIFFERENCES IN LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM DISPLACED PEOPLE'S CAMPS IN NORTHERN UGANDA*

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Abstract

This paper uses a unique data set and the exogenous nature of the conflict and resulting displacement in Northern Uganda to examine their impacts on labor market participation. I find that the longer the existence of the Internally Displaced People's camp to which individuals moved, the less men work. In contrast, women's labor market decisions are not influenced by the age of the camp in which they live. I argue that these responses stem from the development of gender-specific social norms. A decline in the percentage of men working in a camp reduces the probability that a given man works.

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1 Introduction

Wars and civil conflicts have substantial destructive impacts on human capital formation, infrastructure, institutions, output, and growth at the country-level (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003; Collier et al. 2003; Stewart 2001; Collier 1999) yet the evidence of their impacts at the micro-level is mixed. Most articles in this growing literature analyze the effects of conflict on a variety of individual and household level outcomes and generally find significant impacts on some, but not all, outcomes of interest. The literature has primarily focused on child level outcomes, particularly education and health (Akresh & de Walque 2008; Blattman & Annan 2007; Akresh and Verwimp 2006; Merrouche 2006; Shemyakina 2006; Lopez and Wodon 2005; Bundervoet and Verwimp 2005; de Walque 2004; Stewart 2001). However, identifying the consequences of conflict are complicated by difficulties in determining the direction of causation.

In addition to the direct consequences, conflicts often cause mass displacement, both during and for some time after, the cessation of hostilities. Conflict-induced displacement is a reoccurring phenomena with poorly understood consequences. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in 2005 there were 23,700,000 internally displaced people[1] in 51 countries worldwide. Uganda had the third largest population of internally displaced people in December 2005 with 1,740,498 people internally displaced according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). Globally, the length of time people are displaced from their homes ranges from days to over 50 years.

Displacement itself has serious repercussions and the impacts on those displaced have

[1]Internally displaced persons are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border." (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction, paragraph 2).

rarely been investigated[2]. The creation of an Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camp is an abrupt formation of a new community. Over time the new community develops norms regarding behavior through social interactions. These new social norms affect many aspects of behavior including the decision to participate in labor market activities. Moreover, the reactions to conflict and displacement may differ significantly by gender. This paper shows that social norms affect labor market behavior differently for men and women in Internally Displaced People's camps in Northern Uganda.

I use household survey data I collected in 2005 during the conflict in 32 Internally Displaced People's camps in Lira and Pader districts of Northern Uganda. I exploit the exogeneity of camp choice and camp formation to examine camp characteristics that determine labor market participation. The findings suggest that the length of time the camp has been in existence, camp age, has a strong negative impact on the amount of time men work. Yet women's labor market participation is not influenced by camp age. I control for other camp characteristics that have been cited as explanations for male idleness, including conflict intensity and measures of work opportunities, and continue to find the same strong result. Further robustness checks include controls for individual and household characteristics, including the amount of time that the household has spent in the camp. The results suggest that a culture of male idleness develops in camps over time and this hypothesis is tested empirically.

This study emphasizes the negative effects of moving to an established community of male idleness in contrast to the migration literature where moving to an area with established migrants leads to better labor market outcomes (Damm 2006; Munshi 2003). However,

[2]The literature regarding conflict-induced displacement has primarily focused on refugees (Werker 2007; Jacobsen 2002; Scoones 1998). There are many similarities in the economic conditions in refugee camps and Internally Displaced People's camps. One important distinction is the restrictions on employment and movement often placed on refugees by their host country, because they lack citizenship, that are not imposed on internally displaced people. However, employment and movement are, in fact, more restricted in some IDP camp settings. In the Northern Uganda context, employment per se is not restricted by the government but movement is heavily restricted due to the conflict and thus employment opportunities are limited.

the results are consistent with the findings of both Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003) and Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) who demonstrate that an increase in the fraction of the reference group using welfare increases the individual probability of welfare use.

The impact of displacement on labor market outcomes has been investigated by both Ibáñez and Moya (2006) and Kondylis (2007), though in very different circumstances. Ibáñez and Moya (2006) study the impact of forced migration in Colombia on unemployment as well as the impact of an income generation program in that setting. Their results show large short and long-term consequences of forced displacement. Unemployment rates increase dramatically during the first months of displacement; from 1.7 percent for household heads prior to displacement to more than 50 percent during the first three months after displacement. After a year of settlement, the unemployment rate for displaced household heads decreases but remains high, equivalent to that of the urban extreme poor. Their findings also suggest that the income generation programs are effective at temporarily increasing labor income but that the impact disappears once the program ends. The situation in Colombia is quite different from that of Northern Uganda. In Colombia displacement usually takes place on an individual basis, unlike the massive displacement in Northern Uganda. Furthermore, in Colombia the destination of migration is existing communities whereas migration in Northern Uganda is primarily to IDP camps.

Kondylis (2007) investigates the impact of displacement in Bosnia & Herzegovina on post-war labor market outcomes. Once she controls for selection into displacement, she finds that displaced men and women are less likely to be in work relative to stayers. Moreover, displacement leads to higher post-war unemployment for men, whereas it has no significant impact on the employment status of women. It solely decreases women's participation. Finally, she finds no impact on wages or hours worked for both men and women. While Kondylis analyzes post-war labor market outcomes, this paper investigates the labor market

outcomes while displaced.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the conflict and prolonged displacement in Northern Uganda. The data is described in section 3. Section 4 introduces the estimation strategy and provides evidence of the assumptions underlying the estimation method; the exogeneity of camp age. Results are reported and discussed in section 5. I find that the longer the existence of the camp to which people moved, the less men work. Furthermore, I show that this result is being driven by a response to the overall labor market participation of men in the community and not to a lack of opportunities. Moreover, I show that women's labor market decisions are not influenced by the age of the IDP camp in which they reside. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion of the policy implications.

2 The Context: Conflict and Displacement in Northern Uganda

This section provides an overview of the conflict and displacement in Northern Uganda. The identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of the conflict and the resulting date of IDP camp formation. Therefore, section 4 elaborates on the random nature of both the conflict and displacement. Section 4 also demonstrates empirically that camp age and camp-level conflict intensity were not determined by observable local pre-displacement characteristics.

Politically, Northern Uganda comprised 18 districts in 2005. Of these districts Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader in the Acholi region, Lira and Apac in the Lango region, and Kotido, Moroto, and Nakapiripirit in the Karamoja region have been most affected by the rebel group insurgency. The regions are depicted in Figure I. This research focuses on the Acholi and Langi peoples of Lira and Pader districts. The Acholi and Langi speak almost identical languages and share many cultural characteristics. Prior to the conflict, they were

traditionally rural farmers, living in villages on their own land with livestock. Appendix A describes traditional gender roles in both societies, as well as the change in these roles since displacement.

The conflict in Northern Uganda arose from a division between the North and South of the country. When the current president, Yoweri Museveni, and his Southern-based army took power in 1986, Northerners were marginalized. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group led by Joseph Kony, formed claiming to represent Northern grievances. The LRA received little public support from Northerners and has since terrorized the local population. Though initially claiming as its objective the overthrow of the Southern-based government and the ruling of Uganda by the biblical Ten Commandments, the LRA lacks a clearly articulated political agenda. Its stated aim became to purify the Northern population through violence; declaring that civilians needed to be punished for accepting the government's rule. The LRA also has a spiritual component. Kony is a self-proclaimed prophet who claims that God instructs his actions.

The LRA has tortured, raped, murdered, mutilated and abducted the Northern population. Children and youth are abducted and forced to become soldiers, labourers, porters, and child brides. Some are taken for years; others for a few hours or days. Some are allowed to leave; some escape; while others are captured by the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF), the Ugandan military, and eventually freed.

In response to the insecurity in the North over 80 percent of the population moved, either voluntarily or forcibly, to Internally Displaced People's camps. Due to the threat of attack, camp residents were confined to the camp boundaries; leaving the majority of the population without access to their ancestral homes and land. Security zones were created as perimeters around each IDP camp restricting the movements of camp residents from the camp in which they lived. This left most households dependent on food aid for survival. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) provided food rations to all camp residents.

Referred to by the Ugandan government as 'protective camps' many have experienced frequent rebel attacks. Camp residents have also been victims of abuses by soldiers. Most camps were established around pre-existing villages or trading centers near military detaches. The process of camp formation is discussed further in section 4. IDP camps have been described as "sites of semi-urbanization of rural life." (Bøäs and Hatløy, 2005, p.11). Conditions in IDP camps are poor and camps lack adequate sanitation and water. They also have extremely high population densities. IDP camps are characterized by a high incidence of malnutrition, high mortality rates, low life expectancies, high primary school dropout rates, and early pregnancies and marriages.

Another feature of camp life is idleness, particularly of men (Petty and Savage 2007; Bøäs and Hatløy 2005; Okot et al. 2005). Observers have claimed that this has led to a high level of male drunkenness, disorder, and domestic violence(Makerere University 2005; Adoko and Levine 2004; Isis-Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange 2001). Yet people who are drinking or being idle are easily noticed and this may have led observers to conclude that the problem is larger than it actually is. This paper provides evidence of the extent of male idleness and its causes.

3 Data Description

3.1 Sampling

Together with two colleagues at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) I collected the data used for the research described in this paper in Northern Uganda from October to December 2005[3]. The sample was drawn entirely from households living in

[3]The data was collected as an evaluation of two alternative food for education programs by the International Food Policy Research Institute with assistance from Makerere University School of Public Health in Kampala, Uganda. The data analyzed in this paper was collected prior to the implementation of the food for education programs.

IDP camps in Lira and Pader districts in Northern Uganda. Thirty-two IDP camps were selected for the study with 16 in Pader and 16 in Lira[4]. Households with primary school-aged children, those between 6 and 17, were randomly sampled. The sample consists of 885 households. The data was collected using a detailed household questionnaire and an IDP camp questionnaire to which the camp leader or another camp administrator responded.

3.2 Sample Characteristics

Sample characteristics are presented in table I. Mean household size in the sample is 5.93 household members. On average, households left their ancestral homes 39 months, 3 years and 3 months, prior to being interviewed with the majority coming directly to the IDP camp in which they resided in 2005. There is considerable variation in the date when households left their land, particularly by district. On average, residents of Lira district left their homes over a year after those in Pader. This is consistent with the expansion of the conflict from the Acholi region of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, to surrounding areas, including the Lango region of Lira district. Therefore, the district of residence is controlled for in all specifications. Moreover, the estimation is also run separately for Pader and Lira districts and presented in Appendix B.

On average households' ancestral lands are located near the IDP camp in which they reside with a mean distance of 4.87 miles. Though at first glance this appears to be a short distance, households had considerable difficulty accessing their homes due to the additional security threats they faced when leaving the camp boundaries. Forty-six percent of households had not visited their homes in the previous 6 months.

Camp size and population vary greatly in Northern Uganda. In the sample the mean

[4]In 2005, there were 22 IDP camps in Lira district (excluding 16 camps in Lira Municipality; the urban camps) and 30 IDP camps in Pader district. In Lira, the IDP camps in the sample comprised 86% of the rural camp population and 66% in Pader (OCHA IDP camps population as of February 2006 (MAPPADER-200603-01 & MAPLIRA-200603-01)).

camp population in 2005 was 19,214 people on a mean area of 0.55 square miles. The mean distance from a camp to the nearest market is 13 miles and the mean distance to the nearest major town or employment source is 27 miles; making them inaccessible on a daily basis. The nearest neighboring IDP camp is on average a distance of 6 miles away.

Security in the camps is not guaranteed. The number of UPDF soldiers typically guarding a camp is 59. Only three camps in the sample did not have any camp residents directly threatened or attacked, either in the camp or nearby, in the previous 12 months. 53.13 percent of camp leaders report food shortage as the greatest problem affecting the camp, with 21.88 percent reporting health problems, and 15.63 percent reporting lack of water as the greatest problem. No camp reported lack of employment opportunities as the greatest problem affecting the camp and its residents.

Table II presents a summary of the primary income generating activities of men and women. In the sample men's labor market participation practically mirrors that of women. This is a substantial change since displacement as traditionally rural women in Northern Uganda did not work outside the home. Farming remains the primary activity of both, while most casual employment is gender specific. A detailed description of activity choice is presented in Appendix A.

4 The Exogeneity of the Conflict and Displacement

4.1 The Process of Displacement and Camp Formation

This paper exploits the exogeneity of the conflict, IDP camp choice, and camp formation to identify the impacts of displacement on individual labor market outcomes. The estimation method relies on the assumption that unobservable determinants of individual labor market participation are uncorrelated with camp age.

I assume that the reduced-form equation of the decision to participate in the labor market

follows a simple linear model which is formalized in equation 1,

$$y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{camp age})_c + \gamma x_{ic} + \delta z_c + u_{ic} \tag{1}$$

where the subscript i refers to the individual, and c to the IDP camp. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether or not the individual worked in the previous 7 days or in the previous 30 days. Camp age is measured in months. x_{ic} is a vector of individual and household characteristics, including the age of the individual, their literacy status, the size of the household, and measures of conflict intensity at the household level. z_c are camp characteristics which include the IDP camp population, its access to markets, and measures of insecurity at the camp level.

According to all accounts, conflict intensity triggered camp formation. Furthermore, conflict intensity can be seen as random (Blattman 2006; Bøäs and Hatløy 2005; Refugee Law Project 2004; Nabudere 2003). The LRA's terrorizing of the local population did not take place throughout the area at once. The LRA attacked different areas of the region at different times for many reasons which are not fully understood. The LRA moved throughout the region in units; attacking, abducting, destroying, stealing, and terrorizing as they moved. Attacks could be motivated by a number of factors. For instance, if an abductee escaped from captivity, a common response was for the LRA to attack the village of the recently escaped abductee. This tactic was employed in order to demonstrate, to both current abductees and to the Northern population, their displeasure with, and the consequences of, escape. Other villages were attacked because the local population was perceived to be be loyal to the government and unfriendly to the LRA. This could have been the result of local leadership having made radio announcements that were interpreted as unfriendly or from a belief within the LRA whose origin has yet to be understood.

Finally, the spiritual component of the LRA has been cited as directing them to attack

certain regions. According to accounts from escaped abductees in Nabudere (2003), "Joseph Kony's military orders seem to be 'external' to him. The orders are given while he is entranced and possessed by spirits 'from very different places.'" (p.44). The pattern of attack throughout the region does not appear to have been systematic with respect to local characteristics. Except for the perception of allegiance to the government, whose validity is uncertain, local characteristics of the general population were not the primary cause for attack. The LRA attacked to terrorize, to abduct, and to steal cattle and local crops.

The exogeneity of conflict intensity has been previously cited and demonstrated. Attacks and abductions by the LRA have been characterized as random and exogenous of victims' socio-economic characteristics. According to Bøäs and Hatløy (2005), "[the LRA's] violence is random, unpredictable, and highly visible and symbolic. Its killings, mutilations and abductions are a method implemented to institute its control over the population, and the randomness of their violence compensates for their inferiority in numbers" (p.33). Blattman (2006) argues that there is exogenous variation in rebel recruitment practices and he uses this exogeneity to identify the impact of abduction on several individual outcomes including education, earnings, and political participation. He cites interviews with rebel leaders in which they claim that targets were generally unplanned. "Abduction party leaders claim to have raided whatever homesteads they encountered, regardless of wealth, location, and household composition" (p.10). Using data from a survey of war affected youth in Northern Uganda, Blattman also finds little difference in pre-war characteristics between abducted and non-abducted youth.

The formation of an IDP camp and the displacement of the local population was a response to this insecurity but the particular timing of camp formation and displacement resulted from several possible triggers. Camp formation and displacement in the region exploded in 2002 when the security situation in Northern Uganda deteriorated due to the LRA's re-entry with full force into the region from their bases in Southern Sudan. Some IDP

camps had already been established prior to this new wave of intense rebel activity; some as early as 1996 during an earlier period of heightened insecurity in the region. Camps formed throughout Lira and Pader districts over time. The majority of IDP camps in Pader formed before those in Lira. Lira district is located directly south of Pader district (see Figure I) and so the LRA, coming from Sudan, which borders Uganda to the north, passed through Pader on their way to Lira, and in doing so, terrorized the population of Pader. This led to the formation of many camps in Pader before those in Lira.

Many IDP camps formed in response to a specific attack or incident in the area. In reaction, people moved to a nearby village or to the area surrounding the military barracks in search of security. Another possibility leading to camp formation was for an abductee from the area to have escaped and, fearing retribution, the local population relocated. In other cases no specific event triggered the formation of the camp. General insecurity in the area led people to leave their homes and the camp formed as a result. A combination of these events often led to a camp's formation. In all instances the camp was thought to be a short-term solution to the insecurity until the LRA was defeated militarily and individuals could return home. Furthermore, it was often the case that people first began to leave their homes voluntarily in search of temporary security. The UPDF then forced the rest of the local population into the camp and assumed anyone still living outside the camp boundaries to be a rebel. This approach was part of a military strategy for defeating the rebels and was supposed to protect civilians. According to Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (2004, p.64), on October 3, 2002 the UPDF gave civilians in the Acholi sub-region 48 hours to move into 'protected villages' or they would be considered rebel collaborators and arrested or shot.

Therefore, in most cases, households relocated to the nearest camp. Moreover, because the relocation was expected to be for a short period of time, individuals did not base the decision of where to relocate on camp characteristics other than its proximity to their home.

In the sample used in this study, 78 percent of sample households remained in the camp to which they had first moved when they left their homes. Therefore, in the analysis I report results for all households as well as the restricted sample of households who remained in the original camp to which they fled. The identification strategy I use relies on the claim that the time an area first became insecure and the subsequent date on which the camp was formed is unrelated to unobservable determinants of individual labor market activity.

4.2 Evidence of Exogeneity

The data provides some evidence of the exogeneity of the intensity of the conflict, the length of time since the formation of the camp, and the selection of camp residence. This is accomplished by verifying that observable characteristics are not determinants of conflict intensity, camp age, and camp choice. Results are reported in tables III - V.

Several measures of socio-economic status prior to the movement of individuals to IDP camps were captured in the household survey[5]. The household level measures of conflict are whether or not an immediate family member was killed as a result of LRA activity as well as the number of family members killed, and whether any current household member was ever abducted by the LRA. Pre-displacement characteristics are the amount of land owned prior to displacement, the value of livestock owned, and the literacy status of the household head. Results are reported in table III, columns (1)-(3). Neither the literacy of the household head, which was determined prior to displacement, nor the amount of land owned prior to displacement determined the degree to which a household was affected by the conflict[6].

Columns (4)-(8) report results at the camp level[7]. The dependent variables in columns

[5]The time period before the movement of the household to an IPD camp is considered to be 'before the conflict'. Though the conflict began in 1986, it intensified in the late 1990s and early 2000s, forcing the population's movement to IDP camps.

[6]Results are unchanged if the value of land owned or the value of total assets prior to displacement replace the amount of land owned in the regressions. Agricultural land acreage is reported because fewer observations are missing. Results are largely unchanged if literacy, livestock, and land are included in separate regressions.

[7]Camp level results are reported because the sample was selected at the camp level, not the sub-county

(4)-(6) are the sample means of the household level data while columns (7) and (8) use the percentage of the current camp population ever killed as a result of the insurgency and the percentage ever abducted, as reported by a camp administrator. As at the household level, no observable camp characteristics are determinants of camp level violence.

Thus far I have argued that conflict intensity, at both the household and camp level, was not determined by observable pre-displacement characteristics. Table IV presents results demonstrating that the date of camp formation was, likewise, not determined by pre-conflict characteristics. The dependent variable is the log of the age of the camp measured in months. Column (1) includes the pre-displacement characteristics included in the regressions in table III. Neither literacy, the amount of agricultural land owned, or the value of livestock owned were significant determinants of camp formation. Measures of conflict intensity are included as explanatory variables in columns (2)-(4). Camp level variables are constructed by taking means of the household level conflict variables in columns (1)-(3) of table III[8]. Unfortunately, the data does not distinguish between deaths and abductions pre- and post-displacement. Therefore, these results should not be interpreted as causal. Results show only a weak relationship between camp age and conflict intensity, as measured by the number of deaths at the household level. This is not surprising given that camp formation was not only triggered by abductions and murders but also by threats on local areas made by the LRA, suspicions, attacks not causing abductions or deaths, and government force. All regressions include a control for the district in which the camp is located. As described in section 4.1, camps generally formed in Pader district prior to Lira district because the LRA traveled through Pader to reach Lira.

Finally, I argue that households moved to the nearest IDP camp believing the move to be

level. The sample is not representative at the sub-county level and is highly unbalanced.

[8]The percentage of the current camp population ever killed as a result of the insurgency and the percentage ever abducted, the dependent variables in columns (7)-(8) of table III, are measures of conflict intensity since the formation of the IDP camp. Therefore, these measures are not included as determinants of camp age.

temporary. I examine whether individual characteristics determined the distance between a household's land and the IDP camp in which they reside. The individual characteristics of interest are the age of the household head, his literacy status, the wealth of the household prior to displacement, as measured by the amount of land and value of livestock owned, and household size. Additionally, household conflict measures are included as regressors to examine whether households more directly affected by the conflict moved further away from their homes. Finally, the age of the camp is included to determine whether individuals who moved to older camps moved further away. Results are reported in table V. Individual and household observable characteristics as well as camp age are not significant determinants of the distance between the IDP camps and households' ancestral land.

Tables III - V demonstrate that observable individual, household, and camp characteristics are not significant determinants of conflict intensity and camp age. Therefore, the estimation strategy assumes that both are exogenous in the decision to work. The mechanism through which camp age affects labor market participation is investigated using an instrumental variables approach. The rationale is that social interactions influence the decision to work. A culture of idleness amongst men has developed in IDP camps over time. It takes time for the norm of unemployment to develop and diffuse throughout a camp. Thus, camp age is used as an instrument for camp level employment. Many other camp characteristics are investigated as possible instruments but are not significant determinants of camp level employment. Furthermore, I argue and provide some empirical evidence supporting the exclusion restriction for the use of camp age as a valid instrument.

4.3 Outcomes of Interest

The two outcomes of interest are dummy variables for labor market participation; one for the 7 days prior to the interview date, and one for the 30 days prior. Summary statistics of these variables are presented in table VI, separately for men and women and by the

age of the IDP camp. The IDP camps are divided into two categories; the younger camps that have existed for less than 38 months, the median age of the camps in the sample, and the older camps that have operated for 38 months and longer. The statistics show only small differences in women's labor force participation between the older and younger camps. However, men in older camps do work significantly less than those in younger camps. This link is investigated further in Figure II which depicts the relationship between the decision to work in the previous 7 days and camp age. The first panel shows the negative relationship between the percentage of men who worked in the previous 7 days and the age of the IDP camp in which they live. The second panel shows this relationship for women which is less striking and positive. This relationship is investigated further in the next section.

5 Results

5.1 The Impact of Camp Age

Given the random nature of the conflict and displacement in Northern Uganda, their impact on labor market participation is identified in a simple weighted least squares regression[9]. Tables VII and VIII report results with camp age included as an independent variable in the determination of labor force participation. The purpose here is to see the direct link between camp age and the decision to work, differentiated by gender. Tables VII and VIII show that camp age has a strong negative impact on the probability of work for men and that this result is robust. Moreover, tables IX and X show that this relationship does not hold for women.

Table VII presents results for men's labor market participation, both with and without controls. The findings suggest that a one percent increase in camp age leads to a 3% decrease in the probability that a man worked in the previous 7 days and to a 2% decrease in the

[9]Results are largely unchanged when probit or logit regressions are estimated.

probability that he worked in the previous 30 days. Columns (2) and (5) control for the length of time the household itself has lived in the camp. While camp age remains significant, the number of months the household has lived in the camp is not a significant determinant of labor market participation. Columns (3) and (7) include additional individual and household level controls, including the distance of the household from their home, which is a measure of the ease to which they have access to their land.

These results support the view that camp age is picking up a camp characteristic that is determining labor market participation. Therefore, columns (4) and (8) include additional camp characteristics that camp age may be capturing. The percentage of sample households in each camp who had an immediate family member killed is included as a control for conflict intensity. According to the Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Persons Profiling Study (2005), the more insecure the area around the camp, the less there is for the men to do. The distance to the nearest town and the type of road accessing the camp are included as controls for camp-level economic opportunity. Finally, the camp population and the diversity of camp residents are included as possible determinants of labor market participation. Camp age remains an important determinant of the decision to work while other camp characteristics are not significant.

Table VIII replicates the regressions reported in table VII restricting the sample to households that remained in the IDP camp they first moved to when displaced. This restriction is imposed to address the possibility that those households that changed IDP camps moved because of unobserved camp characteristics that influence labor market participation and are correlated with camp age, making the assumption of exogeneity of camp age invalid. With this restriction, the sample is limited to 475 individuals. This restriction increases the magnitude of the impact of camp age on labor market participation and the results remain highly significant. Separate results by district are reported and discussed in Appendix B for both men and women.

Finally, tables IX and X report the same estimations as tables VII and VIII but for women. The results show that camp age is not a determinant of women's decisions to work. Displaced women and men in Northern Uganda react differently to this characteristic of displacement. Men's work decisions are influenced by the age of the IDP camp they reside in while women's are not. I posit that camp age is capturing social interactions amongst men. These results are presented in the following section.

5.2 Social Interactions

This section identifies the mechanism through which camp age influences the decision to engage in income generating activities. The hypothesis is that camp age is capturing the influence of the work choices of neighbors on labor market outcomes. The older the IDP camp, the more time has passed for a culture of idleness amongst men to have developed in a camp. Such a culture would take time to develop; a market for alcohol would form, small establishments for drinking would be built inside the camp, restaurants and venues for passing time would be established, such as, places for watching sports or videos. Finally, it would take time for the norm of unemployment to diffuse throughout a camp. In Acholi and Langi society, it would be acceptable for men to frequent these locales and not women. Thus, camp age would affect men's decisions to work through the influence of their neighbors but not the labor market decisions of women. Furthermore, the traditional male responsibility of ensuring the availability of food for their families is diminished in the camp setting because of the provision of food rations by WFP. A decline in this sense of responsibility may explain why men are more easily influenced by the idleness of others as compared to alternative settings.

Existing research in Northern Ugandan IDP camps has recognized male idleness, alcohol consumption, and the loss of men's traditional responsibilities (Stites et al. (2006), Makerere University (2005), Adoko and Levine (2004), Isis-Women's International Cross Cultural Ex-

change (2001)). According to Stites et al. (2006), "higher rates of male drunkenness were attributed to the stresses of losing their roles as male providers, stress and frustration from living in the camps, and the fact that drinking places are among the only social spaces in the camp"(p.50). This phenomenon is also described by Adoko and Levine (2004) who argue that "enforced idleness caused by displacement has meant a change in drinking habits: whereas men would previously often drink after a days work, many have now become accustomed to drinking instead of working"(p.33).

The identification of peer effects is complicated by their endogenous nature. In order to overcome this endogeneity, an instrumental variables approach is used here. I have argued in section 4.1 and demonstrated in table V that there was no self-selection into IDP camps based on observable characteristics of the individual, the IDP camp, or the IDP camp population. The measure of social interactions used here is at the IDP camp level. Therefore, it is likely that no self-selection into this social group exists. However, as termed by Manski (1993), the reflection problem does exist in this context. An individual's decision to participate in the labor market is taken at the same time as others in the same social group; i.e., decisions are made simultaneously. Therefore, it is impossible to identify endogenous peer effects from contextual effects, z_c, and from correlated effects, $\bar{x}_c$, in equations 2 and 3. λ in equation 3, is the coefficient of endogenous peer effects. An ordinary least squares estimation will not identify λ.

Therefore, I examine peer effects by studying the impact of the percentage of men working in the previous 30 days on the likelihood of participating in the labor market in the previous 7 days. The argument being that when a man makes the decision whether or not to work, he considers the male participation rate in the camp in which he lives in the recent past. This generates dynamics where the labor market participation rate amongst men slowly falls over time. The creation of an Internally Displaced People's camp and the movement of individuals into those camps generates a negative shock to labor market participation amongst men when

compared to the pre-displacement situation. This feeds back into men's decisions to work in the next period, and this pattern continues as the labor market participation of men falls as the IDP camp ages.

However, given that the past 30 days includes the past 7 days, endogeneity issues remain. Therefore, peer effects are estimated using camp age as an instrument for camp level employment for men, as in equation 2.

$$\bar{y}_c = \varphi + \theta \log(\text{camp age})_c + \tau \bar{x}_c + \rho z_c + \upsilon_c \tag{2}$$

where $\bar{x}_c$ is a vector of gender-specific means of individual and household variables at the camp level. z_c are camp characteristics which include the IDP camp population, its access to markets, and measures of insecurity at the camp level. Finally, $\bar{y}_c$ is the percentage of sample individuals per camp who reported working in the previous 30 days, differentiated by gender. These measures are consistent estimates of the population values at the camp level.

Camp age is defined as the number of months since the IDP camp's formation. A two stage least squares estimation strategy is used to identify λ in equation 3, the reduced form estimate of the measure of social interactions.

$$y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta x_{ic} + \delta \bar{x}_c + \gamma z_c + \lambda \bar{y}_c + u_{ic} \tag{3}$$

The estimation is performed separately for men and women and results are reported in tables XIV - XVI. This estimation technique requires camp age to be a significant determinant of $\bar{y}_c$ and that it only affects y_{ic} through $\bar{y}_c$. The former is demonstrated in table XIV, which reports first stage results for men. Although it is impossible to demonstrate that camp age only affects y_{ic} through $\bar{y}_c$, some evidence is provided below.

Section 4 demonstrates that camp age is uncorrelated with observable determinants of

labor market participation. Moreover, the alternative explanation is that camp age is capturing labor market opportunities at the camp level. I argue that this is not the case. Firstly, in order for camp age to negatively affect male labor market participation and to have no effect, and if any, a positive effect, on female participation, the opportunities would have to differ by gender. I am not aware of a convincing explanation for why this would be the case. Furthermore, the variation in market access across camps is small. Where there is significant variation, it does not appear to be driven by the age of the IDP camp. Table XI demonstrates that camp age is not a significant determinant of measures of camp level labor market opportunities. Each row in column (1) of table XI is an indirect measure of labor market opportunities. These opportunity measures are regressed on the log of camp age, while controlling for the district in which the camp is located. The regressions are at the camp level and demonstrate that camp age is not correlated with any observable measure of opportunities. Therefore, I conclude that there is no evidence that there are less labor market opportunities for men in older camps.

Table XII presents the uninstrumented results for men. Social interactions are measured as the percentage of men in each IDP camp who have worked in the previous 30 days, excluding the individual of interest. Similar results are presented for women in table XIII where social interactions are measured similarly, using the percentage of women. The uninstrumented results for men differ significantly from the instrumented ones presented in table XVI, providing evidence that this relationship in not simply a mechanical one.

The first stage results of equation 2 are presented in table XIV for men and table XV for women. Table XIV shows the strong relationship between the percentage of men working in a camp and the camp's age. This relationship does not exist for women. Therefore, camp age is used as an instrument for social interactions for men in table XVI. The coefficient on $\bar{y}_c$ is very significant and varies between 1.6 and 2.1, implying that individual labor market decisions move very closely with the male camp average. An increase in the percentage of men

working in a camp of 10% increases the likelihood that a given man works by approximately 20%.

Finally, I have argued that it takes time for norms to diffuse throughout the IDP camp, including that of idleness. Therefore, I show that this is also the case for other norms, including beliefs commonly used to measure social capital. Women in the sample were asked whether they agreed or disagreed, and how strongly, with 22 statements regarding social capital. These questions are presented in Appendix C. A camp level coefficient of variation was created using the dispersion in women's responses to those questions. Given that it takes time for norms to diffuse throughout a population, the coefficient of variation should be negatively correlated with camp age, implying that women's responses vary less in older IDP camps, and indeed this is the case. The correlation between camp age and the coefficient of variation is -.2987 and camp age is a significant determinant of the camp coefficient of variation. The estimated coefficient of the log of camp age is -0.007 and significant at the 10 percent level[10], where the mean of the coefficient of variation is 0.092.

6 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence of the impacts of conflict-induced displacement on labor market participation. The random nature of the conflict and subsequent displacement in Northern Uganda is exploited to identify causal impacts. The findings suggest significant differences in the responses to displacement by men and women. I find a strong negative impact of prolonged displacement, as measured by camp age, on the labor market participation decisions of men. Women's labor market participation is not influenced by the age of the IDP camp in which they live. The mechanism through which camp age influences behavior is investigated using an instrumental variables approach.

[10]The estimated coefficient is -0.008 when the district is included in the regression and is significant at the 10 percent level.

I argue that camp age is capturing social interactions in labor market participation. The rationale is that the older the IDP camp, the more time has passed for a culture of idleness amongst men to develop in that camp. The formation of an IDP camp leads to the formation of negative social capital amongst men. A similar culture has not developed among women.

The findings of the instrumental variables estimation suggest that social interactions are important determinants of male labor market participation. A one percent increase in the average participation of a men working in a camp increases the individual probability of male labor market participation by between 1.6 and 2.1%. This finding suggests the possibility for large multiplier effects of interventions seeking to increase labor force participation in displaced people's camps.

Furthermore, the length of time of an IDP camp's existence has a strong negative impact on male labor force participation. Research has suggested that male idleness and lack of income has led to a high level of male drunkenness, disorder, and domestic violence (Bøäs and Hatløy 2005, p.15). Therefore, the length of time of an IDP camp's existence should be minimized while taking into consideration security and resettlement issues. Furthermore, programs geared at employing men while displaced may have a significant impact on the culture of work that develops in a camp.

A Gender Relations in Northern Uganda

In traditional Acholi society[11] agricultural land, livestock, and the income they generated were predominantly controlled by men. Men also made decisions about all family income

[11]Most existing research on the conflict in Northern Uganda has focused on the Acholi people who make up the majority of those affected. This has resulted in little published work regarding the Langi people, who make up 48 percent of sample households in this study. Discussions with local individuals during data collection provided information comparing Acholi and Langi societies. Informants expressed the view that both cultures were similar with respect to structure, traditional activities, and gender relations. Therefore, a discussion of Acholi gender relations is provided here. It can be assumed that these statements also hold for Langi society.

including that earned by their spouses (El-Bushra and Sahl 2005, p.15). Women were responsible for domestic tasks such as fetching water and firewood, preparing meals, caring for children, cleaning, and washing. They were also responsible for smaller garden plots and livestock to be consumed by the household (Bøäs and Hatløy 2005, p.16).

Conflict and displacement have led to changes in gender roles and relations and according to El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) have also resulted in men's disempowerment (p.22). In the camp setting, women continue to perform the majority of domestic tasks while most also participate in income generating activities. In the study sample, 71 percent of women participated in some form of labor market activity in the 7 days prior to the interview date. The primary activity of 58 percent of those women was in agriculture while the remainder were casually employed brewing, collecting firewood for sale, selling food, as a porter, and performing odd jobs. Furthermore, 17 percent of women whose primary activity was farming had also performed non-farming related work in the past 7 days.

In the sample, men's labor market participation practically mirrors that of women. 72 percent of men in the sample were involved in any labor market activity in the 7 days prior to the interview, with the primary activity of 55 percent of them in agriculture. The remaining 45 percent were casually employed brick making, making handicrafts, in security, as a porter, burning charcoal, collecting firewood, and performing odd jobs.

In the camp setting agriculture appears to be practiced by both men and women while most casual employment is gender specific. Brewing is a female task while brick making, charcoal burning, security, and handicraft production are male tasks. These statistics are consistent with Bøäs and Hatløy (2005) who find that of the 6 main economic activities of displaced people (cultivating land, herding animals, brick production, charcoal production, brewing, and petty trading), only brewing, brick making and charcoal production have distinct gender divisions (p.16).

These statistics suggest a change in gender roles since displacement. In addition to

their domestic tasks women's participation in the labor market is comparable to that of men. Furthermore, the World Food Programme, which provided 50-75 percent of food requirements to households in the sample at the time of data collection, only provides food rations to female household members (unless the household consists only of men and boys). So, in addition to men being 'unable' to provide for their families through traditional means, they cannot collect aid either. As such, according to El-Bushra and Sahl (2005), women have gained a certain degree of economic power (p.20). Yet these daily behavior changes have not changed attitudes and values toward gender roles and ideologies (p.23). According to Bøäs and Hatløy (2005) (p.18), the shift in activities and any resulting changes in economic power do not appear to have empowered women. El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) come to the opposite conclusion claiming women's decision-making power has increased since displacement (p.22).

Though most research regarding the conflict in Northern Uganda emphasizes the loss of agricultural land associated with displacement (Stites et al. 2006; Bøäs and Hatløy 2005; El-Bushra and Sahl 2005), farming still remains the primary activity performed by both men and women in the sample. Prior to displacement, land was shared among family and clan lines and was communally farmed (El-Bushra and Sahl 2005, p.14). Agricultural practices have changed significantly since displacement with camp residents largely working their plots individually (Stites et al. 2006, p.41). In the sample the majority of farming takes place on an individual's own land.

B Results By District

Tables A.1 - A.4 report results for Pader and Lira districts separately for both men and women. Given that most camps formed in Pader prior to those in Lira, the concern is that the results are being driven by differences in the districts which are being captured by camp age. Tables A.1 and A.2 show that this is not the case for men. The negative impact of camp age on labor force participation remains for both Lira and Pader districts. The magnitude of the result is much larger in Lira than it is in Pader, though both are negative and highly significant.

The results for women are presented in tables A.3 and A.4. The results for Lira district suggest a positive and somewhat significant impact of camp age on labor market participation while those for Pader are negative and significant for labor market participation in the previous 30 days. The combination of the stronger negative impact of camp age on male labor market participation for Lira district and the female results suggest that the differential impact of camp age on men and women is similar in both Lira and Pader districts.

C Social Capital Questions

I am now going to read you a series of statements. Please tell me if you disagree, neither agree nor disagree, or agree with each one.

IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS EITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE, ASK THEM WHETHER THEY DO SO STRONGLY OR SLIGHTLY.					
STATEMENT	Strongly disagree	Slightly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly agree	Strongly Agree
19. Most younger people can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5
20. Most older people can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5
21. Most people in this camp can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5
22. Most people in the nearby town can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5
23. Most people are helpful.	1	2	3	4	5
24. Most people try to be fair.	1	2	3	4	5
25. I believe that the government does what is right for the people.	1	2	3	4	5
26. I am confident in the ability of government officials to do their jobs.	1	2	3	4	5
27. I am confident in the abilities of teachers to teach my children.	1	2	3	4	5
28. I can trust my neighbours to look after my house if I am away.	1	2	3	4	5
29. I would ask my neighbors to take care of my children for a few hours if I was sick.	1	2	3	4	5
30. My life is determined by my own actions.	1	2	3	4	5
31. People in this camp get along well these days.	1	2	3	4	5
32. I feel close to the people in this camp.	1	2	3	4	5
33. In this camp, it is generally expected that people will volunteer or help in community activities.	1	2	3	4	5
34. The army is honest and can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5
35. This camp is safe from the LRA.	1	2	3	4	5
36. There is not a lot of crime inside the camp.	1	2	3	4	5
37. The government can protect members of my household from crime and violence.	1	2	3	4	5
38. I feel safe walking to town.	1	2	3	4	5
39. I feel safe within 1 mile of the camp.	1	2	3	4	5
40. I feel safe going home (where I lived before being displaced).	1	2	3	4	5

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Table I: Sample Characteristics

Household Characteristics			
	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Household Size	5.93	(1.91)	
Agricultural Land (acres)	8.41	(9.28)	
Number of Months Displaced	38.87	(20.11)	
Lira	29.84	(11.06)	
Pader	47.34	(22.83)	
Distance of Home to Camp (miles)	4.87	(4.19)	
Percentage Literate			
Men			0.80
Women			0.32
Percentage with Family Member Killed			0.66
Number of Households			885
Camp Characteristics			
Camp Age (months)	40.69	(21.52)	
Camp Population	19213.69	(13409.02)	
Area of Camp (square miles)	0.55	(0.57)	
Distance to Nearest Market (miles)	12.90	(19.60)	
Distance to Nearest Major Town (miles)	26.99	(11.24)	
Distance to Nearest IDP Camp (miles)	5.88	(2.42)	
No. of Soldiers Typically Guarding Camp	59.07	(91.76)	
Number of Camps			32

Table II: Work Activities by Gender: Percentage of Sample by Activity

Primary Activity	Male	Female
In Agriculture	54.97	57.94
Own land	32.25	33.95
Share-cropped, leased or rented land	15.01	16.22
Agricultural laborer	7.71	7.77
Gathering firewood for sale	6.29	6.42
Burning charcoal for sale	6.09	1.86
Odd jobs	6.09	4.73
Porter	4.46	4.22
Making handicrafts/pottery	3.85	1.52
Brick laying/building	3.04	0.17
Policing/security	2.84	0.00
Petty trade	2.03	1.69
Fetching water for sale	2.03	1.35
Teaching	1.83	0.68
Food Sales	0.81	5.07
Domestic Work	0.41	2.87
Brewing	0.20	7.94
Other	5.06	3.54

Notes: Primary activity in the 7 days prior to the interview.

Table III: The Exogeneity of the Conflict

	Household Level Variables			Camp Level Variables				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Family Member Killed	Number Killed	Family Member Abducted	Mean Killed	Mean No. Killed	Mean Abducted	Percentage Killed	Percentage Abducted
Household Head	-.012	.025	.074	.191	2.198	-.416	.002	.008
Literacy	(.051)	(.211)	(.058)	(.272)	(1.387)	(.296)	(.007)	(.026)
Agricultural Land	.0009	-.006	.001	.014	.046	.010	.0005	.001
Owned	(.003)	(.011)	(.003)	(.012)	(.059)	(.015)	(.0004)	(.001)
Value of Livestock	-.001	.007	.006	.029	-.153	.081	.0002	-.004
Owned	(.007)	(.031)	(.006)	(.036)	(.225)	(.052)	(.001)	(.005)
Pader	.023	.335	.097	-.042	.039	.037	-.002	-.002
District	(.046)	(.233)	(.062)	(.083)	(.359)	(.081)	(.002)	(.006)
Constant	.647***	1.838***	.245***	.364*	.066	.459*	-.003	-.0008
	(.050)	(.237)	(.058)	(.219)	(1.098)	(.253)	(.007)	(.017)
No. of Observations	780	780	780	32	32	32	30	29
R^2	.001	.004	.019	.123	.13	.366	.095	.037

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the sub-county level in columns (1) - (3). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Households in the sample lived in 34 sub-counties in Northern Uganda prior to displacement. Regressions in columns (1)-(3) are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp and those in columns (4)-(8) are weighted by the camp population. Value of livestock is in millions of Ugandan Shillings.

Table IV: The Exogeneity of Camp Formation

	Camp Age			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean Household	-.496	-.611	-.870	-.407
Head Literate	(.532)	(.512)	(.564)	(.515)
Mean Agricultural	.059*	.051	.051	.057
Land Owned	(.035)	(.035)	(.034)	(.037)
Mean Livestock Value	.020	.003	.046	.003
Owned	(.068)	(.066)	(.071)	(.085)
Percentage		.602		
Killed		(.441)		
Number			.170*	
Killed			(.087)	
Percentage				.214
Abducted				(.451)
Pader	.165	.191	.159	.158
District	(.243)	(.242)	(.239)	(.243)
Constant	3.401***	3.182***	3.390***	3.303***
	(.475)	(.460)	(.432)	(.436)
No. of Observations	32	32	32	32
R^2	.433	.461	.501	.437

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by the camp population.

Table V: The Exogeneity of Distance Displaced

	Distance Displaced (miles)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Household Head	-.002	-.002	-.003	-.001	-.002
Age	(.017)	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)
Household Head	-.372	-.376	-.382	-.351	-.344
Literate	(.377)	(.379)	(.383)	(.380)	(.367)
Agricultural Land	.006	.006	.007	.007	.003
Owned	(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)
Livestock Value	.040	.041	.040	.042	.046
Owned	(.079)	(.080)	(.080)	(.079)	(.079)
Household	-.021	-.017	-.020	-.023	.0007
Size	(.117)	(.120)	(.119)	(.116)	(.125)
Family Member		.231			
Killed		(.437)			
Number			.108		.098
Killed			(.083)		(.082)
Household Member				-.241	
Abducted				(.348)	
Log (Camp					.948
Age)					(.596)
Pader	.847	.841	.810	.871	.370
District	(.560)	(.562)	(.567)	(.551)	(.554)
Constant	5.042***	4.893***	4.882***	5.094***	1.537
	(1.281)	(1.327)	(1.288)	(1.265)	(2.527)
No. of Observations	777	777	777	777	777
R^2	.014	.015	.019	.015	.024

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the sub-county level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp.

Table VI: Labor Market Participation: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. Observations
Worked in the past 7 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.718	.450	688
Women	.714	.452	830
Worked in the past 30 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.801	.400	688
Women	.847	.360	830
		Young Camps	
Worked in the past 7 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.763**	.426	334
Women	.715	.452	400
Worked in the past 30 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.844***	.363	334
Women	.843	.365	400
		Old Camps	
Worked in the past 7 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.675	.469	354
Women	.714	.452	430
Worked in the past 30 days (0 or 1)			
Men	.760	.428	354
Women	.851	.356	430

Table VII: Camp Age and Male Labor Market Participation

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	-.294**	-.286**	-.270***	-.233***	-.211***	-.227***	-.217***	-.171***
	(.118)	(.115)	(.105)	(.082)	(.077)	(.079)	(.074)	(.065)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		-.011	-.011	.004		.022	.023	.038
		(.026)	(.026)	(.032)		(.028)	(.031)	(.032)
Household Size			.026**	.022***			.022**	.019*
			(.010)	(.008)			(.011)	(.010)
Family Member Killed			.091***	.121***			.125***	.143***
			(.034)	(.039)			(.045)	(.048)
Miles to Home			.0003	.0002			-.003	-.002
			(.006)	(.007)			(.004)	(.005)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.004*	-.003			-.004***	-.004***
			(.002)	(.002)			(.001)	(.001)
Literate			.102	.109*			-.005	-.002
			(.062)	(.063)			(.059)	(.060)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.067				.070
				(.067)				(.045)
Camp Population				-.0009				-.012
				(.019)				(.015)
Miles to Town				.003				.0005
				(.003)				(.002)
Road - local				-.036				-.014
				(.066)				(.046)
Road - community				-.123				-.047
				(.092)				(.068)
Mean Killed				-.622**				-.322
				(.304)				(.232)
Pader District	.110	.111	.097	.117	.061	.058	.048	.041
	(.105)	(.106)	(.093)	(.077)	(.066)	(.067)	(.062)	(.059)
Constant	1.729***	1.737***	1.536***	1.662***	1.531***	1.515***	1.459***	1.452***
	(.367)	(.373)	(.255)	(.290)	(.242)	(.244)	(.208)	(.240)
No. of Observations	612	612	612	612	612	612	612	612
R^2	.05	.05	.091	.116	.034	.035	.08	.093

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table VIII: Camp Age and Male Labor Market Participation: Never Moved Camp

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	-.392**	-.376**	-.369**	-.325***	-.256**	-.266**	-.269**	-.230***
	(.181)	(.184)	(.158)	(.110)	(.114)	(.116)	(.106)	(.077)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		-.022	-.007	.016		.014	.030	.052
		(.044)	(.048)	(.051)		(.034)	(.038)	(.038)
Household Size			.042***	.038***			.034**	.032**
			(.013)	(.009)			(.014)	(.013)
Family Member Killed			.098**	.119***			.132***	.145***
			(.043)	(.044)			(.050)	(.052)
Miles to Home			.003	.003			-.001	-.0002
			(.007)	(.008)			(.006)	(.006)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.004*	-.004*			-.005**	-.006**
			(.002)	(.002)			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.099	.091			-.036	-.044
			(.060)	(.059)			(.090)	(.096)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.107				.092
				(.099)				(.072)
Camp Population				-.011				-.022
				(.026)				(.020)
Miles to Town				.005				.001
				(.004)				(.003)
Road - local				-.060				-.0006
				(.093)				(.060)
Road - community				-.156				-.055
				(.107)				(.079)
Mean Killed				-.618*				-.336
				(.367)				(.282)
Pader District	.197	.201	.172	.183*	.126	.123	.107	.099
	(.160)	(.161)	(.134)	(.110)	(.100)	(.101)	(.091)	(.079)
Constant	2.030***	2.050***	1.737***	1.829***	1.646***	1.634***	1.564***	1.584***
	(.561)	(.562)	(.409)	(.426)	(.356)	(.360)	(.340)	(.355)
No. of Observations	475	475	475	475	475	475	475	475
R^2	.073	.074	.138	.166	.038	.038	.103	.12

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table IX: Camp Age and Female Labor Market Participation

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	.064	.048	.056	.089	.006	.006	.007	.037
	(.044)	(.045)	(.047)	(.059)	(.042)	(.040)	(.038)	(.048)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		.023	.025	.023		-.0009	.002	.004
		(.044)	(.047)	(.048)		(.039)	(.041)	(.041)
Household Size			-.0003	.0007			-.003	-.003
			(.010)	(.010)			(.009)	(.009)
Family Member Killed			-.035	-.033			-.002	-.005
			(.044)	(.049)			(.051)	(.053)
Miles to Home			-.002	-.003			-.001	-.001
			(.005)	(.005)			(.005)	(.005)
Single-Headed			-.042	-.045			-.028	-.029
			(.050)	(.050)			(.041)	(.041)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.0007	-.0009			-.002*	-.003*
			(.002)	(.002)			(.001)	(.001)
Literate			-.012	-.025			.006	-.003
			(.049)	(.050)			(.043)	(.043)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.006				.006
				(.030)				(.028)
Camp Population				.029***				.008
				(.010)				(.011)
Distance to Town				-.004				-.003
				(.002)				(.002)
Road - local				-.012				.001
				(.034)				(.031)
Road - community				-.020				.030
				(.038)				(.053)
Mean Killed				.238*				.206
				(.139)				(.132)
Pader District	-.048	-.051	-.055	-.034	.035	.035	.037	.028
	(.037)	(.039)	(.044)	(.041)	(.034)	(.037)	(.039)	(.034)
Constant	.536***	.516***	.558***	.308*	.813***	.813***	.925***	.743***
	(.146)	(.159)	(.193)	(.185)	(.134)	(.149)	(.196)	(.192)
No. of Observations	729	729	729	729	729	729	729	729
R^2	.003	.003	.008	.023	.003	.003	.012	.021

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table X: Camp Age and Female Labor Market Participation: Never Moved Camp

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	.005	-.037	-.028	.012	-.043	-.069	-.072	-.025
	(.057)	(.052)	(.055)	(.057)	(.060)	(.056)	(.056)	(.059)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		.064	.067	.068		.039	.043	.051
		(.054)	(.058)	(.058)		(.048)	(.052)	(.050)
Household Size			.006	.006			-.002	-.002
			(.012)	(.013)			(.012)	(.012)
Family Member Killed			-.038	-.036			-.002	-.0002
			(.049)	(.054)			(.054)	(.055)
Miles to Home			-.006	-.006			-.002	-.002
			(.007)	(.007)			(.006)	(.006)
Single-Headed			.016	.001			.002	-.009
			(.070)	(.075)			(.063)	(.066)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.001	-.001			-.002	-.003
			(.002)	(.002)			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.030	.017			.021	.009
			(.058)	(.061)			(.047)	(.047)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.022				.026
				(.042)				(.036)
Camp Population				.033**				.011
				(.013)				(.013)
Miles to Town				-.002				-.003
				(.003)				(.003)
Road - local				-.047				-.012
				(.036)				(.040)
Road - community				-.087*				.016
				(.053)				(.056)
Mean Killed				.211				.174
				(.174)				(.142)
Pader District	-.034	-.046	-.041	-.007	.071	.063	.070	.062
	(.043)	(.047)	(.051)	(.053)	(.048)	(.052)	(.055)	(.048)
Constant	.750***	.688***	.689***	.392*	.967***	.928***	1.034***	.791***
	(.194)	(.213)	(.258)	(.222)	(.195)	(.212)	(.261)	(.241)
No. of Observations	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560
R^2	.001	.005	.013	.031	.006	.008	.017	.031

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table XI: Camp Age and Labor Market Opportunities

	Log(Camp Age)	Pader
Camp Population	-.172	-.822
	(.588)	(.508)
Camp Density	-5.139	-.802
	(5.811)	(4.981)
Agricultural Produce Market in Camp (0/1)	-.156	-.237
	(.205)	(.182)
Miles to Nearest Agricultural Produce Market	9.422	13.554*
	(8.034)	(7.157)
Non-Agricultural Products Market in Camp (0/1)	-.227	-.201
	(.215)	(.191)
Miles to Nearest Non-Agricultural Products Market	11.615	9.379
	(7.610)	(6.780)
Farm Inputs Market in Camp (0/1)	-.201	-.354**
	(.189)	(.169)
Miles to Nearest Farm Inputs Market	8.352	20.173***
	(8.695)	(7.747)
Number of Soldiers per Camp Population	.0008	.026***
	(.012)	(.009)
Camp Ever Attacked (0/1)	.196	.054
	(.214)	(.185)
Type of Road Accessing the Camp	-.535	.444
	(.375)	(.324)
Average Miles Home	.943	-.103
	(.585)	(.506)
Miles to Nearest IDP Camp	-1.019	2.511***
	(.991)	(.856)
Miles to Nearest Credit/Lending Institution	4.606	1.033
	(6.695)	(5.859)
Percentage of Household Heads Literate	-.075	-.025
	(.047)	(.041)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are at the camp level. Each row represents a separate regression. Camp population and camp density are in tens of thousands of residents. The type of road accessing the camp takes the value of 1 if the road is a locally-maintained road, a value of 2 if it is a community-maintained road, and a value of 3 if it is a federally-maintained road. In general, the quality of the road is improving as the value of this variable increases.

Table XII: Social Interactions and Male Labor Market Participation: Uninstrumented

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Camp Level Male Labor	.616**	.526**	.486**	.274
Market Participation ($\bar{y}_c$)	(.251)	(.227)	(.207)	(.283)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS				
Log(Months in Camp)		-.088**	-.084*	-.045
		(.044)	(.044)	(.032)
Household Size			.029**	.023***
			(.012)	(.008)
Miles to Home			-.002	-.001
			(.006)	(.007)
Family Member Killed			.093***	.123***
			(.034)	(.039)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age			-.004*	-.003
			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.098	.110*
			(.061)	(.065)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS				
Diversity of Camp Residents				.099
				(.072)
Camp Population				-.006
				(.020)
Miles to Town				.002
				(.003)
Road - local				-.068
				(.058)
Road - community				-.111
				(.074)
Mean Killed				-.624*
				(.326)
Pader District	-.001	.038	.029	.046
	(.067)	(.076)	(.068)	(.064)
Constant	.230	.583***	.447	.846***
	(.241)	(.224)	(.275)	(.321)
No. of Observations	612	612	612	612
R^2	.018	.027	.071	.102

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table XIII: Social Interactions and Female Labor Market Participation: Uninstrumented

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Camp Level Female Labor	-.243	-.252	-.241	-.563
Market Participation ($\bar{y}_c$)	(.610)	(.637)	(.619)	(.549)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS				
Log(Months in Camp)		.040	.042	.042
		(.046)	(.049)	(.043)
Household Size			-.002	.0002
			(.009)	(.010)
Miles to Home			-.002	-.002
			(.005)	(.005)
Family Member Killed			-.031	-.031
			(.046)	(.048)
Single-Headed			-.046	-.049
			(.046)	(.047)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age			-.0006	-.0007
			(.001)	(.001)
Literate			-.008	-.017
			(.045)	(.047)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS				
Diversity of Camp Residents				-.022
				(.036)
Camp Population				.037***
				(.014)
Miles to Town				-.005
				(.003)
Road - local				.016
				(.045)
Road - community				.002
				(.065)
Mean Killed				.381*
				(.220)
Pader District	-.010	-.029	-.030	.015
	(.030)	(.032)	(.038)	(.052)
Constant	.956*	.838*	.892*	.917**
	(.530)	(.469)	(.456)	(.404)
No. of Observations	729	729	729	729
R^2	.002	.004	.008	.028

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table XIV: Male First Stage Results

	Camp Level Male Labor Market Participation $\bar{y}_c$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(Camp Age)	-.138***	-.146***	-.145***	-.123**
	(.050)	(.050)	(.050)	(.051)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS				
Log(Months in Camp)		.011	.011	.015*
		(.011)	(.011)	(.008)
Household Size			-.0002	-.0003
			(.003)	(.001)
Miles to Home			.0006	.002
			(.002)	(.001)
Family Member Killed			-.015	-.012
			(.011)	(.008)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age			-.0002	.0001
			(.0004)	(.0001)
Literate			.016	.004
			(.013)	(.010)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS				
Diversity of Camp Residents				.008
				(.030)
Camp Population				-.002
				(.010)
Miles to Market				.0003
				(.002)
Road - local				-.013
				(.034)
Road - community				-.042
				(.070)
Mean Killed				-.156
				(.133)
Mean Age				-.011*
				(.006)
Mean Household Size				-.041
				(.037)
Mean Literate				.414***
				(.144)
Pader District	.022	.020	.019	.033
	(.034)	(.034)	(.032)	(.029)
Constant	1.292***	1.284***	1.282***	1.671***
	(.167)	(.167)	(.172)	(.425)
No. of Observations	612	612	612	612
R^2	.269	.271	.283	.437
F	7.750	8.661	8.323	5.874

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table XV: Female First Stage Results

	Camp Level Female Labor Market Participation $\bar{y}_c$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(Camp Age)	.018	.019	.018	.027
	(.028)	(.028)	(.027)	(.031)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS				
Log(Months in Camp)		-.002	-.004	-.004
		(.009)	(.009)	(.007)
Household Size			.0001	.0001
			(.001)	(.0007)
Miles to Home			.0005	.00004
			(.0007)	(.0006)
Family Member Killed			.009	.004
			(.008)	(.003)
Single-Headed			-.013	-.011*
			(.008)	(.006)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age			.0006**	.0001
			(.0002)	(.0002)
Literate			.012	.005
			(.013)	(.006)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS				
Diversity of Camp Residents				-.006
				(.023)
Camp Population				.010
				(.009)
Miles to Town				-.003
				(.002)
Road - local				.016
				(.030)
Road - community				.057
				(.043)
Mean Killed				.219
				(.141)
Mean Age				.010*
				(.005)
Mean Household Size				.029
				(.024)
Mean Literate				-.085
				(.113)
Pader District	.020	.020	.023	.009
	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.029)
Constant	.775***	.777***	.757***	.120
	(.089)	(.092)	(.082)	(.312)
No. of Observations	729	729	729	729
R^2	.043	.043	.061	.338
F	.4233	.4935	.4449	.6846

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table XVI: Social Interactions and Male Labor Market Participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Camp Level Male Labor	2.125***	1.961***	1.868***	1.620***
Market Participation ($\bar{y}_c$)	(.697)	(.631)	(.568)	(.358)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS				
Log(Months in Camp)		-.031	-.031	-.018
		(.028)	(.030)	(.029)
Household Size			.027***	.020**
			(.009)	(.008)
Miles to Home			-.0009	-.002
			(.006)	(.006)
Family Member Killed			.120***	.141***
			(.043)	(.045)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age			-.003	-.003
			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.072	.085
			(.058)	(.060)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS				
Diversity of Camp Residents				.046
				(.040)
Camp Population				.003
				(.013)
Miles to Town				.002
				(.002)
Road - local				-.016
				(.040)
Road - community				-.063
				(.049)
Mean Killed				-.367**
				(.169)
Mean Age				.010
				(.007)
Mean Household Size				.073
				(.047)
Mean Literate				-.229
				(.180)
Pader District	.064	.072	.061	.060
	(.053)	(.055)	(.050)	(.038)
Constant	-1.015*	-.781	-.860	-1.180*
	(.590)	(.528)	(.561)	(.716)
No. of Observations	612	612	612	612

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road. The instrument is the log of camp age, measured in months.

Table A.1: Camp Age and Male Labor Market Participation: Pader District

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	-.152*	-.157*	-.129	-.173***	-.115*	-.167**	-.144**	-.154***
	(.082)	(.081)	(.079)	(.049)	(.061)	(.074)	(.073)	(.054)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		.006	.021	.024		.072***	.081**	.098***
		(.037)	(.043)	(.037)		(.027)	(.033)	(.031)
Household Size			.024***	.020**			.032**	.031*
			(.008)	(.009)			(.014)	(.016)
Miles to Home			-.016**	-.016*			-.012**	-.010
			(.008)	(.008)			(.005)	(.006)
Family Member Killed			.022	.068*			.097**	.127***
			(.035)	(.039)			(.042)	(.044)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.005***	-.004**			-.007***	-.006***
			(.002)	(.002)			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			-.085	-.082			-.041	-.044
			(.070)	(.065)			(.051)	(.056)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.048				.088
				(.065)				(.058)
Camp Population				.058**				.014
				(.026)				(.026)
Miles to Town				-.001				-.0005
				(.003)				(.002)
Road - local				.058				.041
				(.059)				(.058)
Road - community				-.132*				-.047
				(.070)				(.058)
Mean Killed				-.871***				-.592***
				(.203)				(.217)
Constant	1.295***	1.290***	1.353***	1.916***	1.223***	1.158***	1.155***	1.424***
	(.301)	(.308)	(.310)	(.316)	(.220)	(.207)	(.193)	(.239)
No. of Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311	311	311
R^2	.025	.025	.074	.136	.017	.023	.093	.123

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table A.2: Camp Age and Male Labor Market Participation: Lira District

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	-.718***	-.702***	-.702***	-.706***	-.500***	-.488***	-.525***	-.574***
	(.189)	(.193)	(.189)	(.153)	(.109)	(.114)	(.138)	(.121)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		-.022	-.009	-.019		-.016	-.013	-.015
		(.026)	(.030)	(.040)		(.035)	(.034)	(.036)
Household Size			.013	.012			.006	.006
			(.012)	(.012)			(.016)	(.017)
Miles to Home			.008*	.009*			.001	.001
			(.005)	(.005)			(.006)	(.006)
Family Member Killed			.149***	.138**			.156**	.142**
			(.052)	(.056)			(.068)	(.071)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.003	-.003			-.003**	-.003**
			(.002)	(.002)			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.212***	.210***			.006	.001
			(.069)	(.068)			(.096)	(.098)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.050				.040
				(.052)				(.036)
Camp Population				-.005				-.018
				(.020)				(.012)
Miles to Town				.003				-.001
				(.003)				(.001)
Road - local				-.028				.013
				(.061)				(.033)
Mean Killed				.029				.291*
				(.286)				(.166)
Constant	3.161***	3.177***	2.875***	2.849***	2.505***	2.517***	2.622***	2.684***
	(.623)	(.620)	(.526)	(.432)	(.366)	(.365)	(.507)	(.474)
No. of Observations	301	301	301	301	301	301	301	301
R^2	.121	.122	.206	.21	.076	.077	.124	.134

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local is a type of road providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road. There are no community roads in Lira district.

Table A.3: Camp Age and Female Labor Market Participation: Pader District

	7 Days					30 Days		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	.095**	.085	.098	.145***	.056*	.043	.059*	.054
	(.043)	(.059)	(.063)	(.047)	(.029)	(.034)	(.035)	(.036)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		.015	.016	.012		.019	.016	.011
		(.050)	(.056)	(.057)		(.029)	(.030)	(.030)
Household Size			.0004	.0005			.001	.0005
			(.013)	(.014)			(.012)	(.011)
Miles to Home			-.004	-.004			-.007	-.008
			(.005)	(.006)			(.005)	(.005)
Family Member Killed			.003	.005			.016	.015
			(.045)	(.045)			(.034)	(.037)
Single-Headed			-.039	-.042			-.066*	-.070
			(.078)	(.081)			(.039)	(.043)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.0006	-.001			-.002*	-.002
			(.001)	(.001)			(.001)	(.001)
Literate			-.053	-.056			.007	.011
			(.084)	(.086)			(.056)	(.058)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				.073***				.012
				(.027)				(.030)
Camp Population				.039				.022
				(.025)				(.019)
Miles to Town				-.0009				.0002
				(.001)				(.001)
Road - local				-.131***				-.004
				(.032)				(.026)
Road - community				-.125***				.017
				(.040)				(.047)
Mean Killed				.070				.105
				(.152)				(.127)
Constant	.369**	.355**	.365**	.198	.655***	.637***	.699***	.619***
	(.163)	(.162)	(.183)	(.205)	(.106)	(.109)	(.150)	(.153)
No. of Observations	371	371	371	371	371	371	371	371
R^2	.01	.011	.016	.03	.006	.007	.031	.036

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local and road-community are types of roads providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road.

Table A.4: Camp Age and Female Labor Market Participation: Lira District

	7 Days				30 Days			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(Camp Age)	-.028	-.049	-.036	-.130	-.143	-.132*	-.152	-.250**
	(.130)	(.109)	(.131)	(.093)	(.099)	(.077)	(.093)	(.098)
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL CONTROLS								
Log(Months in Camp)		.030	.029	.032		-.016	-.013	-.006
		(.068)	(.072)	(.072)		(.066)	(.066)	(.062)
Household Size			-.003	.002			-.012	-.009
			(.015)	(.016)			(.012)	(.012)
Miles to Home			-.002	-.002			.0009	.002
			(.008)	(.008)			(.006)	(.006)
Family Member Killed			-.056	-.066			-.007	-.028
			(.066)	(.076)			(.083)	(.086)
Single-Headed			-.049	-.036			-.015	-.007
			(.067)	(.067)			(.061)	(.058)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROLS								
Age			-.0004	-.0007			-.002	-.003
			(.002)	(.002)			(.002)	(.002)
Literate			.011	-.009			.004	-.011
			(.059)	(.064)			(.052)	(.057)
CAMP LEVEL CONTROLS								
Diversity of Camp Residents				-.044				-.014
				(.034)				(.032)
Camp Population				.027***				-.009
				(.009)				(.010)
Miles to Town				-.008***				-.009***
				(.002)				(.002)
Road - local				.111**				.095**
				(.046)				(.038)
Mean Killed				.661***				.741***
				(.185)				(.185)
Constant	.845**	.820*	.865	.782**	1.314***	1.327***	1.547***	1.570***
	(.431)	(.465)	(.551)	(.375)	(.326)	(.363)	(.461)	(.362)
No. of Observations	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358
R^2	.0002	.001	.008	.038	.007	.007	.016	.049

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the camp level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the camp population divided by the number of individuals sampled per camp. Diversity of camp residents is a dummy variable equal to one if most residents of the camp are from the immediate surrounding area (within 3 miles). Camp population is in tens of thousands of residents. Mean killed is the percentage of sample households by camp reporting having an immediate family member killed as a result of the insurgency. Road-local is a type of road providing access to the camp. The omitted category is federally-maintained road. There are no community roads in Lira district.

Figure I: Map of Uganda





Figure II: Labor Market Participation and Camp Age, by Gender