Archives du séminaire PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 25/04/2024 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper documents a link between the colonial conquerors of specific areas in Latin America and modern development as measured by luminosity in 2010. The findings suggest that the level of education of the conqueror is a potential determinant of this link. The relationship holds when looking solely at within-country variation and when we look at spatially contiguous areas in the same country that have different conquerors. We also find evidence supporting the idea that durable investments in the organization of the state that built state capacities is the main source of persistence by looking at measures of state capacity at three different dates.

Reynal-Querol Marta () The Colonial Origins of State Capacity: Evidence from Spanish Conquerors in Latin America

Tim Besley

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 28/03/2024 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Angelucci Charles () *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 07/03/2024 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


A key tenet of representative democracy is that politicians' discourse and policies should follow voters' preferences. In the median voter theorem, this outcome emerges as candidates strategically adjust their platform to get closer to their opponent. Despite its importance in political economy, we lack direct tests of this mechanism. In this paper, we show that candidates converge to each other both in ideology and rhetorical complexity. We build a novel dataset including the content of 9,000 primary and general election websites of candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 2002-2016, as well as 57,000 campaign manifestos issued by candidates running in the first and second round of French parliamentary and local elections, 1958-2022. We first show that candidates tend to converge to the center of the ideology and complexity scales and to diversify the set of topics they cover, between the first and second round, reflecting the broadening of their electorate. Second, we exploit cases in which the identity of candidates qualified for the second round is quasi-random, by focusing on elections in which they narrowly win their primary (in the U.S.) or narrowly qualify for the runoff (in France). Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that second-round candidates converge to the platform of their actual opponent, as compared to the platform of the runner-up who did not qualify for the last round. We conclude that politicians behave strategically and that the convergence mechanism underlying the median voter theorem is powerful.

Le Pennec Caroline () KEEP YOUR ENEMIES CLOSER: STRATEGIC PLATFORM ADJUSTMENTS DURING U.S.

Rafael Di Tella, Randy Kotti, Vincent Pons

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 07/12/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Support for populist radical right parties in Europe has dramatically increased in recent years. We decompose the rise of these parties from 2005 to 2020 into four components: shifts in party positions, changes in voter attributes (opinions and demographics), changes in voter priorities, and a residual. We merge two wide datasets on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We find that shifts in party positions and changes in voter attributes do not play a major role in the recent success of populist radical right parties. Instead, the primary driver behind their electoral success lies in voters' changing priorities. Particularly, voters are less likely to decide which party to support based on parties' economic positions. Rather, voters---mainly older, nonunionized, low-educated men---increasingly prioritize nativist cultural positions. This allows populist radical right parties to tap into a preexisting reservoir of culturally conservative voters. Using the same datasets, we provide a set of reduced-form evidence supporting our results. First, while parties' positions have changed, these changes are not consistent with the main supply-side hypothesis for populist support. Second, on aggregate, voters have not adopted populist right-wing opinions. Third, voters are more likely to self-identify ideologically based on their cultural rather than their economic opinions.

Ro'ee Levy Jonathan () Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right


Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 23/11/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Can beliefs about politics, particularly the benefits of war and peace, move thick financial markets? During and after the Siege of Paris by the Prussian army (1870- 71) we document that the prices of the French 3% sovereign bond (rente) differed persistently between the Bourse in Paris and elsewhere, despite being the most actively traded financial asset in continental Europe. Further, these differences were large, equivalent to almost 1% of French GDP in overall value. We show these differences manifested themselves during the period of limited arbitrage induced by the Siege and persisted until the peace terms were revealed. We show that as long as French military resistance continued, the rente price remained higher in Paris than the outside markets. However, when the parties ceased fire and started negotiating peace terms, this pattern was reversed. Further, while the price in Paris responded more negatively (positively) to defeats (victories), the price responded more to peace events elsewhere. These specific patterns are difficult to reconcile with other potential mechanisms, including differential information sets, need for liquidity, or relative market thickness. Instead, we argue that these results are consistent with prices reflecting the updating of different prevailing political beliefs in Paris and elsewhere about the benefits of war versus peace.

Salgado Marcos () Markets under Siege: How Political Beliefs Move Financial Markets

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 09/11/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


A distinct feature of the Protestant Reformation was Martin Luther’s intentional use of the vernacular (German), rather than Latin, in his writings in order to engage the laity in theological discussions. Focusing on the Holy Roman Empire, we provide causal evidence that the Reformation led to an increase in vernacular printing output in Protestant printing cities relative to Catholic ones. Hence, more knowledge and ideas became accessible to broader segments of the society. We also show that the increased use of the vernacular after the Reformation lowered the entry barriers for authors, allowing broader segments of society to contribute to the market for knowledge and ideas. In addition, the works covered a wider range of fields. Finally, we provide evidence for two underlying mechanisms for the increased use of the vernacular in printing: an increase in religious competition and the advancement of the standardization of the German language following the Reformation.

BINZEL Christine (FAU) The Protestant Reformation and the Transformation of Society: The Rise of the Vernacular

Andreas Link, and Rajesh Ramachandran

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/10/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We provide experimental evidence that monitoring of police activity through body-worn cameras reduces use of force, handcuffs and arrests, and enhances criminal reporting by the police. Stronger treatment effects occur on events ex-ante classified as low risk. Monitoring effects are moderated by officer rank, which is consistent with a career concern motive by junior officers. We reconcile our estimates with the literature which has, to date, shown mixed results. We rule out the hypothesis that de-policing is occurring due to BWC. Overall, our results show that body-worn cameras robustly de-escalate citizen-police interactions, and we show the mechanisms as to why that happens

SOUZA Pedro (FAU) De-Escalation Technology: The Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen-Police Interactions

Daniel Barbosa, Thiemo Fetzer, and Caterina Viaira

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 12/10/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We study cultural integration as an equilibrium of marital matching and intrahousehold decisions regarding fertility and cultural socialization. Structural estimates reveal strong demand to preserve cultural identity on the part of immigrants and little acceptance of the immigrants’ cultural diversity of natives. These demands depend crucially and interestingly on parental education. Nonetheless, we simulate substantial, though heterogeneous, integration rates across immigrant groups, 75% on average over one generation. Counterfactuals show how more accepting preferences of the natives would lead to slower cultural integration, while a reduction in economic incentives to immigrants would increase it. Finally, we evaluate a policy enhancing social welfare by strengthening the ethnic network of immigrants.

BISIN Alberto (FAU) Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy - with Giulia Tura (Università Milano - Bicocca)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/09/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We provide experimental evidence that monitoring of police activity through body-worn cameras reduces use of force, handcuffs and arrests, and enhances criminal reporting by the police. Stronger treatment effects occur on events ex-ante classified as low risk. Monitoring effects are moderated by officer rank, which is consistent with a career concern motive by junior officers. We reconcile our estimates with the literature which has, to date, shown mixed results. We rule out the hypothesis that de-policing is occurring due to BWC. Overall, our results show that body-worn cameras robustly de-escalate citizen-police interactions, and we show the mechanisms as to why that happens

SOUZA Pedro (FAU) De-Escalation Technology: The Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen-Police Interactions ; () ;
écrit avec Daniel Barbosa, Thiemo Fetzer, and Caterina Viaira

La séance est annulée

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 08/06/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We study how large exogenous shocks affect countries and regions through the disruption and reorganization of production networks. We develop a sufficient statistics approach for measuring a shock's impact on welfare that holds regardless of the microfoundation of endogenous production network formation. Using unique firm-to-firm railway shipment data within Ukraine, we apply our framework to quantify the propagation effects of the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. We find large disruption of production linkages to and from direct conflict areas, which are imperfectly substituted by linkages strictly outside the conflict areas. In a difference-in-differences framework, we document a strong negative relationship between changes in regional welfare following the conflict, as measured by our sufficient statistics, and the degree of supplier and buyer exposure that regions had to the conflict-affected areas. Our results show that the conflict led to a 17% reduction in welfare for an average district, compared to districts without supplier and buyer conflict exposure. This empirical evidence provides insight into why localized conflicts within a country or region often have far-reaching detrimental consequences for the broader economy.

Makarin Alexey (FAU) Production Networks and War: Evidence from Ukraine (with Vasily Korovkin and Yuhei Miyauchi)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 01/06/2023 de 12:00:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

MICHALOPOULOS Stelios (FAU) Movies

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 20/04/2023 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases may be almost impossible without a green transition—a substantial transformation of consumption and production patterns. To study such transitions, we propose a dynamic model, which differs from the common approach in economics in two ways. First, consumption patterns reflect not just changing prices and taxes, but changing values. Transitions of values and technologies create a dynamic complementarity that can help or hinder a green transition. Second, and unlike fictitious social planners, policy makers in democratic societies cannot commit to future policy paths, as they are subject to regular elections. We show that market failures and government failures can interact to prevent a welfare-increasing green transition from materializing or make an ongoing green transition too slow. JEL Codes: D72, D91, Q58.

Persson Torsten (FAU) The Political Economics of Green Transitions" (with Tim Besley). I attach the latest version of this paper

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 05/04/2023 de 16:30:00 à 18:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Many governments have engaged in policy experimentation in various forms to resolve uncertainty and facilitate learning. However, little is understood about the characteristics of policy experimentation, and how the structure of experimentation may affect policy learning and policy outcomes. We aim to describe and understand China's policy experimentation since 1980, among the largest and most systematic in recent history. We collect comprehensive data on policy experimentation conducted in China over the past four decades. We find that, while experimentation outcomes strongly predict whether policies roll out nationally, the experimentation exhibits two characteristics that complicate policy learning. First, about 90% of the experiments exhibit positive sample selection in terms of a locality’s economic development. Second, promotion-driven local politicians allocate more resources to ensure the experiments' success, and such effort is not replicable when policies roll out to the entire country. The presence of sample selection and strategic effort is not fully accounted for by the central government, affecting policy learning and distorting national policies originating from the experimentation. Taken together, these results suggest that, while China’s bureaucratic and institutional conditions make policy experimentation possible at an unparalleled scale, the complex political environments can also limit the scope and bias the direction of policy learning

Yang David (FAU) Policy Experimentation in China: the Political Economy of Policy Learning

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 01/12/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Recent decades have seen major disruptions to the local media environment in the United States. The changing economics in local news media has resulted in the purchase of many previously independent local television outlets by conglomerates as well as the consolidation of existing ownership groups. In this paper, we examine the content, viewership, and political consequences of media consolidation, exploiting the staggered timing of acquisitions of local TV stations on part of conglomerate owners. When stations are acquired by a conglomerate, coverage of locally elected officials decreases. This has negative effects on viewership. Preliminary results suggest negative effects on turnout and increased incumbency advantage in state elections, and no effects on turnout but increasing Republican vote share in congressional elections. These results hold important implications for the ability of voters to hold elected officials accountable and how this relates to the regulation of media ownership.

Ornaghi Arianna (FAU) Media Consolidation

with Gregory Martin, Josh McCrain, and Nicola Mastrorocco

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 20/10/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in political institutions in many countries. Furthermore, most governments fell short of expectations regarding preparedness and quality in the management of the pandemic. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust in public institutions? Did citizens’ ideology interfere on the way they processed information on their government performance? To investigate both questions, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. Respondents in the treatment group were provided information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a key policy under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly over-estimate the number of contact tracers in their region. When we provide the actual number of contact tracers, we find: a decline in trust in governments; a reduction on willingness to fund public institutions; and a decrease in COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are ruled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility for it to the central government. We call this the blame shifting effect. In those regions, the negative information does not translate into lower voting intentions for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that the exercise of political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high political polarization and where areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.

Martinez-Bravo Monica (FAU) The Management of the Pandemic and its Effects on Trust and Accountability

with Carlos Sanz (Bank of Spain)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/10/2022 de 12:00:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We examine the impact of conflict-driven displacement on human capital by looking at the Mozambican civil war (1977-1992), during which more than four million civilians fled to the countryside, cities, refugee camps, and settlements in neighboring countries. First, we present descriptive patterns linking displacement to education and sectoral employment for the entire population. Second, we compare brothers and sisters separated during the war. Displaced individuals invest more in education than their siblings who stayed behind, particularly rural-born children escaping to urban areas. Third, we jointly estimate place-based and uprootedness effects as potential mechanisms. Both are present, with displacement fostering education and decreasing attachment to agriculture by the same rate as exposure to an environment approximately half-a-standard deviation more developed than one's birthplace. Fourth, we report on an original survey we conducted in Mozambique's largest Northern city, whose population doubled during the civil war. Those displaced to Nampula have significantly higher education than their siblings who remained in the countryside. Besides, their education has converged to non-mover urban dwellers. However, internally displaced people report significantly lower social/civic capital and have worse mental health three decades after the war. Jointly the results suggest that forced displacement, especially to cities, can trigger human capital investments and break links with subsistence agriculture but at the cost of lasting social and psychological traumas.

Papaioannou Elias (FAU) Forced Displacement and Human Capital

with Giorgio Chiovelli, Stelios Michalopoulos, and Sandra Sequeira

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 29/09/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Yuchtman Noam (FAU) **

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 07/06/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Bazzi Samuel (FAU) The Other Great Migration: Southern Whites and the New Right

with Andreas Ferrara, Martin Fiszbein, Thomas Pearson, and Patrick Testa

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/05/2022 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We use newly digitized records from the U.S. Post Office to study how strengthening state capacity affects public service delivery and innovation in over 2,800 cities between 1875–1905. Exploiting the gradual expansion of a major civil service reform, cities with a reformed postal office experience fewer errors in delivery, lower unit costs and an increase in mail handled per worker. This improvement goes with greater information flow, as measured by increased volumes of mail and newspapers. We observe more joint patenting involving inventors and businesses from different cities, suggesting that a more effective postal service contributed to innovation and growth during the Gilded Age.

XU Guo (FAU) Strengthening State Capacity: Postal Reform and Innovation during the Gilded Age

with Abhay Aneja (UC Berkeley)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 12/05/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Widmer Philine (University of St. Gallen) PEPES Junior - En Route: The Colonial Origins of Francophone Africa's Emigration Patterns with Awa Ambra Seck

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 05/05/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We study the impact of large-scale administrative reform on state capacity in the Spanish empire in the Americas. During the late 18th century, the Spanish Crown entirely overhauled the provincial colonial government, introducing a new corps of Intendants to replace the existing body of local Crown representatives (Corregidores). Our empirical strategy leverages the staggered timing of this reform across different parts of the empire, extending from modern-day Mexico to Argentina, and yields three main findings. First, using granular administrative data from the network of royal treasuries, we show that the reform led to a sizable increase in public revenue (i.e. fiscal capacity). Second, the reform also led to a reduction in the incidence of acts of insurrection by the indigenous population, which had been harshly exploited by the corregidores (i.e., legal capacity). However, we show in third place that the reform also heightened tensions with the local creole elites, as reflected by naming patterns, and potentially contributed to the subsequent demise of the colonial system.

Martinez Luis (University of St. Gallen) Bourbon Reforms and State Capacity in the Spanish Empire

with Giorgio Chiovelli, Leopoldo Fergusson, Juan D Torres, and Felipe Valencia-Caicedo

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 07/04/2022 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


What explains economic changes, or lack-thereof, in China over the tumultuous century 1850-1950? Why was Japan’s economy able to pull far ahead of China in this period, despite starting without an advantage? This paper highlights the critical role of ideology and ideological change induced as a response to Western impact following Qing China’s forced opening during the mid-19th century. We argue that Imperial Qing’s highly centralized and absolutist political regimes and traditional dominance in a China-centered world order encouraged resistance to new intellectual resources and a failure to recognize the impending crisis in the new world order. This contrasted with Japan’s decentralized daimyo system under the Tokugawa shogunate, which encouraged (though unintentionally) ideological competition between various sources of power. By laying out the quantitative profile of Chinese and Japanese economic change during 1850-1950 and reviewing the main historiography, this paper builds a new analytical framework linking ideology with economic change. It delineates three phases of economic changes in light of the specific timing of intellectual and ideological transformation during this period and embeds our narrative with two specific cases of commercial and financial developments

Rubin Jared (University of St. Gallen) Ideology and Economic Change: The Path to the Modern Economy in China and Japan

with Debin Ma (Oxford)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 17/03/2022 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper studies the impact of the Spanish influenza pandemic (1918-20) on religiosity and science. Focusing on the United States during the 1900-1930 period, we define a novel indicator of revealed religiosity that leverages naming patterns of newborn babies, and measure scientific progress through the universe of patents granted over this period. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to the pandemic, we find that relatively more affected counties became both more religious and more innovative. Moreover, we document that the relationship between religiosity and science changed over time, being negative before 1918, and positive thereafter, a finding at odds with the current literature. We use individual-level data to shed light on the mechanisms. We show that in counties affected by the pandemic: i) individuals in science-related fields, who were less religious before the shock, became even less religious than the rest of the population; ii) pre-existing differences in religiosity increased, leading to a polarization of religious beliefs.

PASQUAMARIA SQUICCIARINI Mara (University of St. Gallen) Religiosity and Science: an Oxymoron? Evidence from the Great Influenza Pandemic

joint with Enrico Berkes, Davide Coluccia, and Gaia Dossi

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/12/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Dewitte Edgar (Sciences Po) PEPES Junior - Explaining the heterogeneous effect of Internet on elections

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 18/11/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We document the impact of religiosity on the development of science and education during the past millennium. We measure historic religiosity - or the intensity of religious upbringing - by exploiting that given names reveal the preferences and identities of parents, including their religious identity. We confirm that individuals who share first name with a major religious figure engage in more religious behaviors, reflected in their choice of studies, loyalty towards the church, and authors' writing topics, as well as response to natural disasters. We do so using data for more than 40.000 university students throughout the Holy Roman Empire and 330.000 authors writing during the past millennium. We proceed to document that knowledge production was slower in areas across Europe with more intense religious upbringing. To establish causality, we compare individuals that are very similar (university students or authors), born in the same area, and exploit that religiosity is measured at the parental level, while outcomes are measured at the level of the child. Our results contribute to a growing literature on the societal impact of differences in religious intensity

Sinding Bentzen Jeanet (Sciences Po) In the Name of God! Religiosity and the Transition to Modern Growth

With Lars Harhoff Andersen

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/10/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper investigates the heterogeneous effect of biased local TV news on political outcomes and opinions. I exploit the quasi-random staggered expansion of Sinclair Broadcast Group, the now largest local TV broadcasting company in the U.S., which reached over 40% of U.S. markets in 2020. Though Sinclair has owned local TV stations since 1971, its conservative slant emerges in the run-up to the 2004 election and operates through the supply-side filtering of available news stories. Using an event study methodology, I estimate that exposure to Sinclair bias since 2004 corresponds to a 2.5%-point increase in the presidential Republican vote share during the 2008/2012 election, an effect that doubles during the 2016/2020 elections. Estimates imply that Sinclair convinced 4.6% - 13.6% of its potential audience to vote Republican, depending on the election year. While there is a null or negative trend for counties later exposed, interactions reveal a common trend across groups: the effect is concentrated among “isolated” counties (proxied by population change and the share of minorities and the college-educated), in contrast to economic and historical shocks. Individual-level survey data corroborate county-level evidence, across treatment groups and election types. Little evidence exists that Sinclair’s bias increases support for traditionally Republican policy positions or populist rhetoric. Instead, I find a 10% differential change in sentiments towards the 2016 Republican candidate, depending on the respondent’s level of education. Congruently, discriminatory attitudes towards minorities and immigrants increased. The totality of the results suggests that political persuasion is a dynamic and affective process, sensitive to environmental and personal characteristics.

Avetian Vladimir (Sciences Po) PEPES Junior - Small screen, big echo? Estimating the political persuasion of local television news bias using Sinclair Broadcast Group as a natural experiment.

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 30/09/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Governments may be tempted to crack down on the opposition when the attention of donor countries is distracted. As strategic reaction to this, the opposition will have incentive to not incite such crackdowns. At the level of individuals, with agitations already under way, agents will substitute visible forms of unrest (riots) for more covert operations on soft targets (civilian targeted violence). We start from a simple game-theoretic model of the strategic interaction between the government and opposition in the face of anticipated versus unanticipated shocks. The empirical test of the theory exploits both unanticipated (disaster) and anticipated (election) shocks taking place in major donor countries to explain different forms of social violence in recipient countries. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that in times when a given government has "leeway" to repress, the opposition reacts by reducing public agitations. But this is accompanied by increased violence towards private, pro-government, citizens. This implies that international lack of attention hurts democratic oppositions through the out-of-equilibrium threat of repression, and has knock on violent effects, even when on the surface the situation appears "calm". Thus, observed political crackdowns may only represent the "tip of the iceberg", and policies that would enhance international scrutiny would help safeguard public demonstrations of dissent, and reduce violence against civilians.

Rohner Dominic (Sciences Po) Donor Attention and Civil Unrest in Africa

with Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois and Rogerio Santarrosa

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 23/09/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


How does competition from online platforms affect the organization, performance, and editorial choices of newspapers? And what are the implications of these changes for the information voters are exposed to and for their political choices? We study these questions using the staggered introduction of Craigslist – the world’s largest online platform for classified advertising – across US counties between 1995 and 2009. This setting allows us to separate the effect of competition for classified advertising from other changes brought about by the Internet, and to compare newspapers that relied more or less heavily on classified ads ex ante. We find that, following the entry of Craigslist, local papers experienced a significant decline in the number of newsroom and management staff. Cuts in editorial staff disproportionately affected editors covering politics. These organizational changes led to a reduction in news coverage of politics and resulted in a decline in newspaper readership, which was not compensated by increased news consumption online or in other media. Finally, we document that this reduced exposure to political news coverage was associated with more party-line voting and increased ideological polarization in voters’ choices.

Durante Ruben (Sciences Po) The Impact of Online Competition on Local Newspapers: Evidence from the Introduction of Craigslist

with Milena Djourelova, Gregory Martin

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 03/06/2021 de 16:30:00 à 18:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


The political consequences of revolution are among the most important, but least understood, of all war impacts. Using a census of 3.68 million Nepalis (2.56 million of whom are of voting age) covering eleven districts, party nomination lists, electoral data, and party candidate selection committee surveys, we report five key findings. First, the historically disadvantaged social group of Janajatis – who formed the backbone of the Maoist insurgent group - gained representation proportional to their population share. Second, all parties – including the Maoist party – positively select candidates on education. Third, educated and Janajati party selection committee members demonstrate less bias against Janajati candidates. Fourth, the Maoist party - which has the most diverse party selection committees and the most Janajati nominees - provided the most Janajati tickets. Finally, using a close-election regression discontinuity design, we find that electing more educated leaders causally improves earthquake reconstruction for all constituents. By contrast, electing lower caste politicians marginally increases benefits for co-caste members, but does not have broader impacts. Taken together, our results provide a nuanced picture of how rebel groups enabled an inclusive federal democracy in Nepal: they created a cadre of positively selected leaders from historically disadvantaged castes during the revolution. This broadening of the pool of qualified candidates for post-conflict politics, in turn, leads to improved policy outcomes.

Callen Michael (Sciences Po) Does Revolution Work? Evidence from the Birth of Nepal's Federal Democracy

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 29/04/2021 de 14:30:00 à 16:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We use variation in exposure to victimization of 1,537 households of eastern Congo for each year of 1990–2013 to examine the formation of preferences to participate in armed groups. In this context, most armed groups are Congolese militia, whose objective is fighting foreign armed groups. We find that foreign armed group attacks on household members are associated with a larger propensity that individuals join a Congolese militia in subsequent years. The results are consistent with the formation of preferences arising from parochial altruism towards the family to fight foreign perpetrators. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the most gruesome of those attacks, by those that take place at a young age, and persists for several years. Consistent with parochial altruism, we find that the effect is largest when the victim is a household member or the village chief, smaller when the victim is another household in the village, and insignificant if the victim is in a nearby village. To examine the external validity of our result, we analyze heterogeneous effects by weakness of the state. We find that the response is concentrated in village-year observations in which state forces are absent. Finally, we show that, to undo this effect, the yearly per capita income outside armed groups would have to permanently increase 18.2-fold. These results suggest that intrinsic preferences are important for armed group participation relative to economic incentives, and emphasize their interaction with state weakness.

Sanchez de la Sierra Raul (Sciences Po) The Forging of a Rebel

with Gauthier Marchais, Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, and David Qihang Wu

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 23/03/2021 de 16:00:00 à 17:15:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Digital technologies such as smartphones and social media occupy a large and growing share of leisure time. While these technologies provide obvious benefits, it is often argued that they can be addictive and harmful. We lay out a model of digital addiction and estimate its parameters using a randomized experiment involving about 2000 smartphone users. We find that smartphone social media use is habit forming, and while people correctly predict habit formation, they consume as if they are inattentive to it. Functionality that allows people to set time limits on social media apps reduces use by about 15 percent, suggesting that people have self-control problems. People slightly but consistently underestimate future use, suggesting slight naivete about temptation. Our structural model predicts that in our sample, non-rational habit formation—projection bias, temptation, and naivete—increases social media use by 12–25 minutes per day and reduces long-run consumer surplus by $50–$100 per person each year.

Gentzkow Matt (Sciences Po) Digital Addiction

with Hunt Allcott and Lena Song

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 11/03/2021 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We provide new evidence on how conflict adversely affects economic outcomes. Specifically, we ask whether and how the production network is a first-order determinant of the propagation of conflict to firms outside of conflict zone. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants and geo-coded information on Maoist insurgency, we first provide an estimate of the direct exposure to conflict. Firms located in conflict affected areas suffer a loss of 7-11% of their output. Estimating structurally a general equilibrium model of production networks, we then obtain an estimate for the overall macroeconomic impact of the Maoist insurgency by taking this propagation effects into account. We find that the Maoist insurgency resulted in a 0.4-0.7% decline in aggregate output of Indian’s manufacturing sector. Only the 20% of this loss is due to direct exposure to conflict, whereas the remaining 80% explained by the indirect exposure to conflict through the network production.

Couttenier Mathieu (Sciences Po) The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Production Network Approach

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 17/12/2020 de 16:30:00 à 18:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We test the relationship between historical immigration to the US and political ideology today. We hypothesize that European immigrants brought with them their preferences for the welfare state, and that this had a long-lasting effect on the political ideology of US born individuals. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we document that the historical presence of European immigrants is associated with a more liberal political ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution among US born individuals today. Next, we show that this correlation is not explained by the characteristics of the counties where immigrants settled or other specific, socioeconomic immigrants' traits. Finally, we provide evidence that our findings are driven by immigrants who had been more exposed to social-welfare refroms in their country of origin. Consistent with a mechanism of transmission from immigrants to natives, results are stronger when inter-group contact, measured with intermarriage and residential integration, was higher. Our findings also indicate that immigrants influenced American political ideology during one of the largest episodes of redistribution in US history -- the New Deal -- and that such effects persisted after the initial shock.

Giuliano Paola (Sciences Po) The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States

Marco Tabellini

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 26/11/2020 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Recently, there has been much evidence linking economic shocks in the form of automation to employment and wage outcomes, as well as political outcomes. In this paper, we try to understand the mechanisms behind these effects. In particular, we go beyond current worker outcomes by introducing a new measure of future career prospects. We show that automation does not only affect current wages, but that occupations also differ in the degree to which workers' future career is affected by automation, as automation affects both wages in jobs that workers might aspire to move into, and the likelihood of different career transitions. Moreover, the labor market effects of automation differ by demographic group and local area characteristics. We then demonstrate that these patterns of heterogeneity in the impact of automation align with shifts in voter preference towards Donald Trump in the 2016 election -- with negative impacts predicting a shift in preference towards Trump.

Petrova Maria (Sciences Po) Automation, Career Values, and Political Preferences

Gregor Schubert, Pinar Yildirim, Bledi Taska

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 12/11/2020 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


In this paper, we document the long-run impact of the geographical heterogeneity in skills among the first settlers to Latin America. To this end, we compile administrative data on the early settlers in the Americas between 1492 and 1540 including, among others, name, city of origin, destination, and occupation. From a methodological perspective, a focus on the initial period of colonization in Latin America offers several advantages. First, differences in the geographical distribution of occupations among the first settlers are likely to be accidental. Second, a set-up that analyzes an area with a single colonizer (Spain) allows to hold constant formal institutions and legal origin. Our results show a relevant effect of the skills of first colonizers on long-run levels of development of the areas located around the original settlements. We find evidence of persistence in the form of market orientation and entrepreneurial spirit.

Reynal-Querol Marta (Sciences Po) Colonization, Early Settlers and Development: The Case of Latin America

Jose Garcia-Montalvo

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 04/06/2020 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


How do extremist movements go ‘viral’? To answer this question, we examine the rise of the Nazi Party in Hamburg in 1932. The July 1932 parliamentary election saw the Nazi Party’s biggest triumph before coming to power. In the preceding period, the Nazi party staged massive marches. We examine how these public shows of strength created growing support for the Nazi movement. Areas close to the marching route saw much larger electoral gains. Wide streets were favored because they made marching columns look more impressive. We exploit this fact in our IV strategy, and find large effects. In addition, social network linkages across neighborhoods facilitated the spread of extremism throughout the city. The new data on the characteristics and location of more than 400,000 households show that, even in areas far from the marching routes, gains for the Nazi party were more sizable where numerous inhabitants had connections with others who witnessed the march.

Voth Joachim (Sciences Po) Contagious Extremism: Nazi Marches and Radical Voting

David Yanagizawa-Drott, Bruno Caprettini, and Marcel Caesmann

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 21/11/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper investigates the effects of state censorship of opposition media using evidence from the closing of RCTV, a popular opposition television channel in Venezuela. The government did not renew RCTV’s license, and the channel was replaced overnight, during May 2007, by a pro-government channel. Based upon this censorship of opposition television, we have three key findings. First, using Nielsen ratings data, viewership fell, following the closing of RCTV, on the pro-government replacement,but rose on Globovision, the only remaining television channel for opposition viewers. This finding is consistent with a model in which viewers have a preference for opposition television and substitute accordingly. Second, exploiting the geographic location of the Globovision broadcast towers,Chavez approval ratings fell following the closing of RCTV in places with access to the Globovision signal, relative to places without access. Third, in places with access to the Globovision signal,relative to places without, support for Chavez in electoral data also fell following the closing of RCTV. Counterfactuals, which account for both substitution patterns in media consumption and the persuasive effects of opposition television, document that switching to uncensored outlets led to an economically significant reduction in support for Chavez.

Knight Brian (Sciences Po) Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/11/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Do campaign promises matter? Despite pathbreaking work on information and voting, there is still uncertainty about how voters interpret and respond to campaign information, especially in consolidating democracies where policy promises are rarely the currency of electoral competition. We use a novel approach combining a structural model with a large-scale field experiment to disentangle the effects of information through learning and psychological channels. We elicit multidimensional policy platforms from political candidates in consecutive mayoral elections in the Philippines and show that voters who are randomly informed about these promises rationally update their beliefs about candidates, along both policy and valence dimensions. Those who receive information about current campaign promises are more likely to vote for candidates with policy promises closer to their own preferences. Those informed about current and past campaign promises reward incumbents who fulfilled their past promises, as they perceive them to be more honest and competent. The structural model shows that effects operate through both learning and psychological mechanisms. Treated voters update their subjective beliefs about candidates and increase the weight on policy issues in their utility function. Counterfactual exercises also demonstrate that policy and valence play a significant quantitative role in explaining vote shares and can attenuate the importance of vote buying. At the same time, although these campaign promises have a significant impact, we also show that vote buying is more cost effective than information campaigns, establishing a rationale for why candidates in these environments do not use them in practice.

Labonne Julien (Sciences Po) Making policies matter: Voter responses to campaign promises

C. Cruz, P. Keefer and F. Trebbi

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 26/09/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


When did candidate-centered campaign advertising take off in the U.S., and what accounts for this growth? In this paper, we analyze a novel dataset of political advertisements in newspapers between 1880 and 1930. We show that there was a sharp increase in candidates' newspaper advertising beginning around 1910. We also exploit the panel structure of this data to investigate the impact of political reforms on advertising. The results suggest that the introduction of the direct primary substantially increased the number of campaign advertisements in general election races for statewide offices and for the U.S. House. We do not find similar effects either for the Australian ballot. Also we find little evidence that the reforms affected advertising in U.S. presidential races or by political parties.

Snyder James (Sciences Po) The Growth of Campaign Advertising in the U.S., 1880 to 1930

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/09/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


How does the appearance of a new immigrant group affect the integration of earlier generations of migrants? We study this question in the context of the first Great Migration (1915–1930), when 1.5 million African Americans moved from the U.S. South to northern urban centers, where 30 million Europeans had arrived since 1850. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation induced by the interaction between 1,900 settlements of southern-born blacks in northern cities and state-level outmigration from the U.S. South after 1910. Black arrivals increased both the effort exerted by immigrants to assimilate and their eventual Americanization. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity: while initially less integrated groups (i.e., Southern and Eastern Europeans) exerted more assimilation effort, assimilation success was larger for those culturally closer to native whites (i.e., Western and Northern Europeans). Labor market outcomes do not display similar heterogeneity, suggesting that these patterns cannot be entirely explained by economic forces. Our findings are instead more consistent with a framework in which changing perceptions of outgroup distance among native whites lowered the barriers to the assimilation of white immigrants.

TABELLINI Marco (Harvard) From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation During the Great Migration

Vasiliki Fouka and Soumyajit Mazumder

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/06/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Sviatschi Maria Micaela (Harvard) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/05/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Recent years have witnessed the remarkable diffusion of social media, such as Facebook, in tandem with the spread of the cell phones that have become the key tool for access to those media. We ask whether this has affected the accountability of politicians, in a context where the coverage of local politicians by traditional media is negligible. Using data on the spread of 3G cell phone networks across municipalities in Brazil, we implement a triple-differences strategy to show how legislators respond when municipalities that are part of their electoral base obtain access to the 3G technology. The reaction takes place both in their social media activity – they increase the number of Facebook mentions to the municipality – and in their legislative activity – they decrease the amount of earmark transfers to the municipality and mentions to those municipalities in Congressional speeches. We thus find direct evidence of substitution between the online and offline types of responses. We also show that citizens increase their social media interaction with politicians, as measured by Facebook “likes,” “shares,” or “comments.” Taken together, our results suggest that the combination of social media and mobile phones creates the potential for substitution between online and offline behaviors of the politicians.

FERRAZ Claudio (Harvard) Internet Access, Social Media, and the Behavior of Politicians: Evidence from Brazil

Pedro Bessone, Filipe Campante, and Pedro CL Souza

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 02/05/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

DELL Melissa (Harvard) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 11/04/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Jha Saumitra (Standford) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 04/04/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

WACZIARG Romain (Standford) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/03/2019 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Alberto Alesina (Standford) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/12/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


To predict others’ behavior and make their own choices, voters and candidates can rely on information provided by polls and past election results. We isolate the impact of candidates’ rankings using an RDD in French local and parliamentary two-round elections, where up to 3 or 4 candidates can qualify for the second round. Candidates who barely ranked first in the first round are more likely to run in the second round (5.6pp), win (5.8pp), and win conditionally on running (2.9 to 5.9pp), than those who barely ranked second. The effects are even larger for ranking second instead of third (23.5, 9.9, and 6.9 to 12.2pp), and ranking third instead of fourth also increases candidates’ second round outcomes (14.6, 2.2, and 3.0 to 5.0pp). These results are largest when the candidates have the same political orientation (making coordination relatively more important and desirable), but they remain strong when two candidates only qualify for the second round (and there is no need for coordination), suggesting that bandwagon effect is an important driver of voter behavior and election outcomes.

Pons Vincent (Harvard) Rankings Matter Even When They Shouldn’t: Bandwagon Effect in Two Round Elections

Clémence Tricaud

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 22/11/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Media censorship is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. We conduct a field experiment in China to measure the effects of providing citizens with access to an uncensored Internet. We track subjects' media consumption, beliefs regarding the media, economic beliefs, political attitudes, and behaviors over 18 months. We find 4 main results: (i)free access alone does not induce subjects to acquire politically sensitive information; (ii) temporary encouragement leads to a persistent increase in acquisition, indicating that demand is not permanently low; (iii) acquisition brings broad, substantial, and persistent changes to knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended behaviors; and (iv)social transmission of information is statistically significant but small in magnitude. We calibrate a simple model to show that the combination of low demand for uncensored information and the moderate social transmission means China's censorship apparatus may remain robust to a large number of citizens receiving access to an uncensored Internet

Yang David (MIT) The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?

Yuyu CHEN

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/11/2018 de 13:00:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Shayo Moses (Hebrew University ) How Do We Choose Our Identity? A Revealed Preference Approach Using Food Consumption

David Atkin and Eve Sihra

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 08/11/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We investigate the persistence of right-wing ideology in Germany. The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), founded as a party espousing fiscal conservatism, has turned to an openly nationalist and anti-immigrant platform since 2015. We document this rhetorical change with quantitative text analysis. We further show that municipalities that voted more for the AfD after 2015 also exhibited higher support for the Nazi party in the 1920s and 30s. The historical correlation we observe is positive, significant, and large. In our preferred specification, a one standard deviation increase in historical support for the Nazi party is associated with a 0.15 standard deviations larger change in votes towards the AfD. Our results are robust to controlling for a large set of historical and contemporary covariates, especially relating to unemployment and the recent inflow of refugees from the Middle East.

Cantoni Davide (LMU Munich ) Persistence and Activation of Right-Wing Political Ideology

Felix Hagemeister und Mark Westcott

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 18/10/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper presents evidence showing that since antiquity there have been two opposed types of institutional systems: one resembling central planning and present in ancient China, ancient Egypt, the Inca Empire and other territorial states, and another one with strong market institutions, protection of property rights present mostly in city-states not just in the Mediterranean but throughout the world. Evidence is presented that these institutional differences dating back to the antiquity, and shaped by special geographical conditions, can be seen to be at the root of the two cultural systems in today’s world: individualism and collectivism. These cultural differences have effects on economic performance and institutions in today’s world.

Roland Gerard (UC Berkeley ) The Deep Historical Roots of Modern Culture: A comparative perspective

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 27/09/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


The 20th century has witnessed a rapid pace of cultural change. This paper focuses on cultural change in one particular area -- attitudes towards gay people -- and argues that the AIDS crisis was an important propagator of change. We examine this hypothesis empirically in a variety of ways.

Fernandez Raquel (NYU) Cultural Change

Sahar Parsa and Martina Viarengo

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/09/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Why does democracy occur? Most existing explanations view democracy as an institutional arrangement that solves a class conflict between a rich elite and the rest of the population. We study the logic of democratic transition when ethnic tensions are more salient than the poor/rich divide. We provide a theoretical model where both military and political mobilizations rest on the unobserved strength of ethnic identity. By eliciting information, free and fair elections restore inter-ethnic bargaining efficiency and prevent conflict outbreak. Our setup generates new predictions on the nature of political regime, government tenure, inequality, ethnic politics and social unrest for ethnically divided countries - all consistent with country-level panel evidence on heterogeneity of inequality patterns and government duration across different types of autocratic/democratic regimes.

THOENIG M. (U of Lausanne ) Ethnic conflicts and Democracy

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 20/06/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper studies the labor market consequences of elite education in China, examines the relative importance of elite education and parental background, and sheds light on the mechanisms underlying the impacts of elite education on labor market outcomes. We overcome challenges of data availability and selection bias by compiling our own large-scale dataset and exploiting a discontinuity in elite university admissions eligibility that exists around college entrance exam cutoff scores. We find that receiving an elite education increases the monthly wages of workers by 30-40%. Elite education affects inter-generational mobility, but it does not change the influence that parental background has on employment outcomes. There is suggestive evidence that the wage premium is more likely to be explained by university-related networks and signaling than human capital. Keywords: education, mobility, human capital, China, college exam, college entrace, elite education

Jia Ruixue (U of Lausanne ) The Value of Elite Education in China

Li Hongbin

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/06/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

BECKER Maja (U of Lausanne ) Austerity and Populism: Evidence from the UK

Thiemo Fetzer

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 31/05/2018 de 12:45:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Classic theories of counterinsurgency claim rebel forces execute attacks in an unpredictable manner to limit the government’s ability to anticipate and defend against them. We study a model of combat during an irregular insurgency, where the precision of attacks varies with the ability of insurgents to gather intelligence about the vulnerability of targets across time. We test empirical implications of the theoretical model using newly declassified military records from Afghanistan that track the within-day timing of insurgent attacks on security targets. We pair our conflict microdata with granular information on local opium production, yield heterogeneity, and farmgate prices, which enable us to estimate the quantity of annual taxes extracted from farmers and traffickers. Consistent with our model, we find that the capacity (wealth) of local rebel units influences the timing of their attacks. As rebels extract more resources, the timing of their operations deviates substantially from a random allocation of violence. We test additional empirical implications of our model using novel tactical and survey data on the Taliban's spy operations, rebel infiltration of the Afghan security forces, and latent public support for non-stated armed actors. These findings clarify how the accumulation of economic resources by armed groups influences not just when, but how civil wars are fought

Wright Kelsey (U of Lausanne ) Rebel Capacity and Randomized Combat

Konstantin Sonin and Jarnickae Wilson

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 03/05/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

BARSBAI Toman (U of Lausanne ) From exodus to exitus: Selective emigration after Germany’s failed 1848 revolutions and the rise of the Nazi Party

Hillel Rapoport

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 29/03/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We propose that the development of social hierarchy following the Neolithic Revolution was due to the ability of the emergent elite to appropriate crops from farmers, rather than a result of increased productivity, as usually maintained. Since cereals are easier to appropriate than roots and tubers, we argue that regional variations in the suitability of land for the cultivation of these di§erent crop types can account for differences in the formation of hierarchies and states. Our empirical investigation supports a causal effect of the cultivation of cereals on hierarchy,and the lack of a similar effect of land productivity

PASCALI Luigi (U of Lausanne ) Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy

J. Mayshar, O. Moav and Z. Neeman, CEPR Discussion Paper 10742

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 22/03/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

DO Quy-Toan (U of Lausanne ) The Price Elasticity of African Elephant Poaching

Andrei A. Levchenko, Lin Ma, Julian Blanc, Holly Dublin, and Tom Milliken.

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/03/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


During the early 1990s Germany received over half-million Yugoslavians escaping war. By 2000, most of these refugees were repatriated. In this paper we exploit this episode to provide causal evidence on the role migrants play in expansion of the export baskets of their home countries after their return. We find that the elasticity of exports to return migration is between 0.1 and 0.25 in industries were migrants were employed during their stay in Germany. In order to deal with endogeneity issues we use historic rules of random allocation of asylum seekers across different German states to construct an instrumental variable for the treatment. We find our results to be externally valid when expanding the sample to all countries. We also find that the effect is over 10 times stronger for migrant workers in white collar occupations, as opposed to non-white collars. Similarly, the effect is 3 and 4 times larger upon return migration of workers with occupations intensive in analytical and cognitive tasks (as opposed to manual ones) and with high problem-solving content (as opposed to low content), respectively. Our results point to knowledge diffusion as the main channel driving the link between migration and productivity as measured by changes in comparative advantage.

Bahar Dany (U of Lausanne ) Diasporas, return migration and comparative advantage: a natural experiment of Yugoslavian refugees in Germany

Andreas Hauptmann (IAB), Cem Ozguzel (PSE), Hillel Rapoport (PSE)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 18/01/2018 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

LARREGUY Horacio (U of Lausanne ) BREAKING CLIENTELISM OR REWARDING INCUMBENTS? EVIDENCE FROM AN URBAN TITLING PROGRAM IN MEXICO

John Marshall and Laura Trucco.

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 07/12/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper finds significant, divergent patterns in how people allocate income in group settings. The results indicate that the tendency to favor people conditional on group affiliation, which we call “groupiness,” could be an individual trait. Each participant allocates income in two group treatments, an arbitrary minimal group setting and a political group setting. Many subjects are “not groupy,” showing no favoritism to ingroup in either setting; others are “groupy,” with equally positive favoritism in both. Less than half of subjects are “conditionally groupy,” with greater favoritism in the political group treatment. Using latent class models, we structurally identify nine distinct patterns of behavior. The most prevalent type, 23% of subjects, weighs own and other subjects’ income similarly regardless of group affiliation of others; the second most prevalent type, 20%, puts almost no weight on other subjects’ income regardless of group affiliation of others. Both show no ingroup favoritism albeit in different ways. Twelve percent of subjects’ have particularly high favoritism in both settings. Overall, three of our nine types are not groupy, three are groupy, and three are conditionally groupy. Thus, observed bias in a group setting might not be due to the nature of the setting but rather the selection or composition of individuals within the group.

Kranton Rachel () Deconstructing Group Bias: Individual Groupiness and Income Allocation

Rachel Kranton, Matthew Pease, Seth Sanders, and Scott Huettel

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 23/11/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Using high-resolution data from Africa over the period 1998-2012, this paper investigates the hypothesis that a higher exposure to malaria increases the incidence of civil violence. The analysis uses panel data at the 1o grid cell level at monthly frequency. The econometric identification exploits exogenous monthly within-grid-cell variation in weather conditions that are particularly suitable for malaria transmission. The analysis compares the effect across cells with different malaria exposure, which affects the resistance and immunity of the population to malaria outbreaks. The results document a robust effect of the occurrence of suitable conditions for malaria on civil violence. The effect is highest in areas with low levels of immunities to malaria. Malaria shocks mostly affect unorganized violence in terms of riots, protests, and confrontations between militias and civilians, rather than geo-strategic violence, and the effect spikes during short, labor-intensive harvesting periods of staple crops that are particularly important for the subsistence of the population. The paper ends with an evaluation of anti-malaria interventions.

SUNDE UWE () Malaria Risk and Civil Violence

joint with Matteo Cervellati and Elena Esposito

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 09/11/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


To register: https://doodle.com/poll/yfi8msbhtdbrcs3h

BANERJEE Abhijit () Information Delivery under Endogenous Communication: Experimental Evidence from the Indian Demonetization

Emily Breza, Arun Chandrasekar and Ben Golub

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 22/06/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

BERTRAND Marianne () *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 01/06/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

KUZIEMKO ILYANA () *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/05/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


If you'd like us to provide a sandwich for you, please confirm attendance by Friday May 12 at 16:00, on the following doodle: https://doodle.com/poll/hf49eg7ygc3ctb7e If you'd like to meet the speaker, please inform the organizers of your preferred slots. Don't hesitate to forward this information to colleagues and graduate students who might be interested. We're looking forward to seeing you there! We also want to remind you that we have migrated our official website to the new address at https://sites.google.com/site/pepeseminar/home. Please feel free to take a look at the schedule this year, as well as the archived schedules from previous years.

MICHALOPOULOS Stelios () The Consequences of Emigration during the French Revolution in the Short and Longue Duree

Raphael Frank

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 11/05/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

WACZIARG Romain () *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 20/04/2017 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

JEDWAB Rémi () Economic Shocks, Inter-Ethnic Complementarities and the Persecution of Minorities: Evidence

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 09/03/2017 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

PANDE Rohini () A préciser.

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 08/12/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


A large scholarship claims that states led by women are less conáictual than states led by men. However, it is theoretically unclear why female leaders would favor more conciliatory war policies. And, it is empirically challenging to identify the e§ect of female rule, since women may gain power disproportionately during periods of peace. We surmount this challenge by exploiting features of hereditary succession in European polities over the 15th-20th centuries. In this context, women were more likely to acquire power if the previous monarch lacked a male Örst-born child, or had a sister who could follow as successor. Using these factors as instruments for female rule, we Önd that queenly reigns participated more in inter-state conáicts, without experiencing more internal conáict. Moreover, the tendency of queens to participate as conáict aggressors varied based on marital status. Among unmarried monarchs, queens were more likely to be attacked than kings. Among married monarchs, queens were more likely than kings to participate as attackers and Öght with allies. These results are consistent with an account in which marriages strengthened queenly reigns, both because of alliances, and because queens utilized their spouses to help them rule. Kings, in contrast, were less inclined to utilize a similar division of labor. This asymmetry in how queens utilized male spouses and kings utilized female spouses increased the relative capacity of queenly reigns, enabling them to pursue more aggressive war policies.

DUBE Oeindrila () Queens

S.P. Harish

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 01/12/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

ENIKOLOPOV Ruben () Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia


Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/10/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


What are the origins and consequences of the state as a provider of public goods? We study institutional changes that increased state capacity and public goods provision in German cities during the 1500s, including the establishment of mass public education. We document that cities that institutionalized public goods provision in the 1500s subsequently began to differentially produce and attract upper tail human capital and grew to be significantly larger in the long-run. Institutional change occurred where ideological competition introduced by the Protestant Reformation interacted with local politics. We study plague outbreaks that shifted local politics in a narrow time period as a source of exogenous variation in institutions, and find support for a causal interpretation of the relationship between institutional change, human capital, and growth.

Dittmar Jeremiah () State Capacity and Public Goods: Institutional Change, Human Capital, and Growth in Early Modern Germany

Ralf R. Meisenzahl (Federal Reserve Board)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 29/09/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


The decision to protest is strategic: an individual's participation is a function of beliefs about others' behavior. Models of protest often assume strategic complementarity; however, the incentive to free ride suggests the possibility of strategic substitutes. We conduct the first field experiment directly manipulating individuals' beliefs about others' decisions to protest, in the context of Hong Kong's anti-authoritarian movement. We ask university students about planned protest participation and elicit prior beliefs about others' planned participation in an incentivized manner. We randomly provide information about others' actual protest plans, and elicit posterior beliefs in an incentivized manner, allowing us to identify the causal effects of upward and downward belief adjustment on individuals' participation. We consistently find evidence of strategic substitutes. Heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that protests function like a public goods game. Results from direct survey questions reinforce our experimental findings.

Yuchtman Noam () Are Protests Games of Strategic Complements or Substitutes? Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Democracy Movement

Davide Cantoni, David Yang, and Jane Zhang

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 23/06/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

FRIJTERS Paul (Yale) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/05/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Treisman Dan (UCLA) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 12/05/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Besley Tim (LSE) *; () ;

La séance est annulée

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 21/04/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Spolaore Enrico (Tufts) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 31/03/2016 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Prat Andrea (Columbia) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 20/01/2016 de 16:00:00 à 17:30:00

Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Laitin David (Stanford) Language Policy and Human Development

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 10/12/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

Alberto Alesina (Stanford) Organized crime, violence, and politics

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 03/12/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


A large theoretical literature argues that the legacies of non-democratic regimes can affect the quality of governance in new democracies. However, the empirical evidence on the effects of these legacies is scarce. This paper exploits a natural experiment that took place in the Indonesian democratic transition: the mayors of the Soeharto regime were allowed to finish their five year terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronised, this event generated exogenous variation on how long the agents of the old regime remained in their position and, hence, on the degree of control that they exerted during the democratic transition. The results suggest that districts that had an old-regime mayor for longer exhibit worse governance outcomes and tend to vote more for Soeharto's party. These effects persist several years after the old-regime mayors are no longer in office and are robust to controlling for subsequent political reforms. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to find ways to capture democracy in the medium and long run.

Martinez-Bravo Monica (CEMFI) An Empirical Investigation of the Legacies of Non-Democratic Regimes: The Case of Soeharto's Mayors in Indonesia - SALLE 8

Priya Mukherjee and Andreas Stegmann

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/11/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina, () SEANCE ANNULEE; () ;

La séance est annulée

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/10/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


Identifying the role of intrinsic, ideological motivation in political behavior is confounded by agents’ consequential aims and social concerns. We present an experimental methodology isolating Pakistani men’s intrinsic motives for expressing anti-American ideology in a context with clearly-specified financial costs, but negligible other consequential or social considerations. Fol- lowing a survey, we offer subjects a bonus payment. One-quarter of subjects forgo around one-fifth of a day’s wage to avoid anonymously checking a box indicating gratitude toward the U.S. government, revealing anti-Americanism. We find that even extremists moderate their political expression when the financial cost is high and when anticipating public expression.

BURSZTYN Leonardo () Identifying Ideology: Experimental Evidence on Anti-Americanism in Pakistan


Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 01/10/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Economics training is argued to result in less prosocial behavior. We investigate one possible explanatory mechanism -- analytical thinking. Using a unique subject pool of Muslims in China, we find that prosocial behavior is 10% less after engaging in analytical thinking. The effect is related to social distance; engaging in analytical thinking reduces prosocial behavior to outgroup members by 13%, but has a small and generally insignificant effect on ingroup members. We compare the results with the effects of religious thinking, which lead to more prosocial behavior towards outgroup members. Our results suggest that the two forms of prosocial behavior (ingroup and outgroup) are affected differently by analytical thought processes. That is, prosocial behavior towards outgroup members seems mainly driven by fast thinking processes in response to norms of behavior, whereas prosocial behavior towards ingroup members seems driven as well by slow thinking processes that uses analytical reasoning. These differences can be explained by competition between groups and the relative benefits and costs of prosocial behavior within and across groups when such competition exists.

MORTON Rebecca () Does Analytical Thinking Reduce Prosocial Behavior?

seminar co-organized with CEVIPOF

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 05/02/2015 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

ENIKOLOPOV Ruben (Institute of Political Economy and Governance - Barcelone) Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

co-author(s) : Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Georgy Egorov

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 04/12/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


This paper proposes a structural approach to the estimation of the effects of term limits. A structural approach also allows us to measure the welfare effects of different term limit lengths. We identify and quantify discipline and selection effects using U.S. gubernatorial elections data for 1950-2007. We find that the possibility of re-election provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection effect, though it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance.

DRAZEN Allan (U Maryland) Structural Estimation of the Effects of Term Limits

Co-autheur(s) : Boragan Aruoba and Razvan Vlaicu

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/11/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

DRACA Mirko ( University of Warwick) On Target? The Impact of Sanctions on Listed Firms in Iran

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/10/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

RASUL Imran (University College London) State-Building Through Compulsory Schooling: The Response of American States to Mass Migration in the Nineteenth Century

co-author(s) : Oriana Bandiera [LSE], Myra Mohnen UCL] and Martina Viarengo [Graduate Institute, Geneva]

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 02/10/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

PAPAIOANNOU Elias (London Business School) Federal Transfer Multipliers: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 25/09/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


This paper examines the effect of human capital on long-run development by exploiting variation from a State policy that attracted educated immigrants into state sponsored settlements during the era of mass migration in Brazil. We show that immediately after the establishment of settlements, the population living in these areas had higher educational levels than elsewhere in the state. At that moment, settlements were still similar to other areas, but for educational levels. In 1940 and 2000, after settlements had ceased to exist, populations living in these areas continued to be more educated. Local communities that developed from settlements used more educational inputs throughout the period and, over time, shifted occupations towards human capital intensive activities. In 2000, areas corresponding to previous settlements had income per capita 15% higher than the remainder of the state. The evidence indicates that the educational composition of immigrants persisted through time and led, in the long run, to higher levels of development.

FERRAZ Claudio (PUC Rio) Human Capital and Development: The Long-Term Legacy of State Sponsored Settlements in Brazil

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 19/06/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

GINE Xavier (World Bank) TBA

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 05/06/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper traces career transitions of federal and state U.S. banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae, and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door. We find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs, driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms. These worker flows are also driven by state-specific banking conditions as measured by local banks’ profitability, asset quality and failure rates. The regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time, with shorter regulatory spells for workers, and especially those with higher education. Evidence from cross-state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows into regulation and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during periods of intense enforcement, though gross outflows are significantly smaller in magnitude. These results appear inconsistent with a "quid-pro-quo" explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a "regulatory schooling" hypothesis.

TREBBI Francesco (U British Columbia) The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation

Co-author(s) : David Lucca (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) Amit Seru (University of Chicago and NBER)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/05/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper estimates the causal effect of a histori cal midwifery policy experiment on maternal deaths. Specifically, it exploits the geog raphical deployment of trained and licensed midwifes in the 19 th century in Sweden to estimate the reduced form eff ect of the midwifery policy. The estimated policy effect i s between 15-30 percent, i.e., a doubling of trained and licensed midwifes lead to a 15-30 percent reduction in maternal mortality. The reduced form policy effect can be re-scaled by the take-up rate of the policy in order to estimate the risk of dying in childbirth. The risk of dying in childbirth is estimated to be 80-90 percent lowe r if a trained and licensed midwife assisted the birth. The midwife training was only 6 -12 months. The results from this study may therefore inform the current debate of th e most effective strategy for reducing maternal mortality in the developing world .

PETTERSSON-LIDBOM Per (IIES Stockholm U) Midwifes and Maternal Mortality: Evidence from a Midwifery Policy Experiment in Sweden in the 19th Century

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 24/04/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

SNOWBERG Erik (CalTech) Overconfidence and Political Behavior

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 10/04/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Counterfeit and sub-standard antimalarial drugs present a growing threat to public health. We collect data from Uganda to study the mechanisms that determine drug quality in the retail market, and find that 37 percent of outlets studied sell fake drugs. Consumers are aware of the problem, although many of them appear to face difficulties inferring drug quality. Consistent with a simple experience good model, we find that consumers with commonly held biomedical misconceptions about malaria appear to be overly optimistic about quality, and that outlets are more likely to sell fake drugs in villages where such misconceptions are more prevalent. Furthermore, we exploit data from a field experiment to test how incumbent outlets and consumers react to the exogenous entry by an NGO selling authentic antimalarial drugs. The prediction is that such an entry will lead incumbent drugs stores to either exit the market for ACT drugs or switch to selling higher quality medicince. The experimental evidence is consistent with this hypothesis: the intervention decreased the share of stores selling fake drugs by more than 60 percent and the reputation of incumbent outlets among consumers increased. The entry effect on quality was significantly weaker in villages where misconceptions about malaria were more prevalent. Together, our results indicate that consumers are able to learn about quality, but that learning is hampered by consumers’ biomedical misconceptions about malaria. This in turn leads to overly optimistic beliefs about quality that sellers seemingly exploit by selling lower quality medicines.

SVENSSON Jakob (IIES Stockholm U) The Market for (Fake) Antimalarial Medicine: Evidence from Uganda

Co-author(s) : Martina Björkman-Nyqvist and David Yanagizawa-Drott

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 26/03/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

GROSJEAN Pauline (University of New South Wales, Australian School of Business) The Cultural Legacy of Too Many Men

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/03/2014 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

YANAGIZAWA-DROTT David (Harvard) Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter? Evidence from the McCain-Feingold Act

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 05/12/2013 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

ROHNER Dominic (Université de Lausanne) Coping with imported Violence : Evidence on Asylum Seekers, Crimes and Public Policy in Swiss Canton

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/11/2013 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


Does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution? We find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort, support more government redistribution, and tend to vote for left-wing parties. The effect of recessions on beliefs is long-lasting. We support our findings with evidence from three different datasets. First, we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional variation in macroeconomic conditions using data from the 1972–2010 General Social Survey. Our specifications control for nonlinear time-period, life-cycle, and cohort effects, as well as a host of background variables. Second, we rely on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 to corroborate the age-period-cohort specification and look at heterogeneous effects of experiencing a recession during early adulthood. Third, using data from the World Value Survey, we confirm our findings with a sample of 37 countries whose citizens experienced macroeconomic disasters at different points in history.

GIULIANO Paola (UCLA) Growing Up in a Recession

Co-author : Antonio SPILIMBERGO (International Monetary Fund)

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 24/10/2013 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


We study the economic effects of religious practices in the context of the observance of Ramadan fasting, one of the central tenets of Islam. To establish causality, we exploit variation in the length of the fasting period due to the rotating Islamic calendar. We report two key, quantitatively meaningful results: 1) longer Ramadan fasting has a negative effect on output growth in Muslim countries, and 2) it increases subjective well-being among Muslims. We then examine labor market outcomes, and ?nd that these results cannot be primarily explained by a direct reduction in labor productivity due to fasting. Instead, the evidence indicates that Ramadan affects Muslims’ relative preferences regarding work and religiosity, suggesting that the mechanism operates at least partly by changing beliefs and values that in?uence labor supply and occupational choices beyond the month of Ramadan itself. Together, our results indicate that religious practices can affect labor supply choices in ways that have negative implications for economic performance, but that nevertheless increase subjective well-being among followers.

CAMPANTE Filipe (Harvard Kennedy School) Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan

Co-author(s) : David Yanagizawa-Drott

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 17/10/2013 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

REYNAL-QUEROL Marta (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Development and Terrorism: a Disaggregate Analysis

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 26/09/2013 de 12:30:00 à 14:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


Why does group identity, such as ethnicity, become a salient element of electoral politics in some political systems but not others? We argue that inequality between groups plays an important role in answering this question: systems with the highest levels of group-based inequality should be the ones where identity is most salient to electoral competition. We test the argument using data from across the Indian states, finding that state-level party system ethnification is strongly correlated with economic inequality between groups in the states. We also find that when income differences between groups increase, the groups tend to support different parties. Thus, the analysis reveals a strong class component of identity politics in India, and it underlines the importance of disentangling the effect of group identity from that of economic well-being when studying identity politics.

HUBER John (Columbia University – Department of Political science) Ethnic inequality and the ethni?cation of political parties: Evidence from India


Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 26/06/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


n many developing countries, public sector absence is both common and resistant to reform. One explanation for this is that politicians provide public jobs with limited work requirements as patronage. We test this patronage hypothesis in Pakistan using: (i) a randomized controlled evaluation of a novel smartphone absence monitoring technology; (ii) data on election outcomes in the 240 constituencies where the experiment took place; (iii) attendance recorded during unannounced visits and; (iv) surveys of connections between local politicians and health staff . Four results support this view. First, while doctors are present at 42 percent of clinics in competitive constituencies, they are present at only 13 percent of clinics in uncompetitive constituencies. Second, doctors who know their local parliamentarian personally are present at an average of 0.727 of three unannounced visits, while doctors without this connection are present at 1.309 of the three visits. Third, the eff ect of the smartphone monitoring technology, which almost doubled inspection rates, is highly localized to competitive constituencies. Last, we fi nd evidence that program impact is in part due to the transmission of information to senior offi cers. We test this by manipulating the salience of sta absence in data presented to o cials using an online dashboard. These e ffects are also largest in politically competitive constituencies. Our results have implications for the study of bureaucratic incentives in fragile states and are potentially actionable for policymakers trying to build state capacity.

CALLEN Mike (UCSD and UCLA) The Political Economy of Public Employee Absence

Co-author(s) : Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, and Yasir Khan

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 13/06/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This study explores the consequences and origins of contemporary differences in well-being across ethnic groups within countries. We construct measures of ethnic inequality combining ethno-linguistic maps on the spatial distribution of groups with satellite images of light density at night. Ethnic inequality is strongly inversely related to per capita income; this pattern holds when we condition on the overall degree of spatial inequality – that is also associated with underdevelopment. We further show that differences in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands explain a sizable portion of contemporary ethnic inequality. This deeply-rooted inequality in geographic attributes across ethnic regions is also negatively related to comparative development. We also show that ethnic inequality goes in tandem with lower levels development within countries. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer surveys we show that individuals from the same ethnic group are worse off when they reside in districts with a high degree of ethnic inequality.

ALESINA Alberto (MIT) Ethnic Inequality

Co-author(s) : S. Michalopoulos and E. Papaioannu

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 30/05/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs to trusting investors. In this model, the size of the financial sector rises with aggregate wealth, and wealth grows relative to GDP. As a consequence, the ratio of financial income to GDP rises over time, even though fees for given financial services decline. Because the size of the financial sector fluctuates with changes in investor trust, the model can account for the sharp decline of finance in the Great Depression, as well as its slow recovery afterwards. Entry by financial intermediaries as wealth increased in recent years may have further deepened investor trust and encouraged growth of financial income.

SHLEIFER Andrei (Harvard) Finance and the Preservation of Wealth

Co-author(s) : N. Gennaioli and R. Vishny

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/05/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Government corruption is more prevalent in poor countries than in rich countries. This paper uses cross-industry heterogeneity in growth rates within Vietnam to test whether growth leads to lower corruption. We begin by developing a model of government officials' choice of how much bribe money to extract from firms that is based on the notion of inter-regional tax competition, and consider how officials' choices change as the economy grows. We show that economic growth decreases the rate of bribe extraction under plausible assumptions, with the benefit to officials of demanding a given share of revenue as bribes outweighed by the increased risk that firms will move elsewhere. This logic suggests that growth is less effective at reducing bribes if firms are immobile, for example because they lack property rights over their land. Our empirical analysis uses survey data collected from over 13,000 Vietnamese firms between 2006 and 2010 and an instrumental variables strategy based on industry growth in other provinces. We find that, indeed, faster--growing firms experience more rapid declines in bribe payments. Moreover, this pattern is particularly true for firms with strong land rights that could more easily relocate. Our results suggest that as poor countries grow, corruption could subside "on its own," and they demonstrate one type of positive feedback between economic growth and good institutions.

A. OLKEN Benjamin (MIT) Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam

Co-auteurs : Jie Bai, Seema Jayachandran and Edmund J. Malesky

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 25/04/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We propose a new method for measuring the relative ideological positions of newspapers, voters, interest groups, and political parties. The method uses data on ballot propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups take positions on these propositions, and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them. We find that, on average, newspapers in the U.S. are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states. Newspapers also tend to be centrist relative to interest groups. To complete the picture, we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions.

SNYDER Jim (Harvard University) The Balanced U.S. Press

Co-auteur : Riccardo Puglisi (Universita degli Studi di Pavia)

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 04/04/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


This paper formulates a general theory of how political unrest influences public policy. Political unrest is motivated by emotions. Individuals engage in protests if they are aggrieved and feel that they have been treated unfairly. This reaction is predictable because individuals have a consistent view of what is fair. This framework yields novel insights about the sources of political influence of different groups in society. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups have access to the same technology for political participation, equilibrium policy can be distorted. Individuals form their view of what is fair taking into account the current state of the world. If fewer aggregate resources are available, individuals accept a lower level of welfare. This resignation effect in turn induces a benevolent government to procrastinate unpleasant policy choices.

TABELLINI Guido (Bocconi) Emotions and Political Unrest

Co-auteur : Francesco Passarelli

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 21/03/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Is there a causal relationship between shocks to renewable natural resources, such as agricultural and forest lands, and the intensity of conflict? In this paper we conduct a rigorous econometric analysis of a civil conflict that the Indian Prime Minister has called the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by his country, the so called Maoist conflict. We focus on overtime within-district variation in the intensity of conflict in the states where this conflict is primarily located. Using a novel dataset of killings we find that adverse renewable resource shocks have a robust, significant association with the intensity of conflict. A one standard deviation decrease in our measure of renewable resources increases killings by 12.5% contemporaneously, 9.7% after a year, and 42.2% after two years. Our instrumental variables strategy allows us to interpret these findings in a causal manner.

SATYANATH Shanker (NYU) Renewable Resource Shocks and Conflict in India’s Maoist Belt


Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 24/01/2013 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


A single worker is assigned a stream of projects over time. We provide a tractable theoretical model in which the worker allocates her time among di?erent projects. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and the time it takes to complete each project grows. We call this phenomenon “task juggling,” and we argue that this phenomenon is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker e?ort. We then present an augmented model, in which task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or co-workers, each of whom seeks to get the worker to apply e?ort to his project ahead of the others’. We also study how the worker should be incentivized, when the worker can multitask across projects of di?erent complexity: We extend the model to allow for switching costs, where the worker forgets projects which are infrequently worked on. We also model environments, such as triage, where task juggling can in fact be optimal.

PERSICO Nicola (Kellogg School of Management) Time Allocation and Task Juggling

Co-auteurs : Decio Coviello & Andrea Ichino

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 06/12/2012 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10


This paper studies the causes of the largest famine in history, where approximately 30 million individuals died in rural China. We are motivated by the observation that average rural food retention during the famine seems too high to generate a famine without rural inequality in food availability. We document two novel facts. First, there is significant variance in famine mortality rates across rural regions. Second, these rural mortality rates are positively correlated with per capita food production, a surprising pattern that is unique to the famine years. This suggests that government redistributive policy contributed to the spatial variation in famine. To explain these results, we document that the historical grain procurement policy was inflexible – i.e., Chinese central planners had difficulty aggregating and responding to new information. We then argue that the inflexibility of the grain procurement policy together with the drop in production in 1959 can explain the observed variation in famine severity across rural areas.

QIAN Nancy (Yale University Department of Economics) The Institutional Causes of China’s Great Famine, 1959-1961

Co-auteur : Xin Meng and Pierre Yared

Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 22/11/2012 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

BURGESS Robin (LSE) The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya

Co-auteurs : Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, Gerard Padro i Miquel.

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 25/10/2012 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

BANDIERA Oriana (London School of Economics) Can basic entrepreneurship transform the economic lives of the poor?

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 14/06/2012 de 15:00:00 à 16:30:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


We provide evidence that increased political in?uence, arising from CIA interventions during the Cold War, was used to create a larger foreign market for American products. Following CIA interventions, imports from the US increased dramatically, while total exports to the US were unaffected. The surge in imports was concentrated in industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage, not a comparative advantage. Our analysis is able to rule out decreased trade costs, changing political ideology, and an increase in US loans and grants as alternative explanations. We provide evidence that the increased imports arose through direct purchases of American products by foreign governments.

NUNN Nathan (Harvard University) Commercial Imperialism? Political In?uence and Trade During the Cold War

Co-auteur : D. Berger, W. Easterly and S. Satyanath

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/03/2012 de 15:00:00 à 00:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8


Although the secret ballot has been secured as a legal matter in the United States, formal secrecy protections are not equivalent to convincing citizens that they may vote privately and without fear of reprisal. We present survey evidence that those who have not previously voted are particularly likely to voice doubts about the secrecy of the voting process. We then report results from a field experiment where we mailed information about protections of ballot secrecy to registered voters prior to the 2010 general election. Consistent with our survey data, we find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted. The increase in turnout of more than three percentage points for those without previous records of voting is notably larger than the effect of a standard get-out-the-vote mailing for this group. Overall, these results suggest that although the secret ballot is a long-standing institution in the United States, beliefs about this institution may not match the legal reality and that providing basic information about ballot secrecy can affect the decision to participate to an important degree.

GERBER Alan (Yale University) Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 16/01/2012 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

PEROTTI Roberto (Bocconi University) *

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 15/12/2011 de 15:00:00 à 00:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

GENTZKOW Matthew (Univ. of Chicago) Competition and Ideological Diversity : Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 17/11/2011 de 15:00:00 à 00:00:00

Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10

STROMBERG David (IIES, Stockholm) Determinants of Media - Capture in China

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Le 00/00/0000 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00

G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8

Bahar Dany (IIES, Stockholm) *

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