Calendrier du mois de mai 2018
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 31/05/2018 de 12:45 à 14:00
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WRIGHT Kelsey (PSE)
Rebel Capacity and Randomized Combat
écrit avec Konstantin Sonin and Jarnickae Wilson
Classic theories of counterinsurgency claim rebel forces execute attacks in an unpredictable manner to limit the government’s ability to anticipate and defend against them. We study a model of combat during an irregular insurgency, where the precision of attacks varies with the ability of insurgents to gather intelligence about the vulnerability of targets across time. We test empirical implications of the theoretical model using newly declassified military records from Afghanistan that track the within-day timing of insurgent attacks on security targets. We pair our conflict microdata with granular information on local opium production, yield heterogeneity, and farmgate prices, which enable us to estimate the quantity of annual taxes extracted from farmers and traffickers. Consistent with our model, we find that the capacity (wealth) of local rebel units influences the timing of their attacks. As rebels extract more resources, the timing of their operations deviates substantially from a random allocation of violence. We test additional empirical implications of our model using novel tactical and survey data on the Taliban's spy operations, rebel infiltration of the Afghan security forces, and latent public support for non-stated armed actors. These findings clarify how the accumulation of economic resources by armed groups influences not just when, but how civil wars are fought
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 31/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
KHOURY Laura (Paris School of Economics)
Unemployment Benefits and the Timing of Dismissals: Evidence from Bunching at a Notch in France
In this paper, I use administrative unemployment data to analyse bunching in the workers’ seniority distribution, at a notch created by an unemployment benefit schedule designed for workers laid-off for economic reasons. I exploit the discontinuity in the level of the budget set to estimate an elasticity of labour supply to unemployment benefits. I also investigate the possible channels of strategic behaviours in a context where the dismissal decision is the result of bargaining between employer, employee and representatives within the firm. I find evidence that significant bunching occurs at the relevant seniority threshold as a response to incentives created by the unemployment benefit scheme: employers and employees maximise joint surplus thanks to a third party’s - the State - transfer. I find that this bunching is concentrated in the population who has the most to gain and is the most able to implement strategic behaviours and to take advantage of unemployment compensation rules.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 31/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014, Paris
ERLANSON Albin (Stockholm School of Economics)
Costly Verification in Collective Decisions.
écrit avec Andreas Kleiner
We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when the information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information, but the principal can verify an agent’s information at a given cost. We exclude monetary transfers. When is it worthwhile for the principal to incur the cost and learn an agent’s information? We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. The evidence is verified whenever it is decisive for the principal’s decision. This mechanism can be implemented as a weighted majority voting rule, where agents are given additional weight if they provide evidence for their information. The evidence is verified whenever it is decisive for the principal’s decision. Additionally, we find a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms in this setting. Finally, we extend our analysis of optimal mechanisms to imperfect verification.
Behavior seminar
Du 31/05/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
FLEURBAEY Marc (PSE)
If you're an egalitarian, how come you're not a vegan?
écrit avec Martin Van der Linden (Utah State University)
Abstract
We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one
public good, the latter representing the welfare of other species. We show that it
is impossible for a social evaluator to be egalitarian with respect to humans and be
speciesist, in the sense of always respecting unanimous preferences among humans
(even when they imply harming other species). One solution is to only impose a respect
for unanimity among humans when it does not lead to a decrease in the welfare
of other species. Characterizing social preferences satisfying these properties reveals a
surprising link between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and
unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest
preferences for the welfare of other species.
Keywords: Welfare Economics, Animal Ethics, Egalitarianism, Eciency, Fairness.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 30/05/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
ALLEN T. (Dartmouth College)
The Geography of Path Dependence.
écrit avec Dave Donaldson (MIT).
How much of the distribution of economic activity today is determined by history rather than by geographic fundamentals? And if history matters, does it matter much? We develop an empirical framework that enables answers to these questions. Our model combines a workhorse model of trade subject to geographic frictions with an overlapping generations model of labor mobility also subject to spatial fractions. Both production and consumption potentially exhibit local agglomeration and congestion externalities. We derive parameter conditions, for arbitrary static and dynamic geographic scenarios, under which equilibrium transition paths are unique and yet steady states may nevertheless be non-unique — that is, where initial conditions (“history”) determine long-run steady-state outcomes (“path dependence”). We then estimate the model’s parameters (which govern the strength of agglomeration externalities and trade and migration frictions), by focusing on moment conditions that are robust to potential equilibrium multiplicity, using spatial variation across US counties from 1800 to the present. At these parameter estimates our simulations — based on randomly reassigning the geographical incidence of various shocks among members of similar regional clusters — imply the the long arm of history has only small consequences for the distortions caused by spatial path dependence.
Economic History Seminar
Du 30/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PIKETTY Thomas (EHESS-PSE)
Inégalité et conflit politico-idéologique. France, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis 1948-2017
Le séminaire sera donné en français et s'appuiera sur une recherche disponible en ligne à l'adresse http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 30/05/2018 de 09:00 à 19:00
CEPII, Room 5.107 , 113 rue de Grenelle 75007 Paris
écrit avec Organizers : Gianluca Orefice (CEPII) and Hillel Rapoport (PSE and CEPII)
Texte intégral
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 29/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan R1-13
LETROUIT Lucie (Université Gustave Eiffel)
How do social norms affect credence goods markets ? Theoretical and experimental analysis of joking relationships and land transactions in Mali
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 29/05/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R1-15, PSE Campus jourdan- 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
DIETRICH Franz (PSE, CNRS)
Comparing elite and citizen preferences for bypass or engage aid: evidence from survey experiments in US,UK, Germany and France
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 29/05/2018 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
OSSA R. (Zurich)
Accounting for the New Gains from Trade Liberalization
écrit avec Chang-Tai Hsieh University of Chicago and NBER, Nicholas Li University of Toronto, Mu-Jeung Yang University of Washington, Seattle
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 29/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BACH Maria (Lausanne)
From Saving Comes Having? Disentangling the Impact of Saving on Wealth Inequality
This paper investigates the channels through which saving flows impact the dynamics of wealth inequality. The analysis relies on an administrative panel that reports the assets and income of every Swedish resident at the yearly frequency. We document that the saving rate, defined as saving from labor income divided by net worth, is on average a decreasing function of net worth itself. The saving rate is also highly heterogeneous within net worth brackets. Heterogeneity across and within net worth brackets have conflicting effects on wealth inequality. As a result, saving rate heterogeneity is measured to have a strong impact on social mobility but only a weak impact on the distribution of net worth. Heterogeneity in wealth return is instead the main driver of the recent increase in top wealth shares.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 28/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FEINMESSER Itay (Johns Hopkins University)
The Market for Influence
Much of the content we consume comes from onlineresources. We read news on Facebook and Twitter and learn about new products and services from Instagram and blogs. This paper builds a parsimonious economic model that captures the interplay between contentcreators (or influencers), consumers (or followers), and firms (or marketers) in the provision of content on the internet, and in influencing economic activity in the market for goods. We derive a unique equilibrium with the following properties: First, high ability influencers post more sponsored content, and this adversely affects the experience of their followers. Still, high ability influencers deliver, in equilibrium, better experience then low ability ones. As a result, high ability influencers have more followers, and receive a higher per-post price. Surprisingly, the per-reader price that an influencer receives declines with her popularity, a result that is confirmed by marketing data. We uncover equilibrium inefficiencies that are exacerbated by search frictions in the market and analyze the recent recommendation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to apply “The FTC’s Endorsement Guides” to content created by individual influencers. Under a wide range of parameters, such policy may be detrimental to followers’ welfare and total surplus.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 28/05/2018 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Glenn (MIT)
A Model of Online Retail Recommendations
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 25/05/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
KNEBELMANN Justine (PSE)
Bringing property owners into the tax net: avenues of fiscal capacity. Experimental evidence from Dakar, Senegal
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 24/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GORELKINA Olga (University of Liverpool)
Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 24/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
SOCIETY OF ECONOMICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD Prenom ... (SEHO)
There is no regular seminar scheduled. See link below.
Economic History Seminar
Du 23/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SICSIC Michaël ()
L’apogée Pompidou: large firms and vocational training
The general and broad view about the Trente Glorieuses hides quite different periods between 1946 and
1973. Up to the mid sixties the very quick growth in France was then seen as a catch up relative to its own
trend before the thirties. Then the continuation along the same path came as a surprise. This paper is about
this period from around 1965 to 1973.
This short period (50 years ago) was new and different from the reconstruction because it was the beginning
of a long process of reduction in work time, of reduction in wages inequality, while there was a renewed
increase in industrial labor force. It was a time of concentration of large private firms with strong internal
training within those firms, in a particularly favorable macro environment for France.
The first section describes the impressive relative success of the French economy. The second section
addresses the macro environment, with focuses on public finances more than on the 1969 devaluation, and
the third section recall the evolving view of the best analysts from the mid sixties to the eighties about
French growth. The fourth section deals with the concentration of firms which is not interpreted as the result
of a dirigiste industrial policy but as private firms consolidating, helped by a legislative change in 1965
favorable to mergers and acquisitions. The fifth section attempts to shed some light on vocational continuing
training.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 22/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - R1-13
SARDOSCHAU Sulin()
JAROTSCHKIN Alexandra(PSE)
TBD
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 22/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PONTHIÈRE Grégory ()
Premature deaths, accidental bequests and fairness
écrit avec Marc Fleurbaey, Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau, Stephane Zuberk
While little agreement exists regarding the taxation of bequests in general, there is a widely held view that accidental bequests should be subject to a confiscatory tax. We propose to reexamine the optimal taxation of accidental bequests in an economy where individuals care about what they leave to their offspring in case of premature death. We show that, whereas the conventional 100 % tax view holds under the standard utilitarian social welfare criterion, it does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion, which assigns a strong weight to the welfare of unlucky short-lived individuals. From an egalitarian perspective, it is optimal not to tax, but to subsidize accidental bequests. We examine the robustness of those results in a dynamic OLG model of wealth accumulation, and show that, whereas the sign of the optimal tax on accidental bequests depends on the form of the joy of giving motive, it remains true that the 100 % tax view does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 18/05/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ZHUANG Maiting (PSE)
TV shows, social media and anti-Japanese sentiment in China
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 18/05/2018 de 11:00 à 12:30
PSE Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris Salle R1-16
RUEDA DAVID (University of Oxford)
Insurance and Redistribution: An Experiental Approach
Most distributive theories in political economy understand individuals to be motivated by material self-interest, often approximated by their current positions in the income distribution. It has become increasingly common, however, to also conceptualise material self-interest inter-temporally. This approach extends the more direct focus on effects of contemporary relative income (as in Romer 1975 and Meltzer and Richard 1981) and opens the door to arguments about insurance and risk (as in Sinn 1995; Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009; Mares 2003), and about social mobility and life-cycle profiles (Rueda and Stegmueller 2018; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Haider and Solon 2006; Benabou and Ok 2001). Distinguishing between redistribution (in the present) and insurance (against something that could happen in the future), however, is empirically challenging. In this paper, we propose that the effects of insurance motivations on support for redistribution are income dependent. We distinguish our argument from other theoretical alternatives and explore its implications through a laboratory experiment designed to separate the influence of redistribution, insurance and altruistic motivations that we conducted through the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) in the United Kingdom and Chile.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
IOVINO Luigi (Bocconi)
Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies without Rational Expectations
écrit avec Dmitriy Sergeyev
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE)
Consistency of Choice Correspondences: a Theoretical and an Empirical Study.
Experiments in economics generally elicit a choice function: for a given choice set, a decision maker chooses exactly one alternative. It is a restriction on most models of revealed preferences, that start with a choice correspondence: for a given choice set, a decision maker chooses a subset of alternatives. This paper explores the impact of this restriction on the formulation of revealed preferences axioms and on the consistency of observed behaviors. In order to do so, a new methodology is built to elicit a choice correspondence in an incentive compatible way, called pay-for-certainty. We introduce a new theoretical requirements, increasing chosen set that guarantees the elicitation of a proper choice correspondence with the pay-for-certainty methodology.
We implement the methodology in the laboratory and compare it to choice functions. 40.13% of observed choices are singletons and only 2.33% of subjects have single-peaked preferences. Increasing chosen set is verified by 60.47% of the subjects in the relevant case. 46.51% of all choices correspondences verify WARP whereas 58.82% of all choice functions do.
In a second step, we use the pay-for-certainty methodology to explore the completeness of preferences assumptions, a task impossible with choice functions. We assess degrees of incomplete preferences. A lower bound introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006) explains only 2.68% of observed behaviors. We characterized and upper bound. It is equivalent to the decision maker maximizing a strict partial preference. It explains 14.77% of observed behaviors. These results points to the relevance of observing choice correspondences instead of choice functions when a choice correspondence is needed to test a theory. .
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 17/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
DOYLE Joseph (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Measuring Physician Quality: Evidence from Physician Availability
Measuring physician quality is fundamental to understanding healthcare productivity, yet attempts to estimate the types of physicians that improve survival can be confounded due to patient sorting. This paper aims to overcome this endogeneity problem by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the mix of physicians available to treat the patient on the particular date of an inpatient admission. One innovation is the use of 100% Medicare claims data to characterize the mix of physicians available including specialty training, medical school quality rankings, patient volume, sex, and years of experience. When heart failure patients enter the hospital when more cardiologists are available, patients receive more intensive treatments and are more likely to survive at one year. The results speak to the debate over the value of treatment intensity and specialists in particular.
Behavior seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
ELLIS Randall (Department of Economics Boston University)
Provider Agency, Health Care Innovation, Pricing, and Regulations: (or How to Reduce Health Care Spending by 50 Percent)
Behavior Working Group
Du 17/05/2018 de 10:00 à 11:00
R2-20
CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po)
Do incentives conflict with fairness
Development Economics Seminar
Du 16/05/2018 de 13:30 à 15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
HJORT Jonas (Columbia Business School )
Ethnic Investing and the Value of Firms.
Economic History Seminar
Du 16/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1-07, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FELICE Emmanuele ()
The Roots of a Dual Equilibrium: GDP, Productivity and Structural Change in the Italian Regions in the Long-run (1871-2011)
The article presents updated estimates of GDP per capita, productivity and employment for Italy’s regions, at the NUTS II level and at current borders, for the whole economy and its three branches (agriculture, industry, services): they span 140 years in ten-year benchmarks (1871-2011). Sigma and beta convergence are tested for GDP per capita, productivity and employment-to-population. Four phases in the history of Italy’s regional inequality are identified, roughly coinciding with the different political eras of the country: mild divergence (the liberal age), strong divergence (the interwar years), general convergence (the golden age) and the “two-Italies” tale (1971-2011). In the first two phases we observe the formation of three macro-areas; in the last decades, we record convergence within the Centre-North and an increasing North/South polarization, with differences in employment becoming more important than those in productivity. This result is in line with a socio-institutional interpretation of the North/South divide.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 15/05/2018 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
DIX-CARNEIRO R. (Duke)
Trade and Informality in the Presence of Labor Market Frictions,
écrit avec P. Goldberg, C. Meghir and G. Ulyssea
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 15/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HENRY Emeric()
BARRERA Oscar()
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina(PSE)
GURIEV Sergei(Science Po)
Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of Post-Truth Politics
How persuasive are “alternative facts,” i.e., misleading or outright false statements
by populist politicians, in convincing voters? How effective is fact checking in countervailing
the alternative facts? We conduct a randomized online experiment to address
these questions in the context of the 2017 French presidential election campaign.
Marine Le Pen (MLP), the extreme-right candidate who reached the runoff, regularly
used misleading arguments in support of her policy proposals, to which mainstream
media responded with systematic fact checking. We expose randomly selected subgroups
of a sample of 2480 voting-age French to quotes from MLP containing misleading
information about immigration and/or to facts from official sources. We find that
alternative facts are highly persuasive: voters exposed to MLP rhetoric move their
policy conclusions and voting intensions toward MLP. Fact checking does nothing to
undo these effects despite improving factual knowledge of voters. In contrast, without
fact-checking, exposure to MLP’s quotes moves posteriors on facts toward more
extreme views away from the truth. Being exposed only to official facts increases
political support for MLP while moving factual knowledge toward the truth.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 14/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MUELLER-FRANK Manuel (IESE Barcelona)
Social Learning Equilibria
écrit avec With Elchanan Mossel, Allan Sly and Omer Tamuz
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish strong equilibrium properties on agreement, herding, and information aggregation.
Economic History Seminar
Du 09/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PALA Giovanni (Oxford)
Innovation encouragement in pre-unification Italy: the case of patents and industrial fairs, 1815-1860
The importance of patents of invention in influencing the direction of innovation and economic choices is increasingly supported in the literature, both theoretically and empirically. Their role as an instrument to deepen our understanding of specific industrial or macroeconomic dynamics is similarly well-established. The use of this tool applied to the nineteenth century European peripheral economies has been limited though, and in the Italian case discontinuous in either time or geographic scope. In fact, there are major geographic areas that are completely unexplored for the years of the Risorgimento (1815-1861). My research fills this gap and provides a new dataset that for the first time compares patent trends in the three kingdoms of Lombardy-Venetia, Sardinia and the Two Sicilies. Additionally, it proposes a study of the legislation and institutional debate in the Italian states using new archival sources. Three results emerge from the study. Firstly, evidence of an increasing confidence and final expansion in the use of patents to protect the traditional Risorgimento’s sectors of innovation. Secondly, that this expansion was fueled in a conspicuous way by foreign capital and foreign innovations, chiefly of French origin. Thirdly, that this was in part understood and tolerated by the administration and establishment of the time as part of a set of policies for the encouragement of inventiveness and growth in the peninsula, which included industrial fairs. These results confirm some of the received wisdom on the period and reassess the Italian dependency from and openness to foreign countries by placing its incipit firmly in the first half of the century. The results are particularly relevant for the debate on the nature and benefits of patenting, their use as tools for the acquisition of other countries’ knowledge, and the creation of incentives for foreign investments inflows. Further study of French investments in peripheral economies is warranted.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 08/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Jourdan - R1-13
ABDELNOUR ATALLAH Marian (PSE)
Skills and Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Evidence from the World Bank's STEP surveys
Du 08/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEBASIS Mishra (India Statistical Institute Dehli)
Selling to a naive agent with two rationales
A seller is selling an object to an agent who uses two rationales to compare pairs
of outcomes - (allocation probability, transfer) pairs. Each rationale is generated by
quasilinear preference over the outcome space, and hence, can be represented by a val-
uation. However, the agent faces a budget constraint when making decisions using the
rst rationale. The agent compares any pair of outcomes using his pair of valuations
in a lexicographic manner: rst, he compares using the valuation corresponding to the
rst rationale; then, he compares using the valuation corresponding to the second ra-
tionale if and only if the rst rationale cannot compare (due to budget constraint). We
show that the optimal mechanism is either a posted price mechanism or a mechanism
involving a pair of posted prices (a menu of three outcomes). In the latter case, the
optimal mechanism involves randomization and pools types in the middle.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 04/05/2018 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PINTO Gustavo (PUC-Rio)
Stay at home with Grandma, Mom is going to work
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 03/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BARSBAI Toman (University of Bristol)
From exodus to exitus: Selective emigration after Germany’s failed 1848 revolutions and the rise of the Nazi Party
écrit avec Hillel Rapoport
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 03/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GOSSNER Olivier (CNRS and X and LSE)
Dynamic Bank Runs.
We study a model of dynamic bank runs under private information. We characterize a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, discuss the informational and fundamental determinants of bank stability and compare outcomes in the dynamic model to its static counterpart.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 03/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
GOUSSé Marion (Laval University)
More or Less Unmarried. The Impact of Legal Settings of Cohabitation on Labor Market Outcomes
écrit avec Co-author: Marion Leturcq
We show how the legal settings of unmarried cohabitation affect partners' labor market outcomes. In Canada, cohabiting couples are automatically entitled to certain rights after a few years of cohabitation. In some provinces, ex-cohabiting partners can claim for alimony upon separation, in others they can claim for an equal split of all the assets acquired during the relationship. As legal settings of unmarried cohabitation differ across time, provinces and duration of the relationship, it provides a unique framework to analyze how different levels of commitment affect couples' decision regarding labor market supply. Using cross-provinces variation in the legal settings and minimum duration for eligibility, we show that unmarried cohabiting men increase their labor
force supply when they become eligible to a more committed cohabitation regime, whereas women decrease theirs. Higher levels of commitment induce larger effects on labor market outcomes.
Behavior seminar
Du 03/05/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
PRATI Alberto (University of Oxford, Wellbeing Research Centre)
Retrospective self-serving believes on dating events: an empirical study using subjective well-being data
Development Economics Seminar
Du 02/05/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
LEON Gianmarco (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE and IPEG)
Teacher Wages, Student Achievement and the Recruitment of Talent in Rural Peru
Economic History Seminar
Du 02/05/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HUBERMAN Michael (U.Montreal)
Domestic Barriers to Internal and International Trade: New Evidence for Brazil, 1920-1940