Archives du séminaire Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 01/07/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - Salle S3 - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 P
NIKIFORAKIS Nikos (Université de Melbourne) Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self?Enforcement
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 24/06/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - Salle S3 - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 P
NOUSSAIR Charles (Tilburg University) Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy
Commentaires d'Antoine D'autume et de Bertrand Wigniolle
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 17/06/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
OECHSSLER Jörg (Université de Heidelberg) Exploitation
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 10/06/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - Salle S2 - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 P
BRACHT Juergen (Université d'Aberdeen) Moral Emotions and Partnership
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 27/05/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
SCHMELZ Katrin (IMPRS, MPI of Economics, Jena ) Cultural Determinants of Reactions to Control: Evidence from a Large-Scale Internet Experiment
Co-auteur(s) : Anthony Ziegelmeyer
Texte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 13/05/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - Salle S2 - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 P
BOULU- RESHEF Beatrice (Université Lyon II) Cooperation and the Boundaries of the Firm: Theory and Evidence from a Framed-Field ExperimentTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 06/05/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
HARRISSON Glenn (Georgia State University) Discounting Behavior: A Reconsideration
Co-auteur(s) : Steffen Andersen, Morten Lau & E. Elisabet RutströmTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 29/04/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - Salle S2 - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013
In an experiment designed to test optimistic bias in a setting that minimizes confounds, subjects received an accuracy bonus for predicting the future price of a financial asset on the basis of historical prices. Subjects were also paid an unconditional award based on what the price would be: in one treatment group the award was increasing in the price, and in the other group it was decreasing in the price. Subjects in the two treatment groups therefore differed in what they wanted prices to be, but not in how their predictions affected their payoff. Consistent with optimistic bias, subjects in the first treatment group predicted higher prices than subjects in the second group. The statistically measurable comparative statics are that the bias is greater in price charts with more subjective uncertainty, but appears not to decrease with the size of the accuracy bonus. In particular, the hypothesis that the bias is inversely proportional to the accuracy bonus can be rejected. This result suggests that optimism is a non-strategic judgment bias, rather than the result of an optimisation process.
MAYRAZ Guy (Nuffield College) Self-serving beliefs in estimating market prices
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 08/04/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Salle S2- Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Pa
LUSK Jason (Oklahoma State University) Selfishness, Altruism, and Inequality Aversion towards Consumers and Farmers
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 01/04/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
SCHMIDT Ulrich (Leibniz Universität) *; () ;
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 25/03/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital (salle S2) - 75013 P
RUSTICHINI Aldo (University of Minnesota) Personality Theory and Decision theory: an Experimental approach
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 24/03/2011 de 15:00:00 à 15:30:00
ENS - Salle Paul Langevin - 29 rue d'Ulm - Paris 5ème
RUSTICHINI Aldo (University of Minnesota) Causes of social reward differences encoded in human brain
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 18/03/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
Loss aversion describes the widespread behavioral avoidance of choices that can lead to losses, even when accompanied by equal or much larger gains. Loss aversion has been well documented in the laboratory and in many field settings, including high-stakes gameshow decisions, financial markets, politics, trade policy for declining industries and rate of organ donation for transplant cases, and it has also been evident in monkey behavior. But what drives loss-averse behavior, and what neural structures mediate the effect? Furthermore, are the value-signals computed in the brain reference-dependent? And how can these signals affect the individual response to financial incentive? In this talk I will present a series of studies that address these questions combining different tools such as fMRI, functional connectivity analysis, brain lesions and genetics. Finally, I will discuss how a deeper understanding of the neural mechanisms can inform economics theories and help to design more efficient policies.
DE MARTINO Benedetto (University College of London) The Neurobiology of Loss Aversion
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 11/03/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
ALDASHEV Gani (University of Namur and ECARES, ULB) How (Not) to Decide: Procedural Games
Co-auteur(s) : Georg Kirchsteiger & Alexander SebaldTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 04/03/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - salle S2 (dans le nouveau bâtiment) 106-112 Bd de l'Hô
Standard economic analysis assumes that preferences are independent of markets. However, there is evidence suggesting that price information can influence preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that markets do not simply allow agents to reveal their preferences, but actually help to shape them. Using a demand-revealing market institution, we find strong support for this shaping hypothesis. Monetary valuations are significantly affected by price feedback and divergent price expectations. These effects are not entirely eliminated by further market experience. Our results suggest that preferences may be characterised by considerable imprecision and may be influenced by market prices in predictable ways.
ISONI Andrea (University of Warwick) Do markets reveal preferences - or shape them?
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 04/02/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE - Paris I - 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital - 75013 Paris
In two studies, we explore whether and to what extent pregnancy and child-bearing changes individual attitudes towards risk. In the first study, we elicit risk attitudes in the group of pregnant women as well as mothers with young children. We find that women who expect/have girls tend to be statically significantly more risk averse than women who expect/have boys. This effect is much stronger in the group of pregnant women compared with mothers. In the second study, we elicit risk attitudes in three groups: pregnant women, women with young children and women who are not pregnant and do not have children (control group). Women in all three groups are relatively homogeneous in terms of age. We use two risk attitude elicitation methods: a context-free Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and a context-dependent revised DoSpeRT scale (Blais and Weber, 2006). We find that pregnant women and women with young children report higher rates of risk aversion than the control group according to the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. Results obtained via the DoSpeRT scale show that women in all three groups exhibit similar risk attitudes in some risk domains (e.g., Ethical and Social domain) but significantly differ in other domains (e.g., Health/Safety domain). Several possible explanations of observed behavior are discussed.
POGREBNA Ganna (University of Warwick) The Effect of Pregnancy and Child-bearing on Attitudes towards Risk
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 21/01/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
ABELER Johannes (University of Nottingham) Fungibility, Labels, and Consumption
Co-auteur(s) : Felix MarkleinTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 14/01/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
ZIEGELMEYER Michael (Mannheim University ) Who lost the most? Financial Literacy, Cognitive Abilities, and the Financial Crisis
Co-auteur(s) : Tabea Bucher-KoenenTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 07/01/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
BLEICHRODT Han (Erasmus School of Economics) Is There One Unifying Concept of Utility? An Experimental Comparison of Utility under Risk and Utility over Time
Co-auteur(s) : Mohammed Abdellaoui, Olivier L'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv Texte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 10/12/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
GALBIATI Roberto (CEPREMAP) Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment
Co-auteur(s) : Karl Schlagz & Joël van der WeeleTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 26/11/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:30:00
We evaluate the effects on crime of a localized policing experiment that decriminalized cannabis possession in the London borough of Lambeth between 2001 and 2002. We find that decriminalization led to a surge in drug related offences, and a collapse in arrest and clear-up rates for drug related crimes in Lambeth. These effects are quantitatively large and persist well after the policy experiment ends. However, the policy does allow the Lambeth police to reallocate their effort towards non-drug related crimes, leading to permanent reductions in nearly all other crime types. We also find the policy to have spillovers onto boroughs neighboring Lambeth. As drug consumers and suppliers relocate to Lambeth after decriminalization, drug crime rates significantly fall in neighbors to Lambeth. To understand the benefits of coordinating drugs policies across jurisdictions, we compare these results to the effects on crime of the nationwide decriminalization of cannabis in the UK from 2004 to 2009. We find that nationwide decriminalization does not lead to a growth in drugs related crime, but does allow the police to reallocate effort towards non-drug related crime. We interpret the results through a Hotelling-style model that makes precise the behavioral response to decriminalization of the police, suppliers and demanders of drugs.
RASUL Imran (University College London) Crime and the Decriminalization of Cannabis: Evidence From a Localized Policing Experiment
Co-auteur(s) : J. Adda & B. McConnell
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 19/11/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
Proper scoring rules constitute one of the most beautiful ideas in decision theory: they provide a tool to read the minds of people, eliciting exactly what their subjective beliefs are in ways more interesting and cheaper than modern neuro-studies can deliver. They can be used, for instance, to grade students way more efficiently than mostly done today. Proper scoring rules were invented by Brier (1950) so as to calibrate weather forecasters, and by de Finetti (1962) so as to justify the use of subjective probabilities. They have recently become popular in experimental economics, where they are widely used to measure beliefs about strategy choices of opponents. Strangely enough, all applications today are still based on the central risk theory of the 1950s, being expected value, and virtually no update of the technique has been considered in the literature. We introduce one by one the new developments in decision under risk since the 1950s, showing each time how proper scoring rules can be modified to account for the new developments. We thus end up with an adaptation of proper scoring rules to the current state of the art in decision under uncertainty with modern "nonexpected utility" theories such as prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky. The adaptation was implemented in an experiment with N=62 subjects.
WAKKER Peter (Erasmus University, Rotterdam and Maastricht University) An Efficient Way to Grade Students, to Measure Subjective Degrees of Beliefs, and to Obtain Neuro-Imaging Data for Free, Based on Modern Theories of Behavior under Risk and Ambiguity
co-auteur(s) : Graham LOOMESTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 12/11/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
BOYCE Chris (PSE) Can individual heterogeneity be ignored? How personality measures can be used to understand economic behaviour and well-being
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 05/11/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
CALVO PARDO Hector (University of Southampton ) Household Stock Market Expectations and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from France
Co-auteur(s) : Luc Arrondel, Xisco Oliver & Derya Tas Texte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 29/10/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
In three binary choice problems people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory as well as many generalized non-expected utility theories such as rank-dependent utility theory, (original) prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, disappointment aversion theory, Yaari's dual model, prospective reference theory, modified mean-variance approach, subjective expected value model, subjectively weighted utility theory etc. The new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected utility theory. The paper presents experimental evidence of the new paradox both on the aggregate and individual level. Decision theories compatible with the new paradox are briefly discussed.
BLAVATSKY Pavlo (University of Innsbruck ) Troika Paradox
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 22/10/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
GOETTE Lorenz (University of Lausanne ) Overcondence is a Social Signaling Bias; () ; Co-auteur(s) : Stephen V. Burks, Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Aldo Rustichini
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 15/10/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
YAMADA Katsunori (Osaka University ) The Easterlin Paradox and Another Anatomy of Income Comparisons: Evidence from Hypothetical Choice Experiments
Co-auteur(s) : Masayuki SatoTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 08/10/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
Reference points are a cornerstone of prospect theory. They determine what decision makers consider as gains and losses. Little is known about how reference points are formed. This paper will shed light on this question. In an experiment with real monetary incentives and large stakes (the maximum outcome being a weekly salary), we elicited preferences over 70 prospects for 139 subjects. We considered several theories of how reference points are formed and measured individual-specific prospect theory parameters using hierarchical Bayesian modeling. Furthermore, we compared the predictive power of the considered reference points.
BAILLON Aurélien (Erasmus University Rotterdam ) What is the reference point in prospect theory?
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 01/10/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
CORAZZINI Luca (Universita Bocconi ) Do Danes and Italians Rate Life Satisfaction in the Same Way? Using Vignettes to Correct for Individual-Specific Scale Biases
Co-auteur(s) : Viola Angelini, Danilo Cavapozzi & Omar Paccagnella
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 24/09/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
SCHMIDT Ulrich (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre) Testing Independence Conditions in the Presence of Errors and Splitting Effects; () ; Co-auteur(s) : Michael H. Birnbauma & Miriam D. Schneiderb
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 17/09/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
VIEIDER Ferdinand (Ludwig-Maximilians-University) Reigning in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives: Experimental Evidence; () ; Co-auteur(s) : Mathieu Lefebvre
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 02/07/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
COFFMAN Lucas (Harvard Universty) The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Favelas
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 28/06/2010 de 17:00:00 à 18:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
NIEDERLE Nuriele (Stanford University) Self-serving beliefs
SEMINAIRE EXCEPTIONNEL
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 25/06/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S2 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
WILLIS Bob (University of Michigan) Stock market crash and expectations of American households
Co-auteur(s) : Peter Hudomiet & Gabor Kezdi
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 18/06/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
FLEURBAEY Marc (CNRS & University Paris-Descartes) *
CHANGEMENT : séance annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 11/06/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict, the future strategic positions of adversaries are very di..erent when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. Then, we show that as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We discuss the applicability of this finding in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.
JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D01, D74.
Keywords: conflict, litigation, property rights, folk theorem.
MACBRIDE Michael (University of California) Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future
Co-auteur(s) : Stergios Skaperdas
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 04/06/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
CHRISTAKIS Nicolas (Harvard University) *
LA SEANCE EST ANNULEE
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 28/05/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
ARRONDEL Luc (PSE) French savers in teh economic crisis (May 2007-June 2009): what has changed?
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 21/05/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
, () workshop experimental economics
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 14/05/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
DOHMEN Thomas (Maastricht University) The Effect of Cognitive Skills on Unemployment Duration
Co-auteur(s) : Armin Falk, David Huffman, Simon Jaeger & Uwe Sunde
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 07/05/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE) Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 16/04/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
CELSE Jeremy (LAMETA, Université Montpellier) Will Joe the Plumber Envy Bill GatesTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 09/04/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques
, () *; () ;
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 02/04/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
CASON Timothy (Purdue University) Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assigment Game
Co-auteur(s) : Sau-Him Paul Lau & Vai-Lam Mui
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 26/03/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
CAPLIN Andrew (New York University) Dopamine and Reward Prediction Error
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 19/03/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
PESSIGLIONE Mathias (MBB, CRICM, INSERM, UPMC, Hopital Pitié-Salpêtrière) Inscription cérébrale des motivations
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 12/03/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
MSE, salle S3 (rez-de-chaussée, nouveau bâtiment)
ETILE Fabrice (PSE) Happy Houses?
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 19/02/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
, ()
PAS DE SEMINAIRE
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 12/02/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
This paper asks whether the gap in subjective happiness between spouses matters per se, i.e. whether it predicts divorce. We use three panel databases to explore this question. Controlling for the level of life satisfaction of spouses, we find that a higher satisfaction gap, even in the first year of marriage, increases the likelihood of a future separation. We interpret this as the effect of comparisons of well-being between spouses, i.e. aversion to unequal sharing of well-being inside couples. To our knowledge, this effect has never been taken into account by existing economic models of the household. The relation between happiness gaps and divorce may be due to the fact that couples which are unable to transfer utility are more at risk than others. It may also be the case that assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline-level reduces the risk of separation. However, we show that assortative mating is not the end of the story. First, our results hold in fixed-effects estimates that take away the effect of the initial quality of the match between spouses: fixed-effects estimates suggest that a widening of the happiness gap over time raises the risk of separation. Second, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness gaps: couples are more likely to break-up when the difference in life satisfaction is unfavourable to the wife. The information available in the Australian survey reveals that divorces are indeed predominantly initiated by women, and importantly, by women who are unhappier than their husband. Hence, happiness gaps seem to matter to spouses, not only because they reflect a mismatch in terms of baseline happiness, but because they matter as such.
Keywords: divorce, happiness, comparisons, panel, households, marriage.
JEL codes: J12, D13, D63, D64, H31, I31, Z13
SENIK Claudia (PSE) You Can’t be Happier than your Wife. Happiness Gaps and Divorce
Co-auteur(s) : Cahit Guven & Holger Stichnoth
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 05/02/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
sychological skills impact performance. This suggests that when analyzing behavior, in addition to cognitive abilities and effort, one should also take into account, for instance, the pressure agents might face when making their decisions. Existing literature has provided important evidence suggesting that even highly qualifed agents may perform worse when the stakes are very high or when they confront unusually high pressure. In this paper we study the degree of heterogeneity in agents' reactions to pressure. More precisely, we identify relative critical abilities with which professional tennis players' performance responds to the importance of a point. Adopting a natural definition of importance, the scoring rules of tennis generate significant variation in point importance. Using data from 12 years of the US Open tournament, we estimate the critical abilities for players in the tournaments controlling for serving and returning strengths. We then show that there is significant heterogeneity in critical abilities across players. Moreover, looking at professional rankings we find that this critical ability has a substantial impact on a player's career. These results suggest that when analyzing human behavior, beyond accounting for the fact that pressure may affect performance, it is also important to recognize that this effect may depend on the idiosyncrasies of each agent.
GOSSNER Olivier (PSE) Performing Best when it Matters Most: Evidence from professional tennis
Co-auteur(s) : Julio Gonzalez-Diaz & Brian W. RogersTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 29/01/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
IRIBERRI Nagore (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Relative Performance Feedback Information and Happiness
Co-auteur(s) : Ghazala Azmat
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 22/01/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
When only group performance is observable, incentives depend on the distribution of payments between group members. This distribution differs between firms. In this paper, we analyze whether the coexistence of various group performance-based payment schemes on the labor market can be related to agents' heterogeneity. We test by a laboratory experiment whether agents self-select between a competitive and a revenue-sharing payment scheme. The theory predicts a sorting of agents based on their preferences and an increase of the efficiency when the payment schemes are freely chosen by agents. Data confirm the predictions. Low inequity averse agents self-select into the competitive scheme and they are more likely to choose it if their risk aversion is low. The efficiency is increasing when the payment schemes are freely chosen. The results go in favor of a exible labor market that leads to a better matching between compensation schemes and agents' preferences.
JEL classification: C92, D03, J33, M52.
Keywords: performance pay, incentives, self-selection, inequity aversion, competition, revenue-sharing.
TEYSSIER Sabrina (INRA, ALISS) Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive ContractsTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 15/01/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
This paper studies selection rules, i.e. the procedures by which a committee chooses the issues to include on its agenda. The main ingredient of the model is that committee members are uncertain about their final preferences at the selection stage: they only know the probability that they will eventually prefer the proposal to the status quo. This probability is private information. Surprisingly, the more stringent the voting rule at the selection stage, the less voters are inclined to select an issue. The driving force is that when an agent conditions on being pivotal for selection, stiffening the selection rule causes an increase of the relative likelihood that the proposal will eventually pass when she prefers the status quo, compared to when she doesn't. The voting rule in the final stage has the opposite effect. Experiments with committees of nine members playing repeatedly indicate that players' strategies are consistent with these results, possibly after some learning.
GODEFROY Raphael (PSE) Issue Selection in Committees: Theory and Experiment
Co-auteur(s) : Eduardo Perez
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 08/01/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
Social status can affect charitable giving both exogenously and endogenously. Exogenously, individuals may change their giving behavior as a result of being endowed with status. Endogenously, status-seeking individuals may give to charity to gain status. We conduct a charitable donation experiment that disentangles the two by varying (a) the social visibility of pre-donation performance and (b) the social visibility of the donation. Performance-visibility exogenously increases status of high-performers while decreasing it for low-performers, whereas donation-visibility enables individuals to endogenously gain status through their contributions. We find that exogenous status significantly increases donations among high performers. By contrast, our evidence of endogenous status-seeking behavior is at best weak.
HEFFETZ Ori (Cornell University) Charitable Giving: The Effects of Exogenous and Endogenous Status
Co-auteur(s) : Anat Bracha & Lise Vesterlund
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 18/12/2009 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
CLARK Andrew (PSE) *; () ;
La séance est annulée
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 11/12/2009 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
This paper analyses whether individuals are influenced by the day of the week when reporting subjective well-being. By using a large panel data set and controlling for observed and unobserved individual characteristics, we find a large day-of the-week effect. Overall, we find a ‘blue’ Sunday effect with the lowest level of subjective well-being. The day-of-the-week effect differs with certain socio-economic and demographic factors such as employment, marital status and age. The paper concludes with recommendations for future analyses of subjective well-being data and design of data collections.
JEL Classification: C23, D60, I31
Keywords: subjective well-being, day-of-the-week effect
AKAY Alpaslan (IZA) Sundays are blue: are not they? The Day of the Week Effect on Subjective Well-Being and Socio-Economic Status
Co-auteur(s) : Peter MartinssonTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 04/12/2009 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00
, ()
No seminar because conference on the economics of obesity at PSE
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 27/11/2009 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers state their first-order beliefs about their opponent’s choice, and second-order beliefs about the opponent’s first order belief. We find that teams play Nash-strategies significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best reply to first order beliefs, something which teams also expect more often from their opponents. Using a maximum-likelihood error-rate model we find that teams can be classified as playing strategically in 62% of cases, while a majority of individuals (60%) plays non-strategically.
JEL-classification: C72, C91, C92
Keywords: Strategic thinking, beliefs, experiment, team decision making, individual decision making
SUTTER Matthias (University of Innsbruck) Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Co-auteur(s) : Simon Czermak & Francesco FeriTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 20/11/2009 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
Simple exchange experiments have identified the fact that participants trade their endowment less frequently than standard demand theory predicts. List (2003) finds, however, that the most experienced dealers acting on a well functioning market are not subject to this “endowment effect”. Thus, it seems that a lot of market experience is needed to overcome the “endowment effect”. In order to understand the effect of market experience, we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty, choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty, which could both lead to an “endowment effect”. While List’s own explanation is related to choice uncertainty, we conjecture that trade uncertainty is important for the “endowment effect”. To test this conjecture, we design a simple experiment where the two treatments impact differently on trade uncertainty, while controlling for choice uncertainty. Supporting our conjecture, we find that “forcing” subjects to give away their endowment in a series of exchanges, eliminates the “endowment effect” in a subsequent test. We discuss why markets might not succeed in providing sufficient incentives for learning to overcome the “endowment effect”.
JEL Classification: C91, D12
Keywords: endowment effect, robustness, experimental economics
HOLLARD Guillaume (PSE) A shock therapy against the endowment effect
Co-auteur(s) : Dirk EngelmannTexte intégral
Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie
Le 13/11/2009 de 10:00:00 à 11:30:00
In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a significant effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is apparent in OLS analyses.
WEIZSACKER Georg (LSE) Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instumental variables to estimate the causal effect